person claiming privilege in Ohio

2004"In a qualified privilege case, `actual malice' is defined as acting with knowledge that the statements are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity." Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 111 , 116 .

1999Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 111 , 114 .

2024If the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee, the second part of the analysis is to determine whether that person was acting within the scope of employment when the cause of action arose.” Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, 2011-Ohio-3375, ¶ 6 , citing Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-6208 , ¶ 14.

2012“If the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee, the second part of the analysis is to determine whether that person was acting within the scope of employment when the cause of action arose.” Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, 130 Ohio St.3d 263 , 2011-Ohio-3375, ¶ 6 , citing Theobald, supra. {¶ 7} For purposes of R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) ‘officer or employee’ must be defined in accordance with R.C. 109.36(A).

2022State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 191 , 503 N.E.2d 147 (1986).

2022State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 191 , 503 N.E.2d 147 (1986).

2019Verhovec v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 334, 337 , 691 N.E.2d 282 (1998), quoting Tedeschi v. Grover, 39 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 529 N.E.2d 480 (10th Dist.1988). {¶56} The Eighth District Court of Appeals observed: The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination might be a shield in criminal cases, but in civil cases it can be a sword turned against the person claiming the privilege.

2019Verhovec v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 334, 337 , 691 N.E.2d 282 (1998), quoting Tedeschi v. Grover, 39 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 529 N.E.2d 480 (10th Dist.1988). {¶56} The Eighth District Court of Appeals observed: The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination might be a shield in criminal cases, but in civil cases it can be a sword turned against the person claiming the privilege.

2019Verhovec v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 334, 337 , 691 N.E.2d 282 (1998), quoting Tedeschi v. Grover, 39 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 529 N.E.2d 480 (10th Dist.1988). {¶56} The Eighth District Court of Appeals observed: The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination might be a shield in criminal cases, but in civil cases it can be a sword turned against the person claiming the privilege.

2019Verhovec v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 334, 337 , 691 N.E.2d 282 (1998), quoting Tedeschi v. Grover, 39 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 529 N.E.2d 480 (10th Dist.1988). {¶56} The Eighth District Court of Appeals observed: The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination might be a shield in criminal cases, but in civil cases it can be a sword turned against the person claiming the privilege.

2014When waiver in this form is found in cases of inadvertent disclosure, it is in order to “punish the person claiming the privilege for a mistake * * *.” Id.

2006When waiver in this form is found in cases of inadvertent disclosure, it is in order to "punish the person claiming the privilege for a mistake * * *." Id. {¶ 15} After weighing the sum of the authorities addressing the question of inadvertent disclosure of privileged information, we find that the middle ground, case-by-case approach is best suited to serve both the interests of justice and the encouragement of disciplined and effective discovery proceedings in the trial courts.

2012“If the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee, the second part of the analysis is to determine whether that person was acting within the scope of employment when the cause of action arose.” Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, 130 Ohio St.3d 263 , 2011-Ohio-3375, ¶ 6 , citing Theobald, supra. {¶ 7} For purposes of R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) ‘officer or employee’ must be defined in accordance with R.C. 109.36(A).

2011Id.

1998"Delay itself does not give rise to the defense of laches, and in order to invoke the doctrine it must be shown that the person claiming the defense has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting the claim." Wise v. Wise (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 702 , 705 , citing Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34 , 35-36 ; Smith v. Smith (1957), 107 Ohio App. 440 , 443-444 .

1993Id.

2024May 21, 1998), citing Tschantz v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio App. 3d 9 (10th Dist.1989). {¶13} With respect to the first prong of the two-part analysis discussed in Engel (i.e., whether the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee), the Ohio Supreme Court has “stress[ed] that in most circumstances a person’s status as a state employee is factually indisputable.” Engel at ¶ 10 .

2001An "evidentiary ruling by a trial court may not be the basis of a claim of error unless the person claiming that error can establish that a substantial right has been affected * * *." Woodfork v. Jones (Feb. 21, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 15841, unreported, at p. 4, citing Campbell v. Johnson (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 543 , 550 .

1998"Delay itself does not give rise to the defense of laches, and in order to invoke the doctrine it must be shown that the person claiming the defense has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting the claim." Wise v. Wise (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 702 , 705 , citing Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34 , 35-36 ; Smith v. Smith (1957), 107 Ohio App. 440 , 443-444 .

1998"Delay itself does not give rise to the defense of laches, and in order to invoke the doctrine it must be shown that the person claiming the defense has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting the claim." Wise v. Wise (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 702 , 705 , citing Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34 , 35-36 ; Smith v. Smith (1957), 107 Ohio App. 440 , 443-444 .