scintilla rule in Ohio

1962This proposition is well established by authoritative decisions. *504 In Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St., 469 , the Supreme Court, when abolishing the scintilla rule in Ohio, said, as appears in paragraph four of the syllabus: “4.

1959In Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St., 469 , 189 N. E., 246 , the scintilla rule was abolished and it was established, inter alia, that on a motion for a directed verdict, the one against whom the motion is made is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor, and that where upon such evidence reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon any question of fact such question of fact is for the jury and the test is not whether the trial judge would set aside the verdict on the weight of the evidence.

1955Marys Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, Admr. (1926), 114 Ohio St. 423 , 151 N.E. 323 , the court still recognized the scintilla rule but sustained the direction of a verdict for the defendant, in effect applying the Lubric Oil case principle.

1955Marys Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, Admr. (1926), 114 Ohio St. 423 , 151 N.E. 323 , the court still recognized the scintilla rule but sustained the direction of a verdict for the defendant, in effect applying the Lubric Oil case principle.

1955The second paragraph of the syllabus in Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton (1928), 118 Ohio St. 106 , 160 N.E. 629 , states: "When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fair minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such proof sustains." In Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St. 167 , 160 N.E. 683 , without mentioning the scintilla rule, the court says: "The conclusion, therefore, of the tri

1955The second paragraph of the syllabus in Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton (1928), 118 Ohio St. 106 , 160 N.E. 629 , states: "When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fair minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such proof sustains." In Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St. 167 , 160 N.E. 683 , without mentioning the scintilla rule, the court says: "The conclusion, therefore, of the tri

1955The second paragraph of the syllabus in Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton (1928), 118 Ohio St. 106 , 160 N.E. 629 , states: "When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fair minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such proof sustains." In Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St. 167 , 160 N.E. 683 , without mentioning the scintilla rule, the court says: "The conclusion, therefore, of the tri

1955The second paragraph of the syllabus in Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton (1928), 118 Ohio St. 106 , 160 N.E. 629 , states: "When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fair minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such proof sustains." In Painesville Utopia Theatre Co. v. Lautermilch, 118 Ohio St. 167 , 160 N.E. 683 , without mentioning the scintilla rule, the court says: "The conclusion, therefore, of the tri

1947This is exemplified in Westfall v. Notman, 53 Ohio App., 314 , 4 N. E. (2d), 932, to which appellees likewise direct our attention.

1931Even so, the language of the courts in three of the cases, Knapp v Jones, 50 Neb., 430 ; Peake v. Buell, 90 Wis., 580 ; and Murphy v. Jordan, 151 Mass., 121 , clearly discloses that upon the the test of the scintilla rule contributory negligence was suggested in the situations presented, all of which were analagous to the occurrences in the instant case.' We recognize that the scintilla rule is in effect in Ohio, and that it is the obligation of the trial court at all times to accept it without modification and to submit to the jury any question of fact which is within its province to determin

1931Even so, the language of the courts in three of the cases, Knapp v Jones, 50 Neb., 430 ; Peake v. Buell, 90 Wis., 580 ; and Murphy v. Jordan, 151 Mass., 121 , clearly discloses that upon the the test of the scintilla rule contributory negligence was suggested in the situations presented, all of which were analagous to the occurrences in the instant case.' We recognize that the scintilla rule is in effect in Ohio, and that it is the obligation of the trial court at all times to accept it without modification and to submit to the jury any question of fact which is within its province to determin

1929The first syllabus of Babbitt v. Say, Admr., 120 Ohio St., 177 , 165 N. E., 721 , is in point.

1929The first syllabus of Babbitt v. Say, Admr., 120 Ohio St., 177 , 165 N. E., 721 , is in point.

1925Bag Co. v. Jaite, OS. 455; 3 Abs. 330 . 2.

1916If the jury shall err, the trial judge may thereafter correct the error; and if he fail to correct it, the higher courts are still available.” There is a clear distinction between the scintilla rule as applied in Ohio and the federal rule as found in Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall., 116 .

1905See Thompson’s Commentaries on Negligence, Section 4041; McGuire v. New York & Harlem Railroad Company, supra; Ingham on Animals, 385.