Village motion in Ohio

2012Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). {¶7} In Schmidt’s first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

2012Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). {¶7} In Schmidt’s first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

2008Comm. Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242 , syllabus. *Page 3 {¶ 7} The trial court granted the Village's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the employment contract was never certified by the Village's fiscal officer, as required by R.C. 5705.41 (D)(1).

2007Comm. Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242 , syllabus. {¶ 7} The trial court granted the Village's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the employment contract was never certified by the Village's fiscal officer, as *Page 3 required by R.C. 5705.41 (D)(1).

2026Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293 , quoting Civ.R. 56(E).

2025The trial court cited the holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio that, “it is well established that in the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary, once a decision of an administrative board is appealed to the court, the board is divested of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, vacate, or modify that decision.” Baltimore Ravens, Inc., v. Self- Insuring Employers Evaluation Bd., 2002-Ohio-1362 ; Lorain Edn.

2025Glass City Academy, Inc. v. City of Toledo, 2008-Ohio-6391 (6th Dist.).

2025Hanson, 1992-Ohio-73 at ¶ 9 . {¶29} The trial court issued a judgment entry on May 2, 2024, converting the Village’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

2025The entire immunity analysis is particularly important because if it is determined that a political subdivision has general immunity under R.C. 2744.01(A) and none of the exceptions under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)-(5) apply, “a court need not move on to consider the defenses and immunities provided under R.C. 2744.03.” Johnson v. Cleveland, 2011-Ohio-2152 . ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

2022No. 07AP-47, 2007-Ohio-5094, ¶ 37 , quoting Swanson v. Ridge Tool Co., 113 Ohio App. 357, 359 (9th Dist.1961). {¶ 14} Here, the trial court's March 1, 2021 decision and entry granting in part, the Village's motion for summary judgment clearly disposed of appellees' claim for fraud in favor of the Village.

2018Cuyahoga No. 97593, 2012-Ohio-3568 , 2012 WL 3222236 . {¶ 36} Appellants argue that the Village's immunity is reinstated under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) because the allegations against it, including "failure to install trenches and blocks, failure to stabilize the hill, remove trees, and failure to take other precautionary measures were decisions, pursuant to (A)(3), within the discretion and policy-making, planning and enforcement powers attendant to the offices held within the Village." Appellants' Brief, p. 16.

2015Taylor argues that summary judgment was appropriate because the magistrate was correct in finding that appellant did not have standing to challenge the zoning ordinances. {¶ 11} Appellant contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are justiciable issues of fact that preclude granting summary judgment, and she has standing to challenge the ordinances pursuant to Moore v. Middleton, 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , because her property is adjacent to Taylor's property.

2015Taylor argues that summary judgment was appropriate because the magistrate was correct in finding that appellant did not have standing to challenge the zoning ordinances. {¶ 11} Appellant contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are justiciable issues of fact that preclude granting summary judgment, and she has standing to challenge the ordinances pursuant to Moore v. Middleton, 133 Ohio St.3d 55 , 2012-Ohio-3897 , because her property is adjacent to Taylor's property.

2012See R.C. 2744.02(C); Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2007-Ohio-4839 , 873 N.E.2d 878 . {¶10} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of review.

2012See R.C. 2744.02(C); Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2007-Ohio-4839 , 873 N.E.2d 878 . {¶10} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of review.

2011Thomas, 2005-Ohio-1921, ¶¶34-35 . {¶30} While we acknowledge this Court’s prior decision in Thomas, we ultimately find that the trial court did not err in granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment because Mother failed to present sufficient evidence that a -15- Case No. 13-10-48 physical defect on the premise caused Garcia’s death.

2008However, "[t]he doctrines of equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel are inapplicable against a political subdivision when the political subdivision is engaged in a governmental function." Hortman v. Miamisburg , 110 Ohio St.3d 194 , 2006-Ohio-4251 , syllabus. {¶ 17} Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err when it granted Village's motion for summary judgment. {¶ 18} Accordingly, we overrule both of Enviro-Flow's assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

2008See, *Page 13 Harsh v. Kwait (2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76683; Luce v. Alcox , Franklin App. 04AP-1250, 2005-Ohio-3373 . {¶ 35} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing on the Village's motion to disqualify counsel. {¶ 36} Shawnee's second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 37} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

2004As such, and based on the foregoing, appellant’s waiver argument lacks merit. {¶ 106} Thus, all of appellant’s arguments under its first assignment of error lack merit and are hereby overruled. {¶ 107} Appellant’s second assignment of error asserts: {¶ 108} “The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee Village of Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff-appellant Seneca Valley, Inc.’s claim for unjust enrichment (September 9, 2002 Journal Entry.)” {¶ 109} Appellant initially asserts that the trial court’s decision to grant the Village summary judgment as to appellant’s secon

2004As such, and based on the foregoing, appellant’s waiver argument lacks merit. {¶ 106} Thus, all of appellant’s arguments under its first assignment of error lack merit and are hereby overruled. {¶ 107} Appellant’s second assignment of error asserts: {¶ 108} “The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee Village of Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff-appellant Seneca Valley, Inc.’s claim for unjust enrichment (September 9, 2002 Journal Entry.)” {¶ 109} Appellant initially asserts that the trial court’s decision to grant the Village summary judgment as to appellant’s secon