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16 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bellikka v. Greengreen2 sentences2023When viewed as a list, the word “property” follows the word “person” within the stat- ute, a clearly tangible term. “[W]hen the legislature chooses to state both a general standard and a list of specifics, the specifics do more than place their particular subjects beyond the dispute; they also refer the scope of the general standard to matters of the same kind, often phrased in Latin as ‘ejus- dem generis.’ ” Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 636 , 762 P2d 997 (1988). 2023When viewed as a list, the word “property” follows the word “person” within the stat- ute, a clearly tangible term. “[W]hen the legislature chooses to state both a general standard and a list of specifics, the specifics do more than place their particular subjects beyond the dispute; they also refer the scope of the general standard to matters of the same kind, often phrased in Latin as ‘ejus- dem generis.’ ” Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 636 , 762 P2d 997 (1988). | 4 | 15 |
Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbeygreen2 sentences2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). 2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). | 1 | 1 |
Dandridge v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1978Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US 749, 767-73 , 95 S Ct 2457 , 45 L Ed 2d 522 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471, 479-80, 485 , 90 S Ct 1153 , 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970). 6 The remainder of petitioner’s contentions focus on provisions in the AFSD Manual which limit the scope of the general rule in OAR 461-06-010 that "GA one person grants are share fractioned when the recipient shares housing.” First, the Manual provides that a GA grant will not be reduced it the recipient rents housing which is available to the general public on a commercial basis: "A recipient renting housing which requires shar 1978Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US 749, 767-73 , 95 S Ct 2457 , 45 L Ed 2d 522 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471, 479-80, 485 , 90 S Ct 1153 , 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970). 6 The remainder of petitioner’s contentions focus on provisions in the AFSD Manual which limit the scope of the general rule in OAR 461-06-010 that "GA one person grants are share fractioned when the recipient shares housing.” First, the Manual provides that a GA grant will not be reduced it the recipient rents housing which is available to the general public on a commercial basis: "A recipient renting housing which requires shar | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vannatta v. Keisling
green
2 sentences2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). 2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
NORTH MARION SCHOOL DIST. 15 v. Acstar Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). 2010Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 402 , 223 P3d 399 (2009) (“When * * * the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for interpreting the general term.”); Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533 , 931 P2d 770 (1997); State v. Gallegos, 217 Or App 248, 255 , 174 P3d 1086 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (under ejusdem generis, a list of specifics gives “further definition” to the scope of a more general standard that follows). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnati
green
1 sentence2007In light of the plain meaning of the term “aggravating” and the totality of the context in which it is used in *256 OAR 213-008-0002(1), we conclude that that term satisfies due process in that it embodies “an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.” Coates, 402 US at 614 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Weinberger v. Salfi
green
2 sentences1978Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US 749, 767-73 , 95 S Ct 2457 , 45 L Ed 2d 522 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471, 479-80, 485 , 90 S Ct 1153 , 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970). 6 The remainder of petitioner’s contentions focus on provisions in the AFSD Manual which limit the scope of the general rule in OAR 461-06-010 that "GA one person grants are share fractioned when the recipient shares housing.” First, the Manual provides that a GA grant will not be reduced it the recipient rents housing which is available to the general public on a commercial basis: "A recipient renting housing which requires shar 1978Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US 749, 767-73 , 95 S Ct 2457 , 45 L Ed 2d 522 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471, 479-80, 485 , 90 S Ct 1153 , 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970). 6 The remainder of petitioner’s contentions focus on provisions in the AFSD Manual which limit the scope of the general rule in OAR 461-06-010 that "GA one person grants are share fractioned when the recipient shares housing.” First, the Manual provides that a GA grant will not be reduced it the recipient rents housing which is available to the general public on a commercial basis: "A recipient renting housing which requires shar | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.