Coleman factors in Texas

2020Coleman, 145 S.W.3d at 658–60 (Cochran, J., concurring); 18 see Hall v. State, No. 05-18-00755-CR, 2019 WL 3773852 , at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reciting Coleman factors); Johnson v. State, No. 06-13-00227-CR, 2014 WL 4695063 , at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 22, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Castillo v. State, 426 S.W.3d 135 , 138 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (same); Bahr v. State, 295 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (same).

2014Id. at 659–60 (Cochran, J., concurring); Bahr v. State, 295 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (reciting Coleman factors).

2015See Odelugo, 443 S.W.3d at 136 ; see also Perez, 352 S.W.3d at 755 .

2015See Odelugo, 443 S.W.3d at 136; see also Perez, 352 S.W.3d at 755 .

2020Coleman, 145 S.W.3d at 658–60 (Cochran, J., concurring); 18 see Hall v. State, No. 05-18-00755-CR, 2019 WL 3773852 , at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reciting Coleman factors); Johnson v. State, No. 06-13-00227-CR, 2014 WL 4695063 , at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 22, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); Castillo v. State, 426 S.W.3d 135 , 138 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (same); Bahr v. State, 295 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (same).

2014Id. at 659–60 (Cochran, J., concurring); Bahr v. State, 295 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (reciting Coleman factors).

2008And, while this Court has held that a motion for new trial is an appropriate way to preserve this type of claim for review (see Williamson v. State, 175 S.W.3d 522 , 523–24 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Delacruz v. State, 167 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.)), Coleman's motion for new trial 2 did not contain an allegation that the sentence was disproportionate to the offense.

2008And, while this Court has held that a motion for new trial is an appropriate way to preserve this type of claim for review ( see Williamson v. State , 175 S.W.3d 522, 523-24 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Delacruz v. State , 167 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.)), Coleman's motion for new trial did not contain an allegation that the sentence was disproportionate to the offense.

2023Although none of that had actually happened, and although the reason for terminating Coleman was not made public and did not mention any health, safety, environmental, economic, or other public concern, it was nevertheless a communication made, “at the very least, in connection with an issue related to safety”. 18 Further, we added, it had not been explained “why statements related to personnel matters cannot also be in connection with matters of public concern.” 19 The Act, we emphasized, “does [not] require more than a ‘tangential relationship’” between a communication and a public concern t

2023Although none of that had actually happened, and although the reason for terminating Coleman was not made public and did not mention any health, safety, environmental, economic, or other public concern, it was nevertheless a communication made, “at the very least, in connection with an issue related to safety”. 18 Further, we added, it had not been explained “why statements related to personnel matters cannot also be in connection with matters of public concern.” 19 The Act, we emphasized, “does [not] require more than a ‘tangential relationship’” between a communication and a public concern t

2020The State may then offer extraneous offenses that are relevant to that contested issue.”); Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.— Austin 2002, no pet.) (holding that extraneous offense was admissible because the defendant had used the State’s witnesses to establish a defensive theory that the complainant had engaged in consensual sex and had fabricated the charge of sexual assault after the fact). 30 Specifically, Coleman’s defense morphed into consent only after he was tied to the offense by the chain of events on April 15, 2016, that had placed him at the complainant’s apartment comp

2020See Karrenbrock v. State, No. 02-16-00386- CR, 2018 WL 5289352 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901 , 905 n.4, 906–07 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Swilley, 465 S.W.3d at 795 ; see also Brock v. State, 495 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. App.— Waco 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding that error in admission of evidence was not preserved when defendant raised a Rule 403 objection at a pretrial hearing on his motion in limine). 15 complain on appeal about the State’s subsequent actions.

2020See Swilley, 465 S.W.3d at 795 ; see also Brock v. State, 495 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. App.— Waco 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding that error in admission of evidence was not preserved when defendant raised a Rule 403 objection at a pretrial hearing on his motion in limine). 15 complain on appeal about the State’s subsequent actions.

2016See generally Reger v. State, 222 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding, in review of ruling on motion for forensic DNA testing, appellate court’s standard is bifurcated), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1117 (2008).

2016See generally Reger v. State, 222 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding, in review of ruling on motion for forensic DNA testing, appellate court’s standard is bifurcated), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1117 (2008).

2015See Odelugo, 443 S.W.3d at 136 ; see also Perez, 352 S.W.3d at 755 .

1998Even under the State’s assertion that a seizure does not occur until a suspect has yielded to a police show of authority, see Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), Coleman’s testimony indicates the dispatch could not legally be considered a basis for the stop. 2 Nevertheless, we believe the remaining factors the State cites, viewed under a totality of circumstances, are sufficient to justify officer Coleman’s stop of Flores.

1990Based upon the obvious condition of the car and the necessity of hot-wiring to start the car, the jury was free to reject Coleman’s claim of a loan from “Chris.” See McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1990Adequacy of Supplemental Brief If it can be argued that the second point of error should be considered as unassigned error in the interest of justice, despite the Coleman rule, {see Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) (opinion on rehearing)), we find that the supplemental brief as to the second point of error is not in compliance with Tex.R.App.P.Ann. 74(f)(1) and (2) (Pamph. 1990).

1990Adequacy of Supplemental Brief If it can be argued that the second point of error should be considered as unassigned error in the interest of justice, despite the Coleman rule, {see Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) (opinion on rehearing)), we find that the supplemental brief as to the second point of error is not in compliance with Tex.R.App.P.Ann. 74(f)(1) and (2) (Pamph. 1990).

1980See generally Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).