repeated warning in Texas

2010I now believe that opinion, as well as the Court's opinion on original submission should be withdrawn because neither opinion addressed the issue raised all along by the State in its petition for discretionary review and its rehearing motions—whether these cases were cognizable for a review by the court of appeals [1] —and both opinions fail to address the State's repeated claim that this case is like McGlynn v. State, 704 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Crim.App.1982)(opinion on reh'g).

2010I now believe that opinion, as well as the Court’s opinion on original submission should be withdrawn because neither opinion addressed the issue raised all along by the State in its petition for discretionary review and its rehearing motions — whether these cases were cognizable for a review by the court of appeals 1 — and both opinions fail to address the State’s repeated claim that this case is like McGlynn v. State, 704 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Crim.App.1982)(opinion on reh’g).

1981We reiterate our holding in West Lake Hills, “In view of the repeated requirement of adjacency in the statutes, we do not believe that the validating statutes should be construed to a different effect in the absence of specific and express provision.” 466 S.W.2d at 729-730 .

1975In view of the repeated requirement of adjacency in the statutes, we do not believe that the validating statutes should be construed to a different effect in the absence of specific and express provision.” 466 S.W.2d 722, 729 .

2015Either way, the appeal to complain: error was clear enough, and correction simple enough, that mandamus review was appropriate. 48 Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 . 49 92 S.W.3d 517 , 523–524 (Tex.2002). [19] [20] [21] [22] Prudent mandamus relief is also preferable to legislative enlargement of interlocutory 50 923 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex.1996). appeals. 54 The unavailability of mandamus relief increases 51 997 S.W.2d 194 , 195–196 (Tex.1999). the pressure for expanded interlocutory appeals.

2015Either way, the appeal to complain: error was clear enough, and correction simple enough, that mandamus review was appropriate. 48 Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 . 49 92 S.W.3d 517 , 523–524 (Tex.2002). [19] [20] [21] [22] Prudent mandamus relief is also preferable to legislative enlargement of interlocutory 50 923 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex.1996). appeals. 54 The unavailability of mandamus relief increases 51 997 S.W.2d 194 , 195–196 (Tex.1999). the pressure for expanded interlocutory appeals.

2010A blueprint for addressing the cognizability question was laid out by this Court in Gonzales v. State, 966 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim.App.1998).

2010A blueprint for addressing the cogniza-bility question was laid out by this Court in Gonzales v. State, 966 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2003Appellant cites Bennett v. State , 677 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.) for the proposition that a prosecutor's repeated violation of the rules of proper jury argument cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard.

1989In Roller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), this Court was faced with a similar situation.

1983Just as the State may enjoin the ongoing commission of a crime, Super X Drugs v. State, 505 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ), the State should likewise be able to enjoin the actions of a public official that facilitate the repeated violation of criminal statutes when that official action is contrary to the statute under which the official acts.

1978In the Haywood case, the Supreme Court stated: “ * * * The true test is the degree of prejudice flowing from the argument — whether the argument, considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to cause such prejudice to the opposing litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the probability that it resulted in an improper verdict. * * In Texas Sand Company v. Shield, supra, the Court repeated that test and then laid down the rule: “Each departure from this degree of ethical conduct, when properly objected to and preserved for re

1975Podolnick v. Hamilton, 349 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Sup.1961).

1975Such has been the uniform rule of decision in this court.” (Emphasis added) Again, in Pickens v. Bacle, 129 Tex. 610 , 104 S.W.2d 482 (1937), the rule was followed, the court speaking of an option to convey as “not a present conveyance” but as “nothing more than a part of the contract to convey when the option was exercised.” The court repeated the rule: “It has been many times held that a married woman cannot make any contract with reference to her homestead or her separate estate which is not a present conveyance of the whole or a part of her title.” (Emphasis added) ( 104 S.W.2d 485 ) Seale

1975Such has been the uniform rule of decision in this court.” (Emphasis added) Again, in Pickens v. Bacle, 129 Tex. 610 , 104 S.W.2d 482 (1937), the rule was followed, the court speaking of an option to convey as “not a present conveyance” but as “nothing more than a part of the contract to convey when the option was exercised.” The court repeated the rule: “It has been many times held that a married woman cannot make any contract with reference to her homestead or her separate estate which is not a present conveyance of the whole or a part of her title.” (Emphasis added) ( 104 S.W.2d 485 ) Seale

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of *213 appellant's right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, [3] McCandless v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S. W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,

1970The repeated warnings and the evidence presented sustain the view that under the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding this case, a full and intelligent waiver of appellant’s right to have an attorney present during questioning was shown, and he was informed that he could terminate questioning at any time, 3 McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636 ; Hernandez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 653 ; Anders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 426 S.W.2d 228 ; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 ; Torres v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 741 ; Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.

1967In its original opinion the majority with absolutely no mention of the waiver requirements of Miranda said: "Under the record, we find that the confession was not obtained in violation of the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 , wherein the Court summarized its holdings in Gideon v. Wainwright and Escobedo v. Illinois, and overrule the first ground of error." In its opinion on re-hearing, no reference is made to the above statement.

1967In its original opinion the majority with absolutely no mention of the waiver requirements of Miranda said: "Under the record, we find that the confession was not obtained in violation of the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 , wherein the Court summarized its holdings in Gideon v. Wainwright and Escobedo v. Illinois, and overrule the first ground of error." In its opinion on re-hearing, no reference is made to the above statement.

1943His domicile is therefore her domicile; so that when he and his wife remove from a homestead, he having no intention of returning, that fixes the character of the removal as an abandonment, for the intent of the husband as head of the family controls, and he has the right to determine whether there shall be a return or not.” In the recent case of Harwell v. Morris, Tex.Civ.App., 143 S.W.2d 809, 816 , this Court repeated the principle that has been stated many'times by our own courts, and said: “It has never been the law in Texas that the residence of the husband is drawn to that of the wife wh

1943His domicile is therefore her domicile; so that when he and his wife remove from a homestead, he having no intention of returning, that fixes the character of the removal as an abandonment, for the intent of the husband as head of the family controls, and he has the right to determine whether there shall be a return or not.” In the recent case of Harwell v. Morris, Tex.Civ.App., 143 S.W.2d 809, 816 , this Court repeated the principle that has been stated many'times by our own courts, and said: “It has never been the law in Texas that the residence of the husband is drawn to that of the wife wh

1943His domicile is therefore her domicile; so that when he and his wife remove from a homestead, he having no intention of returning, that fixes the character of the removal as an abandonment, for the intent of the husband as head of the family controls, and he has the right to determine whether there shall be a return or not.” In the recent case of Harwell v. Morris, Tex.Civ.App., 143 S.W.2d 809, 816 , this Court repeated the principle that has been stated many'times by our own courts, and said: “It has never been the law in Texas that the residence of the husband is drawn to that of the wife wh

1943And although the wife may be residing in another place, the domicile of the husband is her domicile. * * * Even where a wife is living apart from her husband, without sufficient cause, his domicile is in law her domicile. * * * The rule is, said Chief Justice Shaw, * * * ‘founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between husband and wife, as established by law; and the presumption, that from the nature of that relation, the home of the one is that of the other, and intended to promote, strengthen and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where un