16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sierragreen2 sentences1994PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOP In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App.1988), this court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “pretext stops.” As we stated in State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.), cert. granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992): In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in eases where an officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court determines the stop was not made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has deviated from the 1994We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a “reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped the vehicle.” State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990)). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2009Likewise, arguments under article I, section 24 did not appear applicable until the court of appeals ruled that “equal protection policies constrain us to uphold the pretext doctrine.” Id. (quoting State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah Ct.App.1992)). ¶ 27 The circumstances in this case are not exceptional in the way that the circumstances in Lopez were. 1994In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Russon accepted the State’s invitation to “reconsider the pretext analysis.” Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050-56 . | 3 | 5 |
State v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Arroyogreen2 sentences1994We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a “reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped the vehicle.” State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah Ct.App.1988), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990)). 1992See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515 ; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11 . [9] In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, ratified our application of the pretext doctrine in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2019But “without additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.” Id. ¶16 Miller contends that the officer impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of additional (…continued) for stopping Miller would have been relevant under the pretext doctrine, which examined “the detaining officer’s state of mind [to] divine his or her true motives for making the stop.” State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994). 2019The officer's subjective motivation for stopping Miller would have been relevant under the pretext doctrine, which examined "the detaining officer's state of mind [to] divine his or her true motives for making the stop." State v. Lopez , 873 P.2d 1127 , 1137 (Utah 1994). | 2 | 8 |
State v. Arroyogreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Figueroa-Soloriogreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Talbotgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lovegrengreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Randy Alan Parker John Arthur Sorensongreen1 sentence1998See also Parker, 72 F.3d at 1449 (“It is therefore irrelevant to the validity of the initial stop whether [the trooper] may have had subjective motivations for the stop.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cruzgreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Delaneygreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harmongreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence1994Id. at 1044 (citing Sierra, 764 P.2d at 978). | 1 | 1 |
Tarwid v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kellergreen | 1 | 1 |
Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utahgreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1982) (burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access to evidence). [17] We concede that the pretext doctrine complicates matters for trial counsel and trial courts. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moroccogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jose Luis Guzman and Sonia Cruz-Lazogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William O. Trigggreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gregory Lynn Cummins, United States of America v. Timothy Akins, A/K/A Michael Mayfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William O. Trigggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences2017This court held that a rare 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 70 Opinion of the Court procedural anomaly justified the defendant’s failure to raise the issue below because, “[a]t the time of the suppression hearing, the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals,” and the defendant “had no reason to” raise the state constitutional claim at that time. 2017This court held that a rare 14 Cite as: 2017 UT 70 Opinion of the Court procedural anomaly justified the defendant’s failure to raise the issue below because, “[a]t the time of the suppression hearing, the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals,” and the defendant “had no reason to” raise the state constitutional claim at that time. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1994He rejected the pretext stop doctrine and recommended “a return to the basic analysis of the legality of seizures established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).” 831 P.2d at 1051 . 1994He rejected the pretext stop doctrine and recommended “a return to the basic analysis of the legality of seizures established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).” 831 P.2d at 1051 . | 2 | 1992–1994 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences1994We recognize that the pretext doctrine is aimed at circumscribing the “standardless and unconstrained discretion ... of the official in the field.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 1994We recognize that the pretext doctrine is aimed at circumscribing the “standardless and unconstrained discretion ... of the official in the field.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). | 2 | 1992–1994 |
State v. Baker
green
1 sentence2019But “without additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.” Id. ¶16 Miller contends that the officer impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of additional (…continued) for stopping Miller would have been relevant under the pretext doctrine, which examined “the detaining officer’s state of mind [to] divine his or her true motives for making the stop.” State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Segura v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3391 , 82 LEd.2d 599 (1984). 2004Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3391 , 82 LEd.2d 599 (1984). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Archuleta
green
2 sentences1995In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 476 , 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). 1995In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 476 , 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Rhodes v. United States
green
2 sentences1995In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 476 , 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). 1995In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 476 , 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United States v. Cecil Ferguson
green
1 sentence1994We are not convinced that this focus on usual police practice magically transforms the pretext doctrine into an objective assessment of an officer’s conduct. “ ‘[Objective evidence’ of ... general police practice is simply an aggregation of the subjective intentions of officers in the regions.” Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Miranda
green
1 sentence1994Fourth Amendment protections cannot vary from county to county, nor can they be defined by the job description of the seizing officer. “[S]uch a ease-by-case, poliee-department-by-police-department approach fails to provide the consistency and predictability officers need to meaningfully understand their obligations under the fourth amendment.” Miranda, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 791 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Chapman
green
1 sentence1994See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 , 727 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044-50 ; State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (opinion of Orme, J., joined by Billings, J.); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 771 n. 10 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah Ct.App.1990) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez
green
2 sentences1994As applied, the doctrine may insulate suspicious citizens from liability for violating the traffic laws. 8 The United States Supreme Court disapproved of this unequal enforcement of the law in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 , 103 S.Ct. 2573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). 1994As applied, the doctrine may insulate suspicious citizens from liability for violating the traffic laws. 8 The United States Supreme Court disapproved of this unequal enforcement of the law in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 , 103 S.Ct. 2573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Guerrieri green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cannon v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Kehoe v. State
red
2 sentences1992See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 , 770 n. 10 (Utah App.1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, JJ.); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, J.J.). [9] But see United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1992See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515— 16; Smith, 799 F.2d at 708 ; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1096 ; Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135 ; Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216 ; Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882-83 ; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80 . . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| United States v. Timothy Andrew Smith, Stephen Lawrence Swindell green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Camarre green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Baird green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Grovier green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cummins v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.