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15 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottlinggreen2 sentences2005Less than three months later, the Legislature accepted the Meeks Court's thinly veiled invitation to modify the employee-at-will doctrine by enacting § 25-5-11.1 , which states that "[n]o employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits. . . ." In McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 578 So.2d 1299 (Ala. 1991), this Court refused to interpret the term "action" as used in § 25-5-11.1 to mean only a judicial proceeding, as opposed to some less formal demand for 2005In the instant case, Hexcel Decatur requests that we now revisit that holding. 3 The employee-at-will doctrine "provides that an employment contract terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee may be terminated by either party at any time with or without cause." McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 578 So.2d 1299 , 1300 (Ala. 1991). 4 Meeks offers no basis for a conclusion that the employee had commenced a civil action against his employer as opposed to simply filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits. | 2 | 4 |
Meeks v. OPP Cotton Mills, Inc.green2 sentences2005Analysis A. Our discussion of the meaning of § 25-5-11.1 must begin with Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. , 459 So.2d 814 (Ala. 1984), in which the plaintiff asked this Court to modify the employee-at-will doctrine 3 to permit him to sue his former employer for dismissing him because he had filed a workers' compensation claim. 4 *Page 240 The Court in Meeks declined to create an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine and noted that, in the wake of its decision in Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens , 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980), the Legislature had enacted § 12-16-8.1 , Ala. Code 1975, to pro 1985Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. , 459 So.2d 814 (Ala. 1984) (the opinion in that case and Justice Shores's special concurrence contain a listing of most of the recent cases in which we have had an opportunity to modify the employee-at-will doctrine and have declined to do so). | 2 | 3 |
Kitsos v. Mobile Gas Service Corporationgreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., Kitsos v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. , 431 So.2d 1150 (Ala. 1983); Meredith v. C.E. 1984Kitsos v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 431 So.2d 1150 (Ala. 1983); Meredith v. C.E. | 1 | 2 |
Swift v. Gregorygreen1 sentence2004See also Swift v. Gregory, 786 So.2d 1097, 1101 (Ala.2000) (“they [certain statutes] show that the Legislature was quite capable of creating an eligibility for retirement that functioned regardless of the age of the applicant”), and McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So.2d 1299, 1300 (Ala.1991) (pointing to a statute as evidence that “the legislature was fully capable of creating exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine if it so desired”). | 1 | 1 |
Bosarge v. Bankers Life Co.green1 sentence1990Recently, in Bosarge v. Bankers Life Co., 541 So.2d 499, 501 (Ala.1989), involving a suit alleging breach of contract, this Court, quoting Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 728 (Ala.1987), declined to modify the employee-at-will doctrine, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: "`By now, the rule is well settled in Alabama that an employee contract at *1053 will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or justification. | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbellgreen1 sentence1990Recently, in Bosarge v. Bankers Life Co., 541 So.2d 499, 501 (Ala.1989), involving a suit alleging breach of contract, this Court, quoting Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 728 (Ala.1987), declined to modify the employee-at-will doctrine, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: "`By now, the rule is well settled in Alabama that an employee contract at *1053 will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or justification. | 1 | 1 |
Self v. Bennettgreen1 sentence1985See also, Self v. Bennett , 474 So.2d 673 (Ala. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co. , 599 So.2d 1120 (Ala. 1992). 1999Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So.2d 1120 (Ala. 1992). | 5 | 1995–2000 |
Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2005Analysis A. Our discussion of the meaning of § 25-5-11.1 must begin with Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. , 459 So.2d 814 (Ala. 1984), in which the plaintiff asked this Court to modify the employee-at-will doctrine 3 to permit him to sue his former employer for dismissing him because he had filed a workers' compensation claim. 4 *Page 240 The Court in Meeks declined to create an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine and noted that, in the wake of its decision in Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens , 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980), the Legislature had enacted § 12-16-8.1 , Ala. Code 1975, to pro 1991This Court pointed out, however, that the legislature was fully capable of creating exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine if it so desired. ( See, e.g. , Ala. Code 1975, § 12-16-8.1 , by which the legislature created an exception to the doctrine in direct response to our refusal to do so in Bender Ship Repair, supra. ) In an attempt to rectify a perceived harsh result in Meeks , the legislature modified the employee-at-will doctrine by prohibiting employers from terminating employees solely because they had "instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover worker's com | 3 | 1990–2005 |
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So.2d 814 (Ala.1984); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So.2d 1130 (Ala.1977). 1985We have been confronted by similar arguments where it was contended that the employee-at-will doctrine has been circumscribed "when such discharge contravenes a statute or is contrary to `public policy.'" E.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital , 352 So.2d 1130 , 1131 (Ala. 1977); Martin v. Tapley , 360 So.2d 708 , 709 (Ala. 1978). | 2 | 1985–1990 |
Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248 (Ala.1994). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Twilley v. Daubert Coated Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994In Twilley v. Daubert Coated Products, Inc. , 536 So.2d 1364 (Ala. 1988), we held that an employee may state a cause of action under § 25-5-11.1 for a "constructive discharge" as well as for an actual discharge or termination; however, we did not define "constructive discharge" for purposes of § 25-5-11.1 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Williams v. Killough
green
1 sentence1990Thus, we have refused to recognize an exception where an employee had been dismissed for refusing to commit a criminal act, see, e.g., Jones v. Ethridge, 497 So.2d 1107 (Ala.1986); Williams v. Killough, 474 So.2d 680 (Ala.1985), or where an employee had been dismissed because he filed a workmen's compensation claim, see Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., supra, or where an employee had been dismissed because he responded to a subpoena for jury duty, see Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala.1980).'" [4] (Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added in Bosarge . ) Again, we de | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jones v. Ethridge
green
1 sentence1990Thus, we have refused to recognize an exception where an employee had been dismissed for refusing to commit a criminal act, see, e.g., Jones v. Ethridge, 497 So.2d 1107 (Ala.1986); Williams v. Killough, 474 So.2d 680 (Ala.1985), or where an employee had been dismissed because he filed a workmen's compensation claim, see Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., supra, or where an employee had been dismissed because he responded to a subpoena for jury duty, see Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala.1980).'" [4] (Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added in Bosarge . ) Again, we de | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Martin v. Tapley
green
1 sentence1985We have been confronted by similar arguments where it was contended that the employee-at-will doctrine has been circumscribed "when such discharge contravenes a statute or is contrary to `public policy.'" E.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital , 352 So.2d 1130 , 1131 (Ala. 1977); Martin v. Tapley , 360 So.2d 708 , 709 (Ala. 1978). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.