106 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2026Moreover, with respect to statements made in response to a question, the supreme court has indicated that “[a]lthough a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity.” Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 353 ; see, e.g., People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 37 (holding that “the fact that [the declarant] answered questions posed by the 911 dispatcher [did not] destroy[ ] the spontaneity of her statements or 2021“Although a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity [citation].” Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 353 . | 16 | 25 |
People v. Suttongreen2 sentences2026“Courts employ a totality of the circumstances analysis in determining whether a hearsay statement is admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception.” Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d at 107 . 2024“For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, there must be an absence of time for the declarant to fabricate the statement, and the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.” People v. Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 107 (2009). | 9 | 11 |
People v. Housegreen2 sentences2026“Indeed, the period of time that may pass without affecting the admissibility of a statement under the spontaneous declaration exception varies greatly.” Id. 2018Our supreme court has found that “[t]ime is one factor, albeit an elusive one, whose significance will vary with the facts of each case.” House, 141 Ill. 2d at 382 . - 29 - 1-13-3981 “Indeed, the period of time that may pass without affecting the admissibility of a statement under the spontaneous declaration exception varies greatly.” Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 353 . | 5 | 9 |
People v. Gachogreen2 sentences2020This testimony would have supported a factual determination by the trial court that Letkiewicz had been trapped under the dresser for as long as two days. ¶ 104 To determine whether the spontaneous declaration exception applies, we find People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988), instructive. 2020This testimony would have supported a factual determination by the trial court that Letkiewicz had been trapped under the dresser for as long as two days. ¶ 104 To determine whether the spontaneous declaration exception applies, we find People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988), instructive. | 4 | 9 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2007"Although a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity." Williams, 193 Ill.2d at 353 , citing People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229 , 604 N.E.2d 858 (1992). 2007"Although a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity." Williams, 193 Ill.2d at 353 , citing People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229 , 604 N.E.2d 858 (1992). | 4 | 6 |
The People v. Polandgreen2 sentences1990See People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 464 , 193 N.E.2d 25 . 2 To bring a statement within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, three factors are necessary: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) an absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. ( People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill.2d 175 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) In determining whether a *389 statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration, the trial court has considerable discretion. 1990See People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 464 , 193 N.E.2d 25 . 2 To bring a statement within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, three factors are necessary: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) an absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. ( People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill.2d 175 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) In determining whether a *389 statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration, the trial court has considerable discretion. | 3 | 25 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u 2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u | 3 | 8 |
People v. Georgakapoulosgreen2 sentences2025Jan. 25, 2023)), also known as the spontaneous declaration exception (People v. Georgakapolous, 303 Ill. 2004People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1012 , 237 Ill.Dec. 156 , 708 N.E.2d 1196 (1999); People v. Gibson, 99 Ill.App.3d 1068, 1076 , 55 Ill.Dec. 35 , 425 N.E.2d 1208 (1981) ("Trial courts are vested with considerable discretion in admitting testimony which comes within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, for each case must rest on its own facts"). | 3 | 4 |
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 51 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill. 2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 50 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Henricksgreen2 sentences2020“A spontaneous declaration *** is admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” People v. Henricks, 32 Ill. 2020“A spontaneous declaration *** is admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” People v. Henricks, 32 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Meridethgreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., People v. Merideth, 152 Ill.App.3d 304, 315 , 105 Ill.Dec. 126 , 503 N.E.2d 1132 (1987). 2000See, e.g., People v. Merideth, 152 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sommervillegreen2 sentences2000Although a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception (see, e.g., People v. Sommerville, 193 Ill.App.3d 161, 174-75 , 140 Ill.Dec. 443 , 549 N.E.2d 1315 *480 (1990)), the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity (see, e.g., People v. Smith, 152 Ill.2d 229, 260 , 178 Ill.Dec. 335 , 604 N.E.2d 858 (1992); see also M. 2000Although a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception (see, e.g., People v. Sommerville, 193 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2000People v. Edwards, 144 Ill.2d 108, 169 , 161 Ill.Dec. 788 , 579 N.E.2d 336 (1991). 2000People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 169 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pittsgreen2 sentences2000See People v. Pitts, 299 Ill. 2000See People v. Pitts, 299 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
The People v. Damengreen2 sentences1990See People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 464 , 193 N.E.2d 25 . 2 To bring a statement within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, three factors are necessary: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) an absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. ( People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill.2d 175 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) In determining whether a *389 statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration, the trial court has considerable discretion. 1988(People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464 , 193 N.E.2d 25 .) Whether a statement qualifies under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial court. | 1 | 10 |
People v. Kinnersongreen2 sentences2026Moreover, with respect to statements made in response to a question, the supreme court has indicated that “[a]lthough a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity.” Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 353 ; see, e.g., People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 37 (holding that “the fact that [the declarant] answered questions posed by the 911 dispatcher [did not] destroy[ ] the spontaneity of her statements or 2024“When analyzing whether a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance, courts should consider the totality of the circumstances.” People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 31 , 170 N.E.3d 142 . | 1 | 3 |
In Re LSgreen2 sentences1993App. 3d 512, 521 ; In re L.S. (1989), 190 Ill. 1992See In re L.S. (1989), 190 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
| People v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gibsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. L.S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Peterson v. Cochran & McCluer Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences1988App. 3d 488 , 434 N.E.2d 395 .) The spontaneous declaration exception “is based upon the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. 1988App.3d 488 , 434 N.E.2d 395 .) The spontaneous declaration exception "is based upon the experience that, under certain external circumstances *20 of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. | 5 | 1986–1988 |
People v. Newell
neutral
2 sentences2021See, e.g., People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988) (statement made 6½ hours after the occurrence was admissible); People v. Newell, 135 Ill. 2018See, e.g., People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988) (statement made 6½ hours after the occurrence was admissible); People v. Newell, 135 Ill. | 4 | 2000–2021 |
People v. Chatman
green
2 sentences2000For example, in People v. Chatman, 110 Ill.App.3d 19 , 65 Ill.Dec. 778 , 441 N.E.2d 1292 (1982), the appellate court held that the statement of a four-year-old made 18 hours after witnessing a shooting was admissible where the child was emotionally distraught and was found in an uninhabited area. 2000For example, in People v. Chatman, 110 Ill. | 4 | 1984–2000 |
In Re Marriage of Theis
neutral
2 sentences1992(In re Marriage of Theis (1984), 121 Ill. 1990App. 3d at 1099 , 460 N.E.2d at 917 .) Thus, child abuse cases demand an even greater respect for the reliability of the child’s statements, and the child’s welfare is best served by a liberal interpretation of the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule in order to provide the fullest record possible concerning the alleged abuse. | 4 | 1987–1992 |
People v. Lerma
green
2 sentences2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 51 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill. 2016People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496 , ¶ 5 n.1; see People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 381 (1990). ¶ 50 However, “there is a caveat to the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule that the declarant must have had an opportunity to observe personally the matter of which he speaks.” People v. Hill, 60 Ill. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Lawler
green
2 sentences1992(People v. Lawler (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 548, 560 ; People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 91, 97 .) Under the facts of this case, we hold that her statements cannot be said to fall within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. 1992Our court has recognized that persistent questioning will destroy the spontaneity of a statement. ( People v. Lawler (1991), 142 Ill.2d 548, 560 , 154 Ill.Dec. 674 , 568 N.E.2d 895 ; People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 97 , 268 N.E.2d 865 .) Under the facts of this case, we hold that her statements cannot be said to fall within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. | 3 | 1991–1992 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha 1988The fact that the trial court may have admitted the statement under another exception to the hearsay rule is immaterial since “the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.” (People v. York (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 68, 71 .) In People v. Jones (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 342 , citing People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192 , this court restated the test used to determine whether a statement falls within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule: “ ‘This court ha | 3 | 1985–1988 |
People v. Parisie
green
2 sentences1979People v. Parisie (1972), 5 Ill. 1979In support of the State’s position on the issue of admission of the statement of the four-year-old child, as a spontaneous declaration exception, the State points out, as stated in People v. Parisie, referred to, that: “It is not the time element that controls, but the existence or lack of spontaneity in the light of the surrounding circumstances that is determinative.” (Parisie, 5 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1979 |
People v. Lisle
green
2 sentences2021And, “[a]lthough a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lisle, 376 Ill. 2018And, “[a]lthough a statement made in response to persistent interrogation might not be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception [citation], the fact that a statement was made in response to a question does not necessarily destroy spontaneity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lisle, 376 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u 2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Stechly
green
2 sentences2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u 2020Whether the Spontaneous Declaration Exception Applies to Letkiewicz’s Statements ¶ 100 Having found that Letkiewicz’s statements were nontestimonial, we now consider whether the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies, as nontestimonial statements “are still subject to ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 ). ¶ 101 For a hearsay statement to be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception, “(1) there must have been an occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and u | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2008In order for a hearsay statement to be admissible under the excited-utterance exception, sometimes also referred to as the spontaneous-declaration exception (Sullivan, 366 Ill. 2008In order for a hearsay statement to be admissible under the excited-utterance exception, sometimes also referred to as the spontaneous-declaration exception (Sullivan, 366 Ill. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
White v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 848 , 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), the Court held that the Fourth District Appellate Court correctly decided that the confrontation clause does not demand that “the prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that the declarant is unavailable” before admitting hearsay statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. 2007Ed. 2d 848 , 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), the Court held that our supreme court correctly decided that the confrontation clause does not demand that "the prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that the declarant is unavailable" before admitting hearsay statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Hart green | 2 | 1993–1997 |
| People v. Clark green | 2 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Sephus green | 2 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Johnson green | 2 | 1989–1989 |
| Keefe v. State of Arizona green | 2 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Robinson neutral | 2 | 1982–1985 |
| People v. Hatfield green | 2 | 1980–1982 |
| Thomas v. Goodman green | 2 | 1980–1981 |
| People v. Burney green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. McDonald green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. White green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Perkins green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Dobbey green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Sutton green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. McDade green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| The PEOPLE v. Taylor green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Thompkins green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Roy green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Nevitt green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Watts green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hackett v. Ashley green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Tarshes v. Lake Shore Harley Davidson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| The People v. York green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Grover green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.