spontaneous declaration exception in New York

1993The spontaneous declaration exception applies to statements made by bystanders as well as participants (People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227 ; People v Brown, supra).

1991Although the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies to statements made by bystanders as well as participants (People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227 ), where, as here, there is no proof of the identity of the declarants or of whether they had an "adequate opportunity to observe” the event (supra, at 232), it is error to permit such testimony (People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ; and see, People v Rhodes, 96 AD2d 565 ).

1993The spontaneous declaration exception applies to statements made by bystanders as well as participants (People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227 ; People v Brown, supra).

1988Although the police officer was only able to paraphrase the victim’s statements, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted these statements into evidence under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, since they were precipitated by a startling event and were not the result of studied reflection (see, People v Brown, 70 NY2d 513 ; People v Edwards, 47 NY2d 493 ).

2002Nor were these statements admissible against defendants as party admissions. “[T]he hearsay statement of an agent is admissible against his [or her] employer under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule only if the making of the statement is an activity within the scope of his [or her] authority” (Loschiavo v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 58 NY2d 1040, 1041 ; see, Tyrrell v Wal-Mart Stores, supra at 652; Grant v Radamar Meat, 294 AD2d 398, 399 ; Tkach v Golub Corp., 265 AD2d 632, 634 ).

2002Nor were these statements admissible against defendants as party admissions. “[T]he hearsay statement of an agent is admissible against his [or her] employer under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule only if the making of the statement is an activity within the scope of his [or her] authority” (Loschiavo v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 58 NY2d 1040, 1041 ; see, Tyrrell v Wal-Mart Stores, supra at 652; Grant v Radamar Meat, 294 AD2d 398, 399 ; Tkach v Golub Corp., 265 AD2d 632, 634 ).

2002Nor were these statements admissible against defendants as party admissions. “[T]he hearsay statement of an agent is admissible against his [or her] employer under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule only if the making of the statement is an activity within the scope of his [or her] authority” (Loschiavo v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 58 NY2d 1040, 1041 ; see, Tyrrell v Wal-Mart Stores, supra at 652; Grant v Radamar Meat, 294 AD2d 398, 399 ; Tkach v Golub Corp., 265 AD2d 632, 634 ).

1993The bystander need not be identified as long as the statements are sufficiently corroborated by other evidence (see, Cummiskey v Chandris, S.A., 719 F Supp 1183 , affd 895 F2d 107).

1991Although the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies to statements made by bystanders as well as participants (People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227 ), where, as here, there is no proof of the identity of the declarants or of whether they had an "adequate opportunity to observe” the event (supra, at 232), it is error to permit such testimony (People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ; and see, People v Rhodes, 96 AD2d 565 ).

1991The error was not harmless (cf., People v Matos, supra; People v Rhodes, supra) since the only evidence placing defendant directly at the scene of the crime was the crowd’s hearsay statement.

1991Although the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies to statements made by bystanders as well as participants (People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227 ), where, as here, there is no proof of the identity of the declarants or of whether they had an "adequate opportunity to observe” the event (supra, at 232), it is error to permit such testimony (People v Matos, 107 AD2d 823 ; and see, People v Rhodes, 96 AD2d 565 ).

1991The error was not harmless (cf., People v Matos, supra; People v Rhodes, supra) since the only evidence placing defendant directly at the scene of the crime was the crowd’s hearsay statement.

1988Although the police officer was only able to paraphrase the victim’s statements, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted these statements into evidence under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, since they were precipitated by a startling event and were not the result of studied reflection (see, People v Brown, 70 NY2d 513 ; People v Edwards, 47 NY2d 493 ).

1985Here, little time elapsed between the event and the statements, and there is no reason to believe the hearsay declarants may have fabricated their statements (cf. People v Marks, 6 NY2d 67 , cert den 362 US 912 ; People v Sostre, 70 AD2d 40 , affd 51 NY2d 958 ).

1985Here, little time elapsed between the event and the statements, and there is no reason to believe the hearsay declarants may have fabricated their statements (cf. People v Marks, 6 NY2d 67 , cert den 362 US 912 ; People v Sostre, 70 AD2d 40 , affd 51 NY2d 958 ).

1985Here, little time elapsed between the event and the statements, and there is no reason to believe the hearsay declarants may have fabricated their statements (cf. People v Marks, 6 NY2d 67 , cert den 362 US 912 ; People v Sostre, 70 AD2d 40 , affd 51 NY2d 958 ).

1984The fact that defendant initiated the exchange is not determinative (see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 479 ).

1980(People v Del Vermo, supra, p 483; Scheir v Quirin, 77 App Div 624 , affd 177 NY 568 ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1745, 1747.) In 1975 the Court of Appeals extended the spontaneous declaration exception to include not only spontaneous declarations of a participant but also those of a nonparticipant, such as a bystander.

1980(People v Del Vermo, supra, p 483; Scheir v Quirin, 77 App Div 624 , affd 177 NY 568 ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1745, 1747.) In 1975 the Court of Appeals extended the spontaneous declaration exception to include not only spontaneous declarations of a participant but also those of a nonparticipant, such as a bystander.

1980The Court of Appeals in People v Maerling ( 46 NY2d 289, 302-303 ) with regard to the spontaneous declaration rule enunciated in People v Kay, stated: "to come within the rule of that case, the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” Here, the defendant’s inculpatory statement * to Simmons (the security officer at the supermarket robbed on June 14, 1977) was clearly spontaneous (and voluntary) and not the result of custodial interrogation.