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41 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Poggigreen2 sentences2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne 2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People | 13 | 24 |
Showalter v. Western Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences2015Code, § 1240.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .) 2015Co., supra, at p. 468.) "[T]he mental state of the declarant—that is, the question of whether he or she was sufficiently under stress so as to dramatically reduce the possibility of deliberation and 12 prevarication—is crucial to determining whether the exception applies." (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 269-270 (Lucas).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Salazar's statement to Canseco was not admissible pursuant to the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. | 6 | 9 |
People v. Farmergreen2 sentences2014A bench trial commenced on January 2, 2013. 9 “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it.’ [Citations.]” ( 2009Code, § 1240.) “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne 2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne | 2 | 7 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti 2016Analysis “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the 9 Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made | 2 | 4 |
People v. Merrimangreen2 sentences2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People 2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, | 2 | 3 |
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab 1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab | 2 | 3 |
Mancusi v. Stubbsgreen2 sentences1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab 1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab | 2 | 3 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2014(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ].) Defendant argues that Latasha W.’s statement to Officer Martinez did not meet the second Poggi requirement, i.e., the declaration was not made while Latasha W.’s reflective powers remained in abeyance. 2014(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ].) Defendant argues that Latasha W.’s statement to Officer Martinez did not meet the second Poggi requirement, i.e., the declaration was not made while Latasha W.’s reflective powers remained in abeyance. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Damon H.green2 sentences1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s 1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s | 2 | 2 |
People v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti 2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti | 1 | 3 |
People v. Mataelegreen2 sentences2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne 2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gallegogreen2 sentences2014(People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 175 .) Here, the trial court did not make any findings as to why the citizen’s statements to the sergeant were “spontaneous” declarations. 1991(People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 175 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 679 , 802 P.2d 169 ]; People v. Provencio (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 290, 302 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 330 ].) The trial court admitted the statement based on finding the phone call was staged at the direction of the defendants to make an inquiry for money from Flores’s brother, with Flores “perhaps having been threatened, having been beaten, perhaps even having a gun held on him.” The court believed the event Flores was describing when he said he had been hurt was not the kidnapping 1 or the shooting (which had not yet happened) but was “maybe ho | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ordunogreen2 sentences1991(See In re Damon H. (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 471, 477-479 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 623 ]; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 653, 663 [ 202 Cal. Rptr. 289 ]; People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 738, 746-748 [145 *1267 Cal. Rptr. 806].) Defendant makes no argument that there was anything about the facts of this case that made the declarant's statement unreliable. 1985(Ibid.) 9 The circumstances in People v. Orduno, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 738 , are similar to those in the case at bench. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2016(Ibid.; see also People v. Gutierrez (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 170, 177-178 (Gutierrez) [trial court exercises discretion in determining whether there is a foundation for admitting spontaneous statements].) In Gutierrez, the defendant was convicted of robbery. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheelergreen1 sentence2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” ( Gutierrez, supra, at pp. 809-810 ; see Peo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2015Co., supra, at p. 468.) "[T]he mental state of the declarant—that is, the question of whether he or she was sufficiently under stress so as to dramatically reduce the possibility of deliberation and 12 prevarication—is crucial to determining whether the exception applies." (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 269-270 (Lucas).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Salazar's statement to Canseco was not admissible pursuant to the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. 2015(Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 270 .) Given that Canseco was not available to testify and that he had not been asked any questions regarding Salazar's demeanor or voice when Salazar made the statement, the trial court had no basis to assess the level of stress or excitement that Salazar may or may not have been under at the time he made the statement. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Waidlagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Forgasongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pearchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Provenciogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Box v. California Date Growers Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Francisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelley v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bazauregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Riccardi
green
1 sentence2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Clark
green
1 sentence2016Valicia’s testimony made clear, however, that Dawkins’s mental state prevented her “from reflecting on and fabricating her account of what had happened.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 926 .) A short time before Dawkins spoke to Valicia, Brown—an older man whom the teenager Dawkins had just recently met—had repeatedly called her and questioned her about Bacon’s whereabouts, accused her of lying to him and covering for her mother, made belittling and disrespectful comments to her, and physically tried to wrest Bacon’s phone from her by twisting her arm. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196-197 .) The trial court’s determination of preliminary facts will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact 2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact 2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Michigan v. Bryant
green
1 sentence2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Cage
green
2 sentences2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact 2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Blacksher
green
1 sentence2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Ervine green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rufo v. Simpson
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) “‘“[E]ach fact pattern must be considered on its own merits.”’” (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 880 .) “The discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether the nervous excitement still dominated and the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 590-591 ; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-319.) 11 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 911 call was not admissible under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code se | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Vines
green
2 sentences2013No Abuse of Discretion To be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, “‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce . . . nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .) “‘“Neithe 2013(People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) “‘“[E]ach fact pattern must be considered on its own merits.”’” (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 880 .) “The discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether the nervous excitement still dominated and the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 590-591 ; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-319.) 11 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 911 call was not admissible under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code se | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Raley red | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Blakely v. Washington green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| O'Carroll v. Chaparral Airlines, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pervez v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pointer v. Texas green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| California v. Green red | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Dutton v. Evans green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Nelson neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Haskell neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Vernon green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.