spontaneous declaration exception (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

spontaneous declaration exception in California

41 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (30)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Poggigreen
cal · 1988 · cited in 24 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2026
2 sentences

2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne

2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People

1324
Showalter v. Western Pacific Railroadgreen
cal · 1940 · cited in 9 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–2023
2 sentences

2015Code, § 1240.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .)

2015Co., supra, at p. 468.) "[T]he mental state of the declarant—that is, the question of whether he or she was sufficiently under stress so as to dramatically reduce the possibility of deliberation and 12 prevarication—is crucial to determining whether the exception applies." (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 269-270 (Lucas).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Salazar's statement to Canseco was not admissible pursuant to the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

69
People v. Farmergreen
cal · 1989 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–2014
2 sentences

2014A bench trial commenced on January 2, 2013. 9 “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it.’ [Citations.]” (

2009Code, § 1240.) “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.

34
People v. Gutierrezgreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2026
2 sentences

2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne

2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne

27
People v. Thomasgreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti

2016Analysis “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the 9 Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made

24
People v. Merrimangreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026
2 sentences

2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People

2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789,

23
Ohio v. Robertsred
scotus · 1980 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1991
2 sentences

1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab

1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab

23
Mancusi v. Stubbsgreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1991
2 sentences

1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab

1991Evidence admitted under a traditional hearsay exception does not violate the confrontation clause if there are sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of the out-of-court statement. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ]; Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301-302 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Statements admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule are considered reliable because their spontaneity ensures that the declarant has not had time to reflect and fab

23
People v. Browngreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2014
2 sentences

2014(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ].) Defendant argues that Latasha W.’s statement to Officer Martinez did not meet the second Poggi requirement, i.e., the declaration was not made while Latasha W.’s reflective powers remained in abeyance.

2014(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 ].) Defendant argues that Latasha W.’s statement to Officer Martinez did not meet the second Poggi requirement, i.e., the declaration was not made while Latasha W.’s reflective powers remained in abeyance.

22
People v. Damon H.green
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1991
2 sentences

1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s

1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s

22
People v. Morrisongreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti

2023Analysis Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” “ ‘ “To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecti

13
People v. Mataelegreen
cal · 2022 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2026
2 sentences

2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne

2026Code, § 1240 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception”].) Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call under this hearsay 14 exception. “ ‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this ne

12
People v. Gallegogreen
cal · 1990 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2014
2 sentences

2014(People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 175 .) Here, the trial court did not make any findings as to why the citizen’s statements to the sergeant were “spontaneous” declarations.

1991(People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 175 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 679 , 802 P.2d 169 ]; People v. Provencio (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 290, 302 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 330 ].) The trial court admitted the statement based on finding the phone call was staged at the direction of the defendants to make an inquiry for money from Flores’s brother, with Flores “perhaps having been threatened, having been beaten, perhaps even having a gun held on him.” The court believed the event Flores was describing when he said he had been hurt was not the kidnapping 1 or the shooting (which had not yet happened) but was “maybe ho

12
People v. Ordunogreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1991
2 sentences

1991(See In re Damon H. (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 471, 477-479 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 623 ]; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 653, 663 [ 202 Cal. Rptr. 289 ]; People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 738, 746-748 [145 *1267 Cal. Rptr. 806].) Defendant makes no argument that there was anything about the facts of this case that made the declarant's statement unreliable.

1985(Ibid.) 9 The circumstances in People v. Orduno, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 738 , are similar to those in the case at bench.

12
People v. Gutierrezgreen
calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016(Ibid.; see also People v. Gutierrez (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 170, 177-178 (Gutierrez) [trial court exercises discretion in determining whether there is a foundation for admitting spontaneous statements].) In Gutierrez, the defendant was convicted of robbery.

11
People v. Gonzalezgreen
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789,

11
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheelergreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Code, § 1240.) “‘“To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.”’” ( Gutierrez, supra, at pp. 809-810 ; see Peo

11
People v. Lucasgreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Co., supra, at p. 468.) "[T]he mental state of the declarant—that is, the question of whether he or she was sufficiently under stress so as to dramatically reduce the possibility of deliberation and 12 prevarication—is crucial to determining whether the exception applies." (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 269-270 (Lucas).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Salazar's statement to Canseco was not admissible pursuant to the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

2015(Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 270 .) Given that Canseco was not available to testify and that he had not been asked any questions regarding Salazar's demeanor or voice when Salazar made the statement, the trial court had no basis to assess the level of stress or excitement that Salazar may or may not have been under at the time he made the statement.

11
People v. Waidlagreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
People v. Phillipsgreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
People v. Browngreen
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
People v. Forgasongreen
calctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
People v. Pearchgreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
11
People v. Provenciogreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
People v. Jonesgreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
Box v. California Date Growers Assn.green
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
People v. Washingtongreen
cal · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
People v. Francisgreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
11
Kelley v. Russellgreen
calctapp · 1942 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
11
People v. Bazauregreen
calctapp · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Sanchez green
cal · 2019
1 sentence

2026(People v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469 , 477.) “‘To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People

12026–2026
People v. Ramirez green
calctapp · 2006
1 sentence

2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th

12016–2016
People v. Riccardi green
cal · 2012
1 sentence

2016(Ibid.) “‘Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is, in general, largely a question of fact. [Citation.] The determination of the question is vested in the court, not the jury.’” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 .) “On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831 .) The statement Soderbergh heard satisfies the first requirement: th

12016–2016
People v. Clark green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2016Valicia’s testimony made clear, however, that Dawkins’s mental state prevented her “from reflecting on and fabricating her account of what had happened.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 926 .) A short time before Dawkins spoke to Valicia, Brown—an older man whom the teenager Dawkins had just recently met—had repeatedly called her and questioned her about Bacon’s whereabouts, accused her of lying to him and covering for her mother, made belittling and disrespectful comments to her, and physically tried to wrest Bacon’s phone from her by twisting her arm.

12016–2016
People v. Williams green
cal · 1997
1 sentence

2015(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196-197 .) The trial court’s determination of preliminary facts will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.

12015–2015
Crawford v. Washington green
scotus · 2004
2 sentences

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

12014–2014
Davis v. Washington green
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

12014–2014
Michigan v. Bryant green
scotus · 2011
1 sentence

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

12014–2014
People v. Cage green
cal · 2007
2 sentences

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

12014–2014
People v. Blacksher green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2014In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , the California Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court holdings in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ] and Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 224 ], distilling the following principles: (1) the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements, which are “out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial”; (2) to be testimonial, a statement must have occurred “under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity charact

12014–2014
People v. Ervine green
cal · 2009
12013–2013
Rufo v. Simpson green
calctapp · 2001
1 sentence

2013(People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) “‘“[E]ach fact pattern must be considered on its own merits.”’” (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 880 .) “The discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether the nervous excitement still dominated and the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 590-591 ; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-319.) 11 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 911 call was not admissible under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code se

12013–2013
People v. Vines green
cal · 2011
2 sentences

2013No Abuse of Discretion To be admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, “‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce . . . nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 .) “‘“Neithe

2013(People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319 .) “‘“[E]ach fact pattern must be considered on its own merits.”’” (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 880 .) “The discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether the nervous excitement still dominated and the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 590-591 ; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-319.) 11 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 911 call was not admissible under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code se

12013–2013
People v. Raley red
cal · 1992
12006–2006
Blakely v. Washington green
scotus · 2004
12005–2005
People v. Watson green
cal · 1956
12000–2000
O'Carroll v. Chaparral Airlines, Inc. green
scotus · 1989
11991–1991
Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance green
scotus · 1989
11991–1991
Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. green
scotus · 1989
11991–1991
Pervez v. United States green
scotus · 1989
11991–1991
Pointer v. Texas green
scotus · 1965
11985–1985
California v. Green red
scotus · 1970
11985–1985
Dutton v. Evans green
scotus · 1970
11985–1985
People v. Nelson neutral
calctapp · 1960
11967–1967
People v. Haskell neutral
calctapp · 1960
11967–1967
People v. Vernon green
cal · 1868
11967–1967

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1240 (30) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1200 (11) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (11) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (9) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1250 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1252 (5) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1241 (4) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 353 (4) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1101 (3) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 210 (3) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 791 (3) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 1239 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 106 (1965–2026) CA 41 (1967–2026) NY 12 (1977–2002) PA 3 (1986–1988)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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