15 California opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mateo-Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Centergreen2 sentences2019(See Mateo-Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1169 , 1183, 270 Cal.Rptr. 894 [due process does not require a peer review hearing where termination of privileges was the result of administrative decision by hospital to restructure department]; Abrams v. St. 2019(See Mateo-Woodburn v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1169 , 1183, 270 Cal.Rptr. 894 [due process does not require a peer review hearing where termination of privileges was the result of administrative decision by hospital to restructure department]; Abrams v. St. | 1 | 2 |
Abrams v. St. John's Hospital & Health Centergreen2 sentences2019John's Hospital & Health Center (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628 , 639, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 [individual physician, who contracted with a hospital to supply exclusive medical services, is bound by the express waiver of due process hearing rights otherwise afforded him or her under the Business and Professions Code where the physician's contract was terminated for reasons unrelated to the physician's medical competency].) Moreover, section 809.6 expressly prohibits a contractual waiver of peer review proceedings in cases where a physician's medical competency is at issue. 2019John's Hospital & Health Center (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628 , 639, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 [individual physician, who contracted with a hospital to supply exclusive medical services, is bound by the express waiver of due process hearing rights otherwise afforded him or her under the Business and Professions Code where the physician's contract was terminated for reasons unrelated to the physician's medical competency].) Moreover, section 809.6 expressly prohibits a contractual waiver of peer review proceedings in cases where a physician's medical competency is at issue. | 1 | 2 |
Comstock v. Abergreen2 sentences2018Citing a number of cases that reached similar conclusions, the court explained that " '[t]he question is what is pled-not what is proven.' " ( Id. at p. 217, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 , quoting Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931 , 942, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ( Comstock ).) Similarly, courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs opposing anti-SLAPP motions to disavow their own allegations in favor of evidence that is inconsistent with their complaints. 2018Citing a number of cases that reached similar conclusions, the court explained that " '[t]he question is what is pled-not what is proven.' " ( Id. at p. 217, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 , quoting Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931 , 942, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ( Comstock ).) Similarly, courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs opposing anti-SLAPP motions to disavow their own allegations in favor of evidence that is inconsistent with their complaints. | 1 | 2 |
Tumey v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2021(American Motors Sales Corp., supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 988 ; see id. at p. 987; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 579 [adjudicator’s “financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey [v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 510 ]” for it to be disqualifying (italics added)].) Reading section 809.2(b) against this backdrop, we agree with both sides that the question before us is not simply whether the hearing officer will receive a guaranteed payout depending on the results of the peer review hearing. 2021(American Motors Sales Corp., supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 988 ; see id. at p. 987; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 579 [adjudicator’s “financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey [v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 510 ]” for it to be disqualifying (italics added)].) Reading section 809.2(b) against this backdrop, we agree with both sides that the question before us is not simply whether the hearing officer will receive a guaranteed payout depending on the results of the peer review hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Berryhillgreen1 sentence2021(American Motors Sales Corp., supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 988 ; see id. at p. 987; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 579 [adjudicator’s “financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey [v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 510 ]” for it to be disqualifying (italics added)].) Reading section 809.2(b) against this backdrop, we agree with both sides that the question before us is not simply whether the hearing officer will receive a guaranteed payout depending on the results of the peer review hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2020Code, § 809 et seq.; see generally Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85 , 108–110 [discussing selection of arbitrator or individual(s) conducting peer reviewing hearing].) VSP is correct that certain of the arbitration procedures mirror the statutory requirements, such as the provision that the arbitrators or individuals conducting a peer review hearing cannot stand to gain any direct financial benefit from the outcome, they cannot have participated in the peer investigation, and they cannot be practicing in the same specialty as the provider who is subject o | 1 | 1 |
Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A.green2 sentences2016As our high court said in Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377 , 241 P.3d 870 ]: “Use of the indefinite articles ‘a’ or ‘an’ signals a general reference, while use of the definite article ‘the’ (or ‘these’ in the instance of plural nouns) refers to a specific person, place, or thing.” (Italics added.) 3. 2016As our high court said in Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377 , 241 P.3d 870 ]: “Use of the indefinite articles ‘a’ or ‘an’ signals a general reference, while use of the definite article ‘the’ (or ‘these’ in the instance of plural nouns) refers to a specific person, place, or thing.” (Italics added.) 3. | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2011(Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 ], citing cases (Jordan).) Defendant contends the arbitrator exceeded her powers when she assessed emotional distress damages by doubling the economic damages, an approach defendant says was “arbitrary” and did not “weigh[] the evidence and apply[] reasoned judgment.” In addition, defendant argues the award violates public policy by “circumventing the peer review hearing process” and by “violating] the constitutionally-imposed public policy limits on punitive damage awards.” None of defendant’s conten 2011(Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 ], citing cases (Jordan).) Defendant contends the arbitrator exceeded her powers when she assessed emotional distress damages by doubling the economic damages, an approach defendant says was “arbitrary” and did not “weigh[] the evidence and apply[] reasoned judgment.” In addition, defendant argues the award violates public policy by “circumventing the peer review hearing process” and by “violating] the constitutionally-imposed public policy limits on punitive damage awards.” None of defendant’s conten | 1 | 1 |
Applebaum v. Board of Directors of Barton Memorial Hospitalgreen1 sentence2005These latter failures deprive the physician of basic procedural protections that are fundamental to any fair administrative remedy, whether the remedy is governed by principles of “fair procedure” or “due process.” (See Applebaum v. Board of Directors, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 657 [noting that “[ajdequate notice of charges and a reasonable opportunity to respond are basic to both” fair procedure and due process].) Although the failure to provide Dr. Dennis with a hearing certainly would have constituted a denial of a basic procedural protection justifying an immediate tort action under West | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Memorial Med. Center)green2 sentences2001The court acknowledged that a strict reading of the definition of “criminal action” in Penal Code section 683 “would seem to exclude special proceedings of a criminal nature in which a defendant has not yet been charged.” (Memorial Medical Center, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 388.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal determined that excluding a proceeding under Penal Code section 1524 from the definition of “criminal action” in Evidence Code section 1157 would frustrate the legislative purpose of not permitting the peer review privilege to hamper the discovery and prosecution of criminally neglig 2001The determination in Memorial Medical Center, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 363 , that a proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1524 constitutes a criminal action specifically was limited to the meaning of that term as used in Evidence Code section 1157. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Natarajan v. Dignity Health
green
2 sentences2025Making the observation in the context of a case involving a hospital’s medical staff, our Supreme Court explained, “[s]ince a hospital’s medical staff is made up of doctors and other licentiates who could one day themselves be subject to a peer review hearing, each medical staff has an incentive to ensure fairness in the process for conducting peer review . . . .” (Natarajan, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1114 , italics added.) The statute does contain one express exception to the policy that licentiates should perform peer review. 2025(Natarajan, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1103 .) However, the statute expressly provides that a hearing officer’s role is merely to play a facilitative role, in that “the hearing officer . . . shall not act as a prosecuting officer or advocate, and shall not be entitled to vote.” (§ 809.2, subd (b).) The express statutory prohibition on any participation by a hearing officer in the final vote in a peer review hearing serves to underscore the policy that licentiates perform peer review. 14 The Board has requested that we take judicial notice of legislative history materials from 1989. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
El-Attar v. Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
green
1 sentence2025“Under California’s peer review statute, a hospital must afford a physician a fair hearing before revoking the physician’s staff privileges.” (Natarajan v. Dignity Health (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1095 , 1101.) The peer review statute “establishes minimum protections for physicians subject to adverse action in the peer review system.” (Mileikowsky, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1268 .) “The statutory scheme guarantees, among other things, a physician’s right to notice and a hearing before a neutral arbitrator or an unbiased panel, the right to call and confront witnesses and to present evidence, and the rig | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mileikowsky v. West Hills Hospital & Medical Center
green
1 sentence2025“Under California’s peer review statute, a hospital must afford a physician a fair hearing before revoking the physician’s staff privileges.” (Natarajan v. Dignity Health (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1095 , 1101.) The peer review statute “establishes minimum protections for physicians subject to adverse action in the peer review system.” (Mileikowsky, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1268 .) “The statutory scheme guarantees, among other things, a physician’s right to notice and a hearing before a neutral arbitrator or an unbiased panel, the right to call and confront witnesses and to present evidence, and the rig | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bode v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Medical Center
green
1 sentence2024Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (d); Bode v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Medical Center (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236 ; Ellison v. Sequoia Health Services (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1495-1496 ; Sitrick Group, LLC v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1059 , 1065 (Sitrick).) A. Arbitrator’s failure to disclose publicly available information prior to the peer review hearing Nowzari argues that the arbitrator erred in failing to disclose two prior peer review proceedings in which the arbitrator and opposing counsel had been involved—namely, (1) a 2002 proceeding in which the arbitrator | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ellison v. SEQUOIA HEALTH SERVICES
green
1 sentence2024Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (d); Bode v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Medical Center (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236 ; Ellison v. Sequoia Health Services (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1495-1496 ; Sitrick Group, LLC v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1059 , 1065 (Sitrick).) A. Arbitrator’s failure to disclose publicly available information prior to the peer review hearing Nowzari argues that the arbitrator erred in failing to disclose two prior peer review proceedings in which the arbitrator and opposing counsel had been involved—namely, (1) a 2002 proceeding in which the arbitrator | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Pegastaff v. Public Utilities Commission
green
1 sentence2024Moreover, the only legal authority that mentions section 396’s requirement that a superior court transfer an “appeal or petition” to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court if it lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter itself is PegaStaff v. Public Utilities Com. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 374 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
American Motors Sales Corp. v. NEW MOTOR VEH. BD.
green
1 sentence2021(American Motors Sales Corp., supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 988 ; see id. at p. 987; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 579 [adjudicator’s “financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey [v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 510 ]” for it to be disqualifying (italics added)].) Reading section 809.2(b) against this backdrop, we agree with both sides that the question before us is not simply whether the hearing officer will receive a guaranteed payout depending on the results of the peer review hearing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cal. Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
green
2 sentences2019The trial court rejected a similar argument made by the hospital on the ground that plaintiff was not required to exhaust such an administrative remedy because the hospital did not make that remedy available to him. ( Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 478, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 .) The hospital has not challenged this ruling on appeal and we therefore decline to consider the argument further. ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd . (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1048-1049, fn. 12, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64 , 416 P.3d 53 .) Amicus 2019The trial court rejected a similar argument made by the hospital on the ground that plaintiff was not required to exhaust such an administrative remedy because the hospital did not make that remedy available to him. ( Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 478, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 .) The hospital has not challenged this ruling on appeal and we therefore decline to consider the argument further. ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd . (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1048-1049, fn. 12, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64 , 416 P.3d 53 .) Amicus | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2019The trial court rejected a similar argument made by the hospital on the ground that plaintiff was not required to exhaust such an administrative remedy because the hospital did not make that remedy available to him. ( Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 478, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 .) The hospital has not challenged this ruling on appeal and we therefore decline to consider the argument further. ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd . (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1048-1049, fn. 12, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64 , 416 P.3d 53 .) Amicus 2019The trial court rejected a similar argument made by the hospital on the ground that plaintiff was not required to exhaust such an administrative remedy because the hospital did not make that remedy available to him. ( Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 478, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 551 P.2d 410 .) The hospital has not challenged this ruling on appeal and we therefore decline to consider the argument further. ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd . (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1048-1049, fn. 12, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64 , 416 P.3d 53 .) Amicus | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health
green
1 sentence2018Citing a number of cases that reached similar conclusions, the court explained that " '[t]he question is what is pled-not what is proven.' " ( Id. at p. 217, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 , quoting Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931 , 942, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ( Comstock ).) Similarly, courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs opposing anti-SLAPP motions to disavow their own allegations in favor of evidence that is inconsistent with their complaints. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem
green
2 sentences2009And in Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 531 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ], disapproved by the majority here (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1273), the same Court of Appeal panel upheld a hearing officer’s sanction of terminating a hospital peer review proceeding for, among other things, plaintiff’s noncompliance with orders to produce documents relating to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center’s termination of plaintiff’s medical staff privileges—the same information that plaintiff refused to furnish here—and disruptions of the peer review hearing sessions by yelling, disobeying the hearing off 2009And in Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 531 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 ], disapproved by the majority here (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1273), the same Court of Appeal panel upheld a hearing officer’s sanction of terminating a hospital peer review proceeding for, among other things, plaintiff’s noncompliance with orders to produce documents relating to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center’s termination of plaintiff’s medical staff privileges—the same information that plaintiff refused to furnish here—and disruptions of the peer review hearing sessions by yelling, disobeying the hearing off | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Morris v. County of Marin
green
2 sentences2005As our Supreme Court explained in Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 559 P.2d 606 ]: “[T]he ‘directory’ or ‘mandatory’ designation . . . denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates. [Citations.] fiO Thus, for example, if a court determines that a city council’s failure to comply with a particular procedural step in enacting an ordinance does not invalidate the resulting ordinance, which is the culmination of those ste 2005As our Supreme Court explained in Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 559 P.2d 606 ]: “[T]he ‘directory’ or ‘mandatory’ designation . . . denotes whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates. [Citations.] fiO Thus, for example, if a court determines that a city council’s failure to comply with a particular procedural step in enacting an ordinance does not invalidate the resulting ordinance, which is the culmination of those ste | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.