peer review privilege in Massachusetts

2007See Carr v. Howard, supra at 532 (“the peer review privilege imposes some hardship on litigants seeking to discover information from hospital records, but the Legislature has clearly chosen to impose that burden on individual litigants in order to improve the medical peer review process generally”).

2006Once the judge has made that determination, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a showing that the proceedings themselves (rather than the reasons for initiating the proceedings, which the plaintiff was free to discover) were not conducted “in good faith.” We have recognized that “the peer review privilege imposes some hardship on litigants seeking to discover information from hospital records, but the Legislature has clearly chosen to impose that burden on individual litigants in order to improve the medical peer review process generally.” Id. at 532 .

2002Fundamentally, it seems that it is information gathering, analysis, and the results of the medical peer review process that G.L.c. 111, §204(a) protects. 6 See Beth Israel Hospital Association v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 401 Mass. 172, 182 (1987) (the peer review privilege is “designed to foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s peers”); Swatch v. Treat, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 559, 563 (1996) (“[p]eer review committees have a profound interest in the sanctity and protection of the confidentiality under which they operate.

2002Fundamentally, it seems that it is information gathering, analysis, and the results of the medical peer review process that G.L.c. 111, §204(a) protects. 6 See Beth Israel Hospital Association v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 401 Mass. 172, 182 (1987) (the peer review privilege is “designed to foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s peers”); Swatch v. Treat, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 559, 563 (1996) (“[p]eer review committees have a profound interest in the sanctity and protection of the confidentiality under which they operate.

2002Fundamentally, it seems that it is information gathering, analysis, and the results of the medical peer review process that G.L.c. 111, §204(a) protects. 6 See Beth Israel Hospital Association v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 401 Mass. 172, 182 (1987) (the peer review privilege is “designed to foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s peers”); Swatch v. Treat, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 559, 563 (1996) (“[p]eer review committees have a profound interest in the sanctity and protection of the confidentiality under which they operate.

1994It is the explicit intent of 243 CMR 300 that such safeguards be strengthened to the extent permitted by law.” The Supreme Judicial Court, in Beth Israel Hospital Association v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 401 Mass. 172, 182 (1987), in denying the Board of Medicine access to peer review committee proceedings, reports and records, noted that the peer review committee privilege “was designed to foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s peers.” Portions of the regulations indicate that the peer review privilege was intended to extend beyond de jure committee proceeding

2005“The peer review privilege does not rest on its threshold confidentiality as between the parties to the litigation [as does, for example, the attorney-client privilege], but instead is designed to foster a candid exchange of information regarding the quality of medical care.” Id.

2002I am mindful of Miller’s admonition that where “the applicability of the privilege is less than clear from the facts, or where the record permits multiple alternative determinations of facts bearing on the privilege questions, findings by the trial judge of subsidiary facts supporting the determinations would assist appellate review.” Id. 54 Mass.App.Ct. at 501 (citation omitted).

2025Finally, Bredice was cited with approval in Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital, 214 N.W. 2d 490, 492 (Neb. 1974) to prevent plaintiff’s use of review committee minutes and reports at trial Other jurisdictions have refrained from the creation of a peer review privilege.

2005In Massachusetts, privileges are exceptions to the general dufy on all people to testify," Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 5 (1982), and must be strictly construed.

2005The peer review privilege, like all privileges, must be construed in light of the bedrock principle that the law is entitled to eveiy man’s evidence. 1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).

2005See Commonwealth v. Choate-Symmes Health Servs., 406 Mass. 27, 28-29 (1989) (narrowly construing exception to statutory language barring procurement of peer review committee records for use in judicial or administrative proceedings).

1998The court should have conducted an in camera review on a document-by-document basis to determine whether the materials sought were protected by the peer review privilege”), with Community Hosps. of Indianapolis, Inc, v. Medtronic, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 448, 452-453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that in camera review was not appropriate where hospital’s affidavits showed a “process and structure” through which incident reports were submitted to peer review committee, and noting that Indiana peer review statute provides explicitly that “all communications to a peer review committee shall be privilege

1998See, e.g., Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996) (permitting in camera review under Iowa’s peer review statute, Iowa Code § 147.1 [8]); Memorial Hosp. - The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 3, 12 (Tex. 1996); Monty v. Warren Hosp.

1998See, e.g., Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996) (permitting in camera review under Iowa’s peer review statute, Iowa Code § 147.1 [8]); Memorial Hosp. - The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 3, 12 (Tex. 1996); Monty v. Warren Hosp.