cause for an evidentiary hearing in Florida

2018“Blindsiding a party by announcing on the day of the hearing that the court will entertain evidence at a hearing not noticed as an evidentiary hearing is the epitome of a due process violation.” Messing v. Nieradka, 230 So. 3d 962 , (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citing Jackson v. Leon Cty.

2013We therefore “reverse and remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing from which the court can determine the necessary findings required by section 61.13001.” Mata, 75 So.3d at 343 .

2011In Beltran, 982 So.2d at 26 , this Court reversed the trial court’s denial, and found that Evaristo and Grisel had been denied due process, in part because “Evaristo Beltran was not given notice of the sale or of the proceedings against the house.” We remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing specifically to give Evaristo and Grisel “a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the homestead and other defenses.” Id.

2011In Beltran, 982 So.2d at 26 , this Court reversed the trial court’s denial, and found that Evaristo and Grisel had been denied due process, in part because “Evaristo Beltran was not given notice of the sale or of the proceedings against the house.” We remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing specifically to give Evaristo and Grisel “a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the homestead and other defenses.” Id.

2008See Ridenour v. State, 768 So.2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (counsel held ineffective for failing to object to impeachment evidence of prior felony conviction where adjudication was withheld); Wright v. State, 446 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (granting post-conviction relief where counsel elicited testimony that defendant was previously convicted of five crimes when convictions were only misdemeanors).

1994In Gunn v. State, 612 So.2d 643 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), this court reversed the trial court and remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Gunn had told his trial counsel that he wanted to appeal and whether trial counsel neglected to file the notice of appeal.

1993Id.

1991Meeks v. State, 382 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1980).

1991In Kent v. Burdick, 573 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), this court reversed the lower court's order denying visitation and remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the natural father's visitation would be detrimental to the child.

1991As this court in Kent, 573 So.2d at 63-64 , stated: The United States Supreme Court has held that a natural father, absent a finding that he is unfit, has a due process right to maintain a parental relationship with his children.

1987See Mercer; see also, Austin v. Papol, 464 So.2d 1338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Sunstream Jet Center, Inc. v. Lisa Leasing Corp., 423 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

1987In doing so, the court was persuaded by the rationale of In re Grand Jury Matter (Appeal of James Gilbert Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir.1985) (hereinafter Brown).

1983See Mercy Hos pital, Inc. v. Johnson, 431 So.2d 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cohen v. Cohen, 400 So.2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

1980Coates v. United States, 273 F.2d 514 (D.C.Cir.1959); see, Manley v. United States, 396 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1968).

1969Therefore on authority of Jackson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 194 , we reverse the order summarily denying the appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief and remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing.

1969On remand the trial court shall proceed in accordance with the directions announced in the Jackson case: “If the trial court concludes, on hearing with reference to the petitioner’s claim relating to appeal, that an appeal was not omitted under circumstances such as to amount to intentional relinquishment or an abandonment of the right to appeal, and that petitioner desired to appeal and was thwarted as he alleges, then the trial court may again consider (as on a delayed motion for new trial) the other listed contentions * * * and rule thereon as the merits of the several contentions may requi