JCC rule in Florida

2017Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So.2d 897, 900 (Fla. 1973) (on rehearing).

2017Regardless, the JCC ultimately barred the E/C from raising the MCC defense citing waiver pursuant to the “120-Day Rule.” In the order, the JCC applied the analysis discussed in Sierra v. Metropolitan Protective Services, 188 So. 3d 863, 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), to 12 find: (1) the date the E/C first provided the benefits; (2) the specific identity of the injury for which benefits were provided; and (3) whether the E/C timely denied compensability of that injury within the 120 day period immediately following the provision of benefits for that injury.

2017Id. at 867 .

2015In contrast to the petitioners in 5-H Corp., Petitioner here relies on her substantive right to disqualify the JCC under rule 2.330(d), where the ultimate question is whether Petitioner alleged facts that “would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” MacKenzie, 565 So.2d at 1334 -35 (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d, 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)).

2013See Ballard v. Edd Helms Group, 79 So.3d 88, 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), reh’g denied (Feb. 9, 2012) (holding JCC erred in finding E/C overpaid benefits based on defense untimely asserted—first raised by the E/C in written closing argument submitted after final hearing).

2012See also Otis Elevator Co. v. Bryan, 489 So.2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (noting that discovery depositions that serve useful purpose at trial are admissible even if not offered into evidence).

2012In McArthur , this Court declined to require the JCC to rule on the claimant’s claim that the E/C committed fraud, stating that “[a] JCC has only those powers expressly provided by statute.” 35 So.3d at 106-07 .

2012We concluded that “as the JCC recognized at the final hearing, had the Legislature intended to give the JCC the authority to sanction an E/C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09(4) for fraud by employees.” Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).

2012See Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

2012See Hernandez v. Manatee County Gov’t, 50 So.3d 57, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming JCC’s analysis that relevant inquiry when assessing costs was whether information was relevant to any issue, not whether it was originally obtained in connection with different proceeding).

2010See, e.g., Crawford & Co. v. Baxla, 746 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding JCC’s error in admitting and relying upon inadmissible medical testimony was harmless where JCC also relied upon testimony of authorized IME, which essentially mirrored improperly admitted testimony, but explaining affir-mance under such facts “should be viewed as a rare exception” and noting, in the future, such erroneous admissions will likely result in reversal).

2005Cf. Chapman v. Nationsbank, 872 So.2d 390, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing the JCC's order and remanding because it was not clear from an examination of the order whether the JCC found that the claimant had violated section 440.105(4)(b) and directing that, on remand, the JCC should rule that the claimant's statements fall within the scope of section 440.105(4)(b) if the statements were knowingly or intentionally false, incomplete, or misleading, concerned material facts, and were made for the purpose of obtaining benefits).

2004See Hernandez, 856 So.2d at 1142 . *641 REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions for further proceedings.

1996Id.; see Reed v. Reed, 643 So.2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).