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15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fundgreen2 sentences2017In the alternative, Bayview argues that if 1010 Lake Shore imposes a promptness requirement, it should not be applied retroactively, since 1010 Lake Shore was not decided until more than five months after Bayview’s partial tender. ¶ 13 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo (Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005)), as is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment (Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006)). 2017In the alternative, Bayview argues that if 1010 Lake Shore imposes a promptness requirement, it should not be applied retroactively since 1010 Lake Shore was not decided until more than five months after Bayview’s partial tender. ¶ 13 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo (Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005)), as is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment (Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006)). | 2 | 2 |
Allegis Realty Investors v. Novakgreen2 sentences2017In the alternative, Bayview argues that if 1010 Lake Shore imposes a promptness requirement, it should not be applied retroactively, since 1010 Lake Shore was not decided until more than five months after Bayview’s partial tender. ¶ 13 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo (Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005)), as is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment (Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006)). 2017In the alternative, Bayview argues that if 1010 Lake Shore imposes a promptness requirement, it should not be applied retroactively since 1010 Lake Shore was not decided until more than five months after Bayview’s partial tender. ¶ 13 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo (Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595 (2005)), as is the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment (Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006)). | 2 | 2 |
County of Riverside v. McLaughlingreen2 sentences2025In McLaughlin, the Supreme Court defined “promptly,” holding that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with - 16 - No. 1-23-1047 the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 . 2005Ed. 2d at 71-72 , 95 S. Ct. at 868-69 . “[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 , 114 L. | 1 | 6 |
Shawgo v. Department of Children & Family Servicesgreen1 sentence2007See Shawgo v. Department of Children & Family Services, 182 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
1010 Lake Shore Association v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
green
2 sentences2017In interpreting a statute, our main goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1010 Lake Shore, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 21 . 2017In interpreting a statute, our main goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1010 Lake Shore, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 21 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Barry v. Barchi
green
2 sentences2007As expressed in Barry, due process requires that a party “be assured a prompt postsuspension hearing, one that would proceed and be concluded without appreciable delay.” Barry, 443 U.S. at 66 , 61 L. 2007As expressed in Barry, due process requires that a party “be assured a prompt postsuspension hearing, one that would proceed and be concluded without appreciable delay.” Barry, 443 U.S. at 66 , 61 L. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences2005Ed. 2d at 71-72 , 95 S. Ct. at 868-69 . “[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 , 114 L. 1992Ed. 2d at 71-72 , 95 S. Ct. at 868-69 .) In County of Riverside, the court held that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. | 2 | 1992–2005 |
Holt v. Feigenbaum
neutral
2 sentences1999ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1103-04 (1997), citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676 , 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980) (discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees). 1999ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1103-04 (1997), citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676 , 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980) (discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
In re Jennings
neutral
2 sentences1999ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1103-04 (1997), citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676 , 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980) (discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees). 1999ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1103-04 (1997), citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676 , 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980) (discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
The People v. Damen
green
1 sentence1987(People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 472-73 , 193 N.E.2d 25 .) Defendant argues that the five-day delay in reporting the incident now before us violated the promptness requirement and that the complaint was not spontaneous but made only in response to questions posed to complainant by Raasch. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Salas
neutral
1 sentence1987App. 3d 48 , 485 N.E.2d 596 , this court held that the promptness requirement of the common law hearsay exception was not incorporated into the statutory exception created by section 115 — 10. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Arbogast
green
1 sentence1979App. 3d 187, 191 , 353 N.E.2d 434, 438 ), but, nevertheless, dismissed the indictment on the ground the delay between arrest and indictment violated the promptness requirement of section 7. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.