15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Pagegreen2 sentences2024But what if a pre-existing, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity—a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suit—nonetheless barred the taxpayers’ refund suit? [Citations.] Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers’ refund claim.” ¶ 25 The Sundance Homes court continued that the United States Supreme Court “has repeatedly affirmed the notion that a statute of limitation may bar a tax refund action, notwithstanding the Court’s rulin 2024The court concluded: “Undoubtedly, statutes of limitation are valid procedural restrictions which may be invoked to bar an otherwise meritorious claim for a refund, even when that claim is based upon a tax statute that has been held unconstitutional.” Id. at 270 . ¶ 26 Resolution of the certified question hinges on whether the above holding in Sundance Homes applies only when the claim for a refund is based on a statute that has been held unconstitutional or whether it applies in another void judgment context—specifically, a void agency determination. | 1 | 2 |
Parmar v. Madigangreen1 sentence2025See Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 26 (citing Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 51 ). - 10 - ¶ 38 The appellate court concluded “the defendant circuit court clerks collected the filing fees from the plaintiffs in violation of the constitution and absent legal authority to do so; accordingly, their actions were not considered as actions by the State.” 2023 IL App (3d) 220387, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2025Plaintiffs appealed. -4- ¶ 14 The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the cause again, holding that (1) the Court of Claims would lack jurisdiction over the refund claim because it could not decide constitutional matters or grant equitable relief and (2) the refund claim fell within the officer-suit exception to sovereign immunity because the complaint had sought restitution, not damages, as well as an injunction. 2023 IL App (3d) 220387, ¶¶ 19, 25 . 2025Plaintiffs appealed. -4- ¶ 14 The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the cause again, holding that (1) the Court of Claims would lack jurisdiction over the refund claim because it could not decide constitutional matters or grant equitable relief and (2) the refund claim fell within the officer-suit exception to sovereign immunity because the complaint had sought restitution, not damages, as well as an injunction. 2023 IL App (3d) 220387, ¶¶ 19, 25 . | 1 | 1 |
Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grovegreen1 sentence2025The dispositive question is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the separate refund claim that was pending on remand, and the refund claim is the type of claim to be addressed by the Court of Claims. - 11 - ¶ 41 Plaintiffs argue that, even if sovereign immunity bars a claim for damages, they are, in fact, seeking restitution because “ ‘[d]amages differs from restitution in that damages is measured by the plaintiff’s loss; restitution is measured by the defendant’s unjust gain.’ ” Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 257 (2004) (quoting 1 Dan B. | 1 | 1 |
Leetaru v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinoisgreen1 sentence2025See Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 26 (citing Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 51 ). - 10 - ¶ 38 The appellate court concluded “the defendant circuit court clerks collected the filing fees from the plaintiffs in violation of the constitution and absent legal authority to do so; accordingly, their actions were not considered as actions by the State.” 2023 IL App (3d) 220387, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Application of County Treasurergreen1 sentence2019See In re Application of the County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d 253 , 258 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Horn v. the City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2019See Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 231 Ill. 2d at 80 (with regard to tax on casinos with adjusted gross receipts over $200 million, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and not taxed and there was a reasonable relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation); Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (with regard to tax imposed on sale of carry-out food purchased at restaurants but not grocery stores, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and | 1 | 1 |
Citibank, N.A. v. The Illinois Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2019Pursuant to the UTA, all refund claims are required to be filed by the taxpayer within the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 21 of the UTA, which states in pertinent part: “As to any claim for credit or refund filed with the Department on and after January 1 but on or before June 30 of any given year, no amount of tax or penalty or interest erroneously paid (either in total or partial liquidation of a tax or penalty 8 or interest under this Act) more than 3 years prior to such January 1 shall be credited or refunded[.]” Id. § 21. 2019However, neither the UTA nor the ROTA provides that the Department’s audit or audit form tolls or restarts the taxpayer’s three-year statute of limitations period to file a refund claim. ¶ 26 Redbox’s contention that the Department’s audit or audit form implicitly tolled or restarted the limitation period to file a refund claim for use taxes paid over three years prior thus runs contrary to the longstanding Illinois common law prohibiting tolling absent explicit statutory authority (id.) and ignores case law acknowledging strict tax refunding statutes (Citibank, N.A., 2017 IL 121634, ¶ 40 (cou | 1 | 1 |
Giles v. Parksgreen1 sentence2019However, neither the UTA nor the ROTA provides that the Department’s audit or audit form tolls or restarts the taxpayer’s three-year statute of limitations period to file a refund claim. ¶ 26 Redbox’s contention that the Department’s audit or audit form implicitly tolled or restarted the limitation period to file a refund claim for use taxes paid over three years prior thus runs contrary to the longstanding Illinois common law prohibiting tolling absent explicit statutory authority (id.) and ignores case law acknowledging strict tax refunding statutes (Citibank, N.A., 2017 IL 121634, ¶ 40 (cou | 1 | 1 |
Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannouliasgreen1 sentence2019See Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 231 Ill. 2d at 80 (with regard to tax on casinos with adjusted gross receipts over $200 million, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and not taxed and there was a reasonable relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation); Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (with regard to tax imposed on sale of carry-out food purchased at restaurants but not grocery stores, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and | 1 | 1 |
Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authoritygreen1 sentence2019See Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 231 Ill. 2d at 80 (with regard to tax on casinos with adjusted gross receipts over $200 million, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and not taxed and there was a reasonable relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation); Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (with regard to tax imposed on sale of carry-out food purchased at restaurants but not grocery stores, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and | 1 | 1 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2019American Airlines, 402 Ill. 2019Id. ¶ 25 Longstanding Illinois common law prohibits tolling of a statute of limitations absent explicit statutory authority. | 1 | 1 |
Langendorf v. City of Urbanagreen1 sentence2019See Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 231 Ill. 2d at 80 (with regard to tax on casinos with adjusted gross receipts over $200 million, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and not taxed and there was a reasonable relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation); Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (with regard to tax imposed on sale of carry-out food purchased at restaurants but not grocery stores, no violation of uniformity clause because there was a real and substantial difference between those taxed and | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dalm
green
2 sentences2019That a taxpayer does not learn until after the limitations period has run that a tax was paid in error, and that he or she has a ground upon which to claim a refund, does not operate to lift the statutory bar.’ ” Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 267 (2001) (quoting United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 , 609 n.7 (1990)). 2007That a taxpayer does not learn until after the limitations period has run that a tax was paid in error, and that he or she has a ground upon which to claim a refund, does not operate to lift the statutory bar.” (Emphasis added.) Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609 n.7, 108 L. | 5 | 2001–2019 |
Dow Chemical Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2009At the hearing, American argued that (1) the additional refund that it sought was not filed outside of the statute of limitations because it was a mere amendment to the original refund claim, as it did not raise any new factual or legal issues, but merely sought a larger dollar amount for the same type 6 We note that although there is some confusion as to what amount of refund American was actually denied based upon the language of the Notice of Tentative Denial of Claim for Use Tax, which states that American is denied the refund amount of $701,932, the record reveals, and the parties do not 2009App. 3d 263 , 586 N.E.2d 516 , permitting the tolling of the statute of limitations for any amendment thereunder; (3) that alternatively the second refund claim was not time-barred because it related back to the initial refund claim pursuant to section 2-616(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code of Civil Procedure) (735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2006)); (4) that denying American’s second refund claim would constitute bad public policy and deny American its right to due process of law. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Phelan v. Village of LaGrange Park Police Pension Fund
green
2 sentences2005Since there is no specific statutory provision governing refunds when a police pension is terminated under section 3 — 147, the Board relied on Phelan v. Village of LaGrange Park Police Pension Fund, 327 Ill. 2005Since there is no specific statutory provision governing refunds when a police pension is terminated under section 3-147, the Board relied on Phelan v. Village of LaGrange Park Police Pension Fund , 327 Ill. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde
green
2 sentences2001But what if a pre-existing, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity — a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suit— nonetheless barred the taxpayers’ refund suit? [Citations.] Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers’ refund claim.” Hyde, 514 U.S. at 756 , 131 L. 2001But what if a pre-existing, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with retroactivity — a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suit— nonetheless barred the taxpayers’ refund suit? [Citations.] Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers’ refund claim.” Hyde, 514 U.S. at 756 , 131 L. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Ross v. City of Geneva
green
2 sentences2001We could make the same observation with respect to Ross v. City of Geneva, 71 Ill.2d 27 , 15 Ill.Dec. 658 , 373 N.E.2d 1342 (1978), upon which appellants rely. 2001We could make the same observation with respect to Ross v. City of Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27 (1978), upon which appellants rely. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
cluster 465388
green
2 sentences1997Plaintiff had two years from the date of payment to file for a refund and challenge his liability (see USLife , 784 F.2d at 1243 ) and, therefore, the IRS's right to retain the section 6672 assessment terminated after March 30, 1997, assuming plaintiff followed his intention not to file for a refund. 1997Plaintiff had two years from the date of payment to file for a refund and challenge his liability (see USLife, 784 F.2d at 1243 ) and, therefore, the IRS’s right to retain the section 6672 assessment terminated after March 30, 1997, assuming plaintiff followed his intention not to file for a refund. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission
green
2 sentences1993(See Williams, 139 Ill.2d at 52 , 150 Ill.Dec. 578 , 563 N.E.2d 465 .) Notably, the Reciprocal Act of the Code is legislation specifically concerned with the "continuity and preservation of pension credit * * * in the case of employees transferring employment * * * [for the purpose of] [assuring] full and continuous pension credit for all service in public employment which is covered by a retirement system." (40 ILCS 5/20-101 (West 1992).) It further provides that acceptance of a refund is a waiver of pension credit unless repayment of the refund, including interest, is made. (40 ILCS 5/20-118 1993(See Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 52 .) Notably, the Reciprocal Act of the Code is legislation specifically concerned with the “continuity and preservation of pension credit *** in the case of employees transferring employment *** [for the purpose of] assuring] full and continuous pension credit for all service in public employment which is covered by a retirement system.” (40 ILCS 5/20 — 101 (West 1992).) It further provides that acceptance of a refund is a waiver of pension credit unless repayment of the refund, including interest, is made. (40 ILCS 5/20 — 118 (West 1992).) Thus, we can conclude | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Hampton v. City of Chicago
neutral
1 sentence2024Our answer, for the reasons explained above, is yes. ¶ 38 Certified question answered. 14 No. 1-23-1460 Hampton v. City of Chicago, 2024 IL App (1st) 231460 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-CH- 1089; the Hon. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.