refund claim in Texas

2021But we did not consider whether an assignee could bring a tax refund claim if the assignor did not refund some or “all the taxes and interest to the person from whom the taxes were collected.” See Tex. Tax Code § 111.104(f).3 3 The Assignees argue that this Court’s statement in Levy v. OfficeMax, Inc. that the taxpayers “may file a refund claim with the Comptroller once they have procured an assignment from the Retailers,” 228 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.), is “the law of this case” and “firmly established these plaintiffs have standing.” But regarding constitutional standin

2021But we did not consider whether an assignee could bring a tax refund claim if the assignor did not refund some or “all the taxes and interest to the person from whom the taxes were collected.” See Tex. Tax Code § 111.104(f).3 3 The Assignees argue that this Court’s statement in Levy v. OfficeMax, Inc. that the taxpayers “may file a refund claim with the Comptroller once they have procured an assignment from the Retailers,” 228 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.), is “the law of this case” and “firmly established these plaintiffs have standing.” But regarding constitutional standin

2009GATX Terminals Corp. v. Rylander , 78 S.W.3d 630, 634-35 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.).

2009GATX Terminals Corp. v. Rylander, 78 S.W.3d 630, 634-35 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

1998The exception, discussed at length in Borden Inc. v. Sharp, 888 S.W.2d 614 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, writ denied), was repealed effective September 1, 1993, before the date Overhead Door filed the refund claim at issue here.

1998The exception, discussed at length in Borden Inc. v. Sharp , 888 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, writ denied), was repealed effective September 1, 1993, before the date Overhead Door filed the refund claim at issue here.

1998See AMSCO, 893 S.W.2d at 744-46 .

1998See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.056 (West 1998); AMSCO, 893 S.W.2d at 744-45 . 11 Because Overhead Door did not further pursue the matter until the four-year statute of limitations had run, its second refund claim is barred.

1995See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).

1994See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2025See id. in sales tax paid—attributable to the period from January 1, The exemption must affirmatively appear in the statutory 1990, through June 30, 1996—on their purchases of fountain language, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the taxing equipment from the manufacturer of that equipment.

2022See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–29 (describing standard).

2022See Hegar v. Black, Mann, & Graham, L.L.P., No. 03-20-00391-CV, 2022 WL 567853 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Refund suits require a taxpayer to submit a refund claim to the Comptroller and obtain a decision as a prerequisite to establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity.”); see also Tex. Tax Code § 112.151(a) (providing that “person may sue the comptroller to recover an amount of tax . . . that has been the subject of a tax refund claim if the person,” among other requirements, “has filed a tax refund claim under Section 111.104”). 7 In Pike v. Texas EMC Manag

2022See Hegar v. Black, Mann, & Graham, L.L.P., No. 03-20-00391-CV, 2022 WL 567853 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Refund suits require a taxpayer to submit a refund claim to the Comptroller and obtain a decision as a prerequisite to establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity.”); see also Tex. Tax Code § 112.151(a) (providing that “person may sue the comptroller to recover an amount of tax . . . that has been the subject of a tax refund claim if the person,” among other requirements, “has filed a tax refund claim under Section 111.104”). 7 In Pike v. Texas EMC Manag

2022Id. at *2 (quoting TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Comm’n on State 8 Emergency Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173, 182 (Tex. 2013)). 4 owe taxes on stop-loss premiums. 9 The court similarly held the maintenance tax inapplicable because the stop-loss policies “protect an employer from risk incurred from deciding to pay its employees’ healthcare costs,” and that Blue Cross did not collect the premiums from writing health insurance. 10 Finally, the court of appeals determined that Blue Cross presented sufficient evidence to support the amount of its refund claim. 11 We granted the Comptroller’s petition for rev

2022See Tex. Tax Code § 112.151(a) (requiring compliance with administrative procedures laid out in sections 111.104 and 111.105); Combs v. Chevron, Inc., 319 S.W.3d 836, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (stating that compliance with sections 111.104 and 111.105 is jurisdictional 9 prerequisite).

2021The standing requirement “derives from the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers among the departments of government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and from the Open Courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an injury done him,’” and a “court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert it.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (citing Tex. Const. art.

2021What is sometimes called “the manufacturing exemption”—a shorthand moniker that appears nowhere in Tax Code section 151.318—exempts only a limited set of “certain otherwise-taxable tangible personal property that is used in the production process” of “certain types of tangible personal property for sale to ultimate consumers.” See Combs v. Home & Garden Party, Ltd., No. 03-09-00673-CV, 2010 WL 4367054 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Sharp v. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 157, 159, 161 (Tex. App.— Austin 1996, writ denied)); see also Tex. Tax Code § 151

2015See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) (“Only when it is necessary to give effect to the clear legislative intent can we insert additional words 22 or requirements into a statutory provision.”); City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 631 (declining to read additional words into statute in construing statute).

2015See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) (“Only when it is necessary to give effect to the clear legislative intent can we insert additional words 22 or requirements into a statutory provision.”); City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 631 (declining to read additional words into statute in construing statute).

2015See Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628 (reviewing statutory scheme to interpret term). 23 The 2011 and 2013 rules’ supporting documentation requirement also directly conflicts with the statutory limitation in subsection 111.105(e) of the Tax Code concerning the time period in which the Comptroller is authorized to request evidence to support a claim for refund.

2009Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1991)). 5 Refund claim As the plaintiff in a tax refund case, Southern Plastics had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is entitled to a refund of the sales tax it paid on the City’s waste removal services because those services were not subject to tax.