8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2000Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 555 Pa. 211 , 723 A.2d 664, 666 (1999); Department of Transportation v. Boros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139,1142-43 (1993). 2000Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 555 Pa. 211 , 723 A.2d 664, 666 (1999); Department of Transportation v. Boros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139,1142-43 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Borosgreen2 sentences2000Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 555 Pa. 211 , 723 A.2d 664, 666 (1999); Department of Transportation v. Boros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139,1142-43 (1993). 2000Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 555 Pa. 211 , 723 A.2d 664, 666 (1999); Department of Transportation v. Boros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139,1142-43 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harleysville Homestead, Inc. v. Lower Salford Township Authority
green
2 sentences2015The Court held that the developer’s refund claim sounded in tort and that the developer’s agreement to pay the tapping fees was merely “collateral to [the developer’s] cause of action.” Harleysville, 980 A.2d at 753 . 2015The Court held that the developer’s refund claim sounded in tort and-that1 the developer’s agreement to pay the-tapping fees was merely . “collateral to [the developer’s] cause of action.” Harleysville, 980 A.2d at 753 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Trevelyan v. United States
neutral
2 sentences2017“Any final order of the Commonwealth Court entered in an appeal from a decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue [is] appealable to the Supreme Court, as of right….” Wirth v. Com., 95 A.3d 822 , 829 n.5 (Pa. 2014), quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §723(b). [J-28-2017] - 3 payment” for purposes of calculating a refund claim period means the date a report or return is filed.4 Appellee’s Petition for Review, at 5-6, citing Trevelyan v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 716 (D. 2017According to appellee, even if estimated payments or installment payments are made, the “date of payment” for'purposes :of calculating a refund claim period means the date á report1 or return is filed. 4 Appellee’s Petition for Review, at 5-6, citing Trevelyan v. United States, 219 F.Supp. 716 (D. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wirth v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2017“Any final order of the Commonwealth Court entered in an appeal from a decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue [is] appealable to the Supreme Court, as of right….” Wirth v. Com., 95 A.3d 822 , 829 n.5 (Pa. 2014), quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §723(b). [J-28-2017] - 3 payment” for purposes of calculating a refund claim period means the date a report or return is filed.4 Appellee’s Petition for Review, at 5-6, citing Trevelyan v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 716 (D. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I. Corp.
green
2 sentences2006The trial court stated that the purpose of a three-year statutory period for refund claims is to provide notice to the municipality or agency to avoid prejudice due to late assertion of a claim, and it quoted Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I Corp., 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 432 , 570 A.2d 633 (1990), for the principle that such a period is not to be applied as rigorously as a statute of limitations. 2006The trial court stated that the purpose of a three-year statutory period for refund claims is to provide notice to the municipality or agency to avoid prejudice due to late assertion of a claim, and it quoted Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I Corp., 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 432 , 570 A.2d 633 (1990), for the principle that such a period is not to be applied as rigorously as a statute of limitations. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Armco, Inc. v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1996To support this argument, the Tysons claim that they have the option of paying the disputed tax and instituting a refund claim, as did the taxpayer in Armco, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 654 A.2d 1191 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993), resulting in a delay in resolving the question whether the principal/agent exclusion applies which would benefit no one. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming
green
2 sentences1988Lilian v. Commonwealth, 467 Pa. 15 , 354 A.2d 250 (1976); LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 117 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260 , 544 A.2d 1053 (1988). 1988Lilian v. Commonwealth, 467 Pa. 15 , 354 A.2d 250 (1976); LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 117 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260 , 544 A.2d 1053 (1988). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Lilian v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1988Lilian v. Commonwealth, 467 Pa. 15 , 354 A.2d 250 (1976); LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 117 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260 , 544 A.2d 1053 (1988). 1988Lilian v. Commonwealth, 467 Pa. 15 , 354 A.2d 250 (1976); LCN Real Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Wyoming, 117 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260 , 544 A.2d 1053 (1988). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co.
green
1 sentence1965We conclude, therefore, that the petition should be granted so as to allow the taxpayer to add to his specification of objections the following: “(e) That Appellant is entitled to the refund claim under Section 553 (d) of the Sales Tax Act, and under the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sitkins Junk Co., Inc., 412 Pa. 132 (1963), and that the failure to grant said refund was therefore contrary to law.” Accordingly, we make the following Order ' And now, September 20, 1965, the prayer of the petition for leave to amend its appeal and specification of objections, filed by C. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.