testimony at the suppression hearing (Illinois) · Go Syfert
← Illinois issues

testimony at the suppression hearing in Illinois

15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2024 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Slatergreen
ill · 2008 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2024
2 sentences

2024People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).

2023People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). ¶ 15 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const., amend.

44
Miranda v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1966 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1992–2020
2 sentences

2020People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). 5 1-16-0183 ¶ 21 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966), once a suspect is in custody, his statements in response to custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless he has first been warned of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and to be represented by counsel Custodial interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.

2020People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). 5 1-16-0183 ¶ 21 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966), once a suspect is in custody, his statements in response to custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless he has first been warned of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and to be represented by counsel Custodial interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.

14
People v. Brooksgreen
ill · 1999 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 129 (1986) (finding that the testimony at the pretrial hearing and at trial provided a sufficient account of events to determine whether the identification had an independent basis, rendering it unnecessary to remand for further proceedings).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Wyma green
illappct · 2020
2 sentences

2024People v. Wyma, 2020 IL App (1st) 170786, ¶ 57 . ¶ 61 After reviewing the video of the reenactment and the testimony at the suppression hearing and trial, we conclude under the specific circumstances of this case that Logan was subjected to a custodial interrogation.

2024People v. Wyma, 2020 IL App (1st) 170786, ¶ 57 . ¶ 61 After reviewing the video of the reenactment and the testimony at the suppression hearing and trial, we conclude under the specific circumstances of this case that Logan was subjected to a custodial interrogation.

22024–2024
People v. Graves green
illappct · 1996
2 sentences

2006The State relies upon People v. Graves, 281 Ill.App.3d 386, 390-91 , 217 Ill.Dec. 303 , 667 N.E.2d 96 (1996), where the court found reasonable suspicion that the defendant had purchased drugs on the following facts: "Our examination of the testimony at the suppression hearing leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the stop of the taxi by the officers was based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity as contemplated by Terry v. Ohio.

2006The State relies upon People v. Graves, 281 Ill.App.3d 386, 390-91 , 217 Ill.Dec. 303 , 667 N.E.2d 96 (1996), where the court found reasonable suspicion that the defendant had purchased drugs on the following facts: "Our examination of the testimony at the suppression hearing leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the stop of the taxi by the officers was based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity as contemplated by Terry v. Ohio.

12006–2006
People v. Speer green
illappct · 1989
2 sentences

1995At the conclusion of the testimony at the suppression hearing, defendant presented the trial court with a copy of People v. Speer (1989), 184 Ill.

1995App. 3d 730 , 540 N.E.2d 1089 .

11995–1995
People v. Swift green
illappct · 1978
2 sentences

1988App. 3d 486 , 378 N.E.2d 234 , also cited by defendant, the testimony at the suppression hearing “wholly failed to meet the requirement of the second prong of the Aguilar test.” ( 61 Ill.

1988App. 3d 486 , 378 N.E.2d 234 , also cited by defendant, the testimony at the suppression hearing “wholly failed to meet the requirement of the second prong of the Aguilar test.” ( 61 Ill.

11988–1988
Forsyth v. United States green
scotus · 1983
1 sentence

1986Defendant approached the detectives sometime after 2 p.m. on November 10, informing them he wished to talk about his brother Andy. ( Cf. People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 24-25 , 447 N.E.2d 353, 364 , cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 1001 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 104 S.Ct. 507 (where, in finding statement voluntary, the court noted that the defendant, like defendant here, initiated the contact with the police officer).) Defendant agreed to travel with the detectives to the *1009 Villa Park police station, and they arrived at 2:30 to 2:45 p.m.

11986–1986
Goodman v. United States green
scotus · 1983
1 sentence

1986Defendant approached the detectives sometime after 2 p.m. on November 10, informing them he wished to talk about his brother Andy. ( Cf. People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 24-25 , 447 N.E.2d 353, 364 , cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 1001 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 104 S.Ct. 507 (where, in finding statement voluntary, the court noted that the defendant, like defendant here, initiated the contact with the police officer).) Defendant agreed to travel with the detectives to the *1009 Villa Park police station, and they arrived at 2:30 to 2:45 p.m.

11986–1986
People v. Davis green
ill · 1983
2 sentences

1986Defendant approached the detectives sometime after 2 p.m. on November 10, informing them he wished to talk about his brother Andy. ( Cf. People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 24-25 , 447 N.E.2d 353, 364 , cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 1001 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 104 S.Ct. 507 (where, in finding statement voluntary, the court noted that the defendant, like defendant here, initiated the contact with the police officer).) Defendant agreed to travel with the detectives to the *1009 Villa Park police station, and they arrived at 2:30 to 2:45 p.m.

1986Defendant approached the detectives sometime after 2 p.m. on November 10, informing them he wished to talk about his brother Andy. ( Cf. People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 24-25 , 447 N.E.2d 353, 364 , cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 1001 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 104 S.Ct. 507 (where, in finding statement voluntary, the court noted that the defendant, like defendant here, initiated the contact with the police officer).) Defendant agreed to travel with the detectives to the *1009 Villa Park police station, and they arrived at 2:30 to 2:45 p.m.

11986–1986
J. C. Lynch & Son v. Cusaac green
sc · 1916
1 sentence

1986Defendant approached the detectives sometime after 2 p.m. on November 10, informing them he wished to talk about his brother Andy. ( Cf. People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 24-25 , 447 N.E.2d 353, 364 , cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 1001 , 78 L.Ed.2d 697 , 104 S.Ct. 507 (where, in finding statement voluntary, the court noted that the defendant, like defendant here, initiated the contact with the police officer).) Defendant agreed to travel with the detectives to the *1009 Villa Park police station, and they arrived at 2:30 to 2:45 p.m.

11986–1986
People v. Cozzi green
illappct · 1981
1 sentence

1982App. 3d 94, 99 , 416 N.E.2d 1192 .) The testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that defendant was informed of and acknowledged that he understood his right to counsel.

11982–1982

Where else courts name it

NY 80 (1980–2026) TX 20 (1986–2021) PA 19 (1975–2024) OH 15 (2004–2026) IL 15 (1982–2024) MA 6 (1980–2015) CA 6 (1978–2014) NM 6 (1996–2022) AL 5 (1979–2012) WI 5 (1975–2020) TN 5 (1997–2011) LA 5 (1999–2015) AZ 4 (1978–2023) AR 3 (1990–2006) VA 2 (2001–2018) VT 2 (1983–2010) OK 2 (1983–2004) IA 2 (1976–2014) OR 2 (1981–1998) CO 2 (1973–2012) UT 2 (1994–2010) FL 2 (1996–2020) RI 2 (2016–2016) MO 2 (1999–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check