seatbelt violation in Indiana

2012More directly on point, we stated in State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), that an officer’s detection of alcohol on the breath of a motorist after pulling him over for a seatbelt violation provided “reasonable suspicion” that the motorist was driving under the influence and warranted further investigation for OWI.

2007Applying this interpretation, this court, in State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), held that under I.C. § 9-19-10-3, a traffic stop based solely upon the failure of the driver or the passenger to wear a seatbelt does not provide reasonable suspicion for the officer to “unilaterally expand [an] investigation and ‘fish’ for evidence of other possible crimes.” The court noted, however, that an officer may expand his or her investigation subsequent to the traffic stop for a seatbelt violation if other circumstances arise after the stop which independently provide the officer with

2009Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999) (interpreting Ind.Code § 919-10-3). 3 Traffic stops based upon a seatbelt violation are limited by the very statute that authorizes them.

2002Preventing unreasonable law enforcement activity was a key factor motivating our holding in Baldwin v. Reagan that individualized suspicion of a seatbelt violation is required in order to stop a motorist for that purpose. 715 N.E.2d at 337 .

2015Cf. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 382 (Ind. 2010) (declining to address constitutional arguments where challenge to police conduct could be resolved on statutory grounds); Pearson v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but concluding it is inapplicable to a traffic stop based a seatbelt violation), trans. denied.

2009See Pearson, 870 N.E.2d at 1068 (although limited pat-down search of defendant was justified by officer's reasonable concerns for his safety, contraband was discovered as a result of officer's questions, not as a result of the search, and without cireumstances arising after the stop which independently provided the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes, officer's questioning was not permitted under Seatbelt Enforcement Act); Clark v. State, 804 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (reversing denial of defendant's motion to suppress where, aside from the seatbelt violation, there were

2004See also Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (Indiana Code section 9-19-10-3 "cannot reasonably be interpreted to prohibit police officers from concluding limited weapons searches to ensure their safety so long as cireumstances exist over and above the seatbelt violation itself."). 5 In his concurring opinion in Morris, Judge Friedlander observed that the Seat-belt Enforcement Act "carries with it the potential for significant incursion upon the rights against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, s

2004Further, the State contends that prior to asking for consent to search the vehicle, the traffic stop for the seatbelt violation was completed and Clark was free to leave; therefore, "[what had been a traffic stop had segued into a consensual encounter." Br. of Appellee at 7. 'Thus, the traffic stop due to the seatbelt violation has no bearing on the propriety of the later consent to search." Id.

2023Id. [13] Conversely, in Richardson, our Indiana Supreme Court held Officer Tanya Eastwood did not have reasonable suspicion to investigate further after initiating a traffic stop based on an alleged seatbelt violation. 927 N.E.2d at 384 .

2015Cf. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 382 (Ind. 2010) (declining to address constitutional arguments where challenge to police conduct could be resolved on statutory grounds); Pearson v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but concluding it is inapplicable to a traffic stop based a seatbelt violation), trans. denied.

2009See Pearson, 870 N.E.2d at 1068 (although limited pat-down search of defendant was justified by officer's reasonable concerns for his safety, contraband was discovered as a result of officer's questions, not as a result of the search, and without cireumstances arising after the stop which independently provided the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes, officer's questioning was not permitted under Seatbelt Enforcement Act); Clark v. State, 804 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (reversing denial of defendant's motion to suppress where, aside from the seatbelt violation, there were

2009In Clark, there were no facts above and be-youd the seatbelt violation itself which justified the officer's request for consent. 804 N.E.2d at 201 .

2016State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1147-48 (Ind. 2011). [21] In other words, while a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation cannot be turned into a fishing expedition, the Act does not vitiate an officer’s authority to investigate circumstances that become known to the stopping officer after he has initiated 6 The test for reasonable suspicion is identical under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

2016Id.

2016E.g., Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 597 (Ind. 2008).

2012Similarly, we held in Kenworthy v. State, 738 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, that although the original reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop for driving while suspended had disappeared in that the driver was not who the officer thought it was, the officer had “reasonable suspicion” to continue the stop for investigation of OWI when the officer smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle.

2004First, as the State correctly notes, we have already considered this issue in Price, 724 N.E.2d at 675-76 (wherein we determined that 1.C. § 9-19-10-2 does not violate the equal privileges and immunities clause of the Indiana Constitution).

1999As in Kavanagh , however, Judge Lybrook left the door open by admitting his “reluctance] to state that a correct instruction on this subject can never be given.” Id. at 108-09.

1999See Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129 , 90 Ill.Dec. 950 , 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff does not have the duty to anticipate the negligence of others, and therefore, the plaintiffs failure to use a seatbelt is inadmissible as to either damages or liability); and Thibeault v. Campbell, 136 N.H. 698 , 622 A.2d 212 (1993) (holding that evidence of failure to wear seatbelt is inadmissible to demonstrate comparative fault where nonuse of seatbelt did not cause the collision); but see Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So.2d 934 (Fla.1996), as clarified on reh’g, (March 27, 1997) (

1999See Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129 , 90 Ill.Dec. 950 , 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff does not have the duty to anticipate the negligence of others, and therefore, the plaintiffs failure to use a seatbelt is inadmissible as to either damages or liability); and Thibeault v. Campbell, 136 N.H. 698 , 622 A.2d 212 (1993) (holding that evidence of failure to wear seatbelt is inadmissible to demonstrate comparative fault where nonuse of seatbelt did not cause the collision); but see Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So.2d 934 (Fla.1996), as clarified on reh’g, (March 27, 1997) (