15 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shannon v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1992The trial court probably would have been correct to leave the "wanton" portion out of the murder instruction ( Shannon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 548 (1988)), but surely it was incorrect to charge wanton murder on the basis that Crane was "shooting at the store clerk" rather than shooting the gun up in the air. 1992The trial court probably would have been correct to leave the “wanton” portion out of the murder instruction (Shannon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 548 (1988)), but surely it was incorrect to charge wanton murder on the basis that Crane was “shooting at the store clerk” rather than shooting the gun up in the air. | 1 | 2 |
Gall v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1994Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 607 S.W.2d 97, 109 (1980). 1985In our opinion, Gall’s decision to represent himself was independent and not the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gall’s final argument in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that counsel tendered a murder instruction which did not include with the “extreme emotional disturbance” phrase, the additional statutory language, “the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the standpoint of a person in the defendant’s circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” In Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky. 607 S.W.2d 97 (1980), we found the omission proper since, unlike the ca | 1 | 2 |
Sherroan v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2012See id. (“Since the murder instructions directed the jurors not to convict Appellant of murder unless they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting under EED, the failure to include the additional admonition in the presumption of innocence/reasonable doubt instruction did not adversely affect Appellant’s substantial rights.”). | 1 | 1 |
Benjamin v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2012He correctly notes that this Court has on occasion expressed the view that “the preferred practice is to include a form verdict that requires the jury to state whether guilt is found under the theory of intentional murder or under the theory of wanton murder.” Hudson, 979 S.W.2d at 110 ; see also Benjamin, 266 S.W.3d 775 (“better practice” is to require jury to specify the theory upon which it relied). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hagergreen1 sentence2010This argument concerns the “wanton or reckless belief qualification” to a defendant’s subjective belief in the need for self-protection as described in Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828, 841 (Ky.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2010The statutory provision relied upon by Moore in support of the protection of property instruction is KRS 503 .080, which provides, in relevant part, as follows (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that the person against whom such force is used is : (b) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary, robbery, or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503 .055, of such dwelling; It is the trial court's duty to instruct jurors on the whol | 1 | 1 |
McGinnis v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000Further, the Court of Appeals stated, “If there is any doubt as to the error in this case after reviewing Shannon , it is clearly resolved in favor of [Davis] in the commentary on Shannon contained in McGinnis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1994).” Id. at 9. 2000Further, the Court of Appeals stated, "If there is any doubt as to the error in this case after reviewing Shannon , it is clearly resolved in favor of [Davis] in the commentary on Shannon contained in McGinnis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1994)." Id. at 9. | 1 | 1 |
Boulder v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1981See Boulder, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the murder instruction was improper and reverse for a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
Tarrence v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1980The second is that the “extreme emotional disturbance” phase of the murder instruction was fatally deficient in omitting the words, “the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the standpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” Cf. KRS 507.020(l)(a). *108 Under the law of this state prior to adoption of the Kentucky Penal Code, effective January 1, 1975, a homicide that would otherwise have constituted wilful murder was classified as the lesser degree of voluntary manslaughter if it occurred in a sudden affray or in s | 1 | 1 |
Ratliff v. Commonwealthred2 sentences1979See Ratliff v. Commonwealth, Ky., 567 S.W.2d 307 (1978). 1979See Ratliff v. Commonwealth, Ky., 567 S.W.2d 307 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peace v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1927Peace v. Co., 146 Ky. 754 , 143 S. W. 399 . 1912It was conceded, for all practical purposes, that if the killing was not in self-defense, then it was assassination; if it •was done in self-defense, the accused was guiltless..Now, the court (so far as this branch of the-case is concerned), in apt terms described what constituted "the legal right of self-defense on the part of the accused, and, therefore, taking the instructions as a whole,' it caifrio't be said that the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced, or could have been prejudiced'by the omission of the word ‘feloniously.’ ” Again, in Peace v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky., 754 | 2 | 1912–1927 |
Hayes v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2012Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky.2010) In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.1981), for example, we held that an alternative murder instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement because the only evidence of the defendant’s state of mind came from his confession, which indicated an intentional rather than a wanton killing. 2012Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky.2010) In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.1981), for example, we held that an alternative murder instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement because the only evidence of the defendant’s state of mind came from his confession, which indicated an intentional rather than a wanton killing. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Travis v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2012Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky.2010) In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.1981), for example, we held that an alternative murder instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement because the only evidence of the defendant’s state of mind came from his confession, which indicated an intentional rather than a wanton killing. 2012Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky.2010) In Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.1981), for example, we held that an alternative murder instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement because the only evidence of the defendant’s state of mind came from his confession, which indicated an intentional rather than a wanton killing. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hudson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2012He correctly notes that this Court has on occasion expressed the view that “the preferred practice is to include a form verdict that requires the jury to state whether guilt is found under the theory of intentional murder or under the theory of wanton murder.” Hudson, 979 S.W.2d at 110 ; see also Benjamin, 266 S.W.3d 775 (“better practice” is to require jury to specify the theory upon which it relied). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Foster v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2012In Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670 (Ky.1991), we upheld the denial of instructions on unintentional homicide because the manner of killing — the victims were shot at close range, were repeatedly stabbed, were run over by an automobile, and were burned — permitted no inference but an intent to kill. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Houston v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2012Malone is correct, of course, that instructions not supported by the evidence should not be given, Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky.1998), and that a combination instruction, such as the murder instruction here, violates the unanimous verdict requirement if either theory of the crime lacks evidentiary support and there is a reasonable possibility that some member or members of the jury actually relied on the erroneously included *131 theory. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Caudill v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2004Caudill, 120 S.W.3d at 666-67 . 2004Caudill, 120 S.W.3d at 666-67 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Stout v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1912In the still later case of Stout v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky., 184 , this court, after reviewing all the authorities bearing upon this question, held that the - omission of the word “feloniously” from a murder instruction was not a reversible error, and that, under the decisions of this court, this was no longer an open question. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.