Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
22 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial 2015(Shade at pp. 714-715; Chavez at pp. 666-667 ; Price at p. 374.) “[An] instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. [Citation.] In addition, in reviewing [a potentially] ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here, we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 .) To the extent that there was any room for ambiguity in the instructions, the tr | 1 | 3 |
People v. Canizalesgreen2 sentences2024Based on the foregoing, the attempted murder instructions did not leave open the possibility of convicting petitioner under a natural and probable consequences theory of attempted murder.11 To the contrary, the instructions required the jury to find every element of attempted murder under a valid theory, i.e., that petitioner took at least one 10 The kill zone theory of attempted murder is a “theory for establishing the specific intent to kill required for conviction of attempted murder.” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607 .) As such, it is a theory of express malice unaffected by 2024(See People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 617 [when evaluating prejudice, “[t]he jury’s questions during deliberations are also instructive”].) In fact, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the jury might have incorrectly applied the jury instructions, thus negating the murder instruction’s essential requirement of express or implied malice and convicting Queen of murder based upon a theory never advanced by the prosecutor. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Riosgreen2 sentences2024(Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at p. 704 ; Schuller, supra, at pp. 253-254; Rios, supra, at pp. 462-463 .) From this basic premise, defendant asserts the murder instruction was improper because it did not, in and of itself, require the People to prove the absence of heat of passion and imperfect self-defense as an element of murder. 2024(Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at p. 704 ; Schuller, supra, at pp. 253-254; Rios, supra, at pp. 462-463 .) From this basic premise, defendant asserts the murder instruction was improper because it did not, in and of itself, require the People to prove the absence of heat of passion and imperfect self-defense as an element of murder. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Beltrangreen1 sentence2022(People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7 [a “‘“factually inadequate theory[]”’ … is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it,” and “‘reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground’”]); People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“‘“[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramirezgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 (Ramirez).) Accordingly, we conclude that the jury was not reasonably likely to apply the definition of implied malice in the murder instruction to the mental state required for a conviction for attempted murder. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aledamatgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7 [a “‘“factually inadequate theory[]”’ … is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it,” and “‘reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground’”]); People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“‘“[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rogersgreen1 sentence2021(Ibid.; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 874-875 .) The same is true here. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2021However, “failure to object to instructional error will not result in forfeiture if the substantial rights of the defendant are affected. (§ 1259; [citation].) Here, [defendants] claim[] that the flawed instruction[] deprived [them] of due process, and because this would affect [their] substantial rights if true, [the] claim is not forfeited.” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579-580 (Mitchell).) 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mickeygreen1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Blandgreen2 sentences2015Knows that he or she is carrying the deadly weapon.” “[A]rming under the sentence enhancement statutes does not require that a defendant utilize a firearm or even carry one on the body.” (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 (Bland).) But the information alleged Sanchez personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder in violation of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).3 “ ‘[T]he term “uses” . . . requires something more than merely being armed.” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 997 .) Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed with CALCRIM No. 3145, which provides, in 2015Knows that he or she is carrying the deadly weapon.” “[A]rming under the sentence enhancement statutes does not require that a defendant utilize a firearm or even carry one on the body.” (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 (Bland).) But the information alleged Sanchez personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder in violation of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).3 “ ‘[T]he term “uses” . . . requires something more than merely being armed.” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 997 .) Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed with CALCRIM No. 3145, which provides, in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cleavesgreen2 sentences2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R 2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cunninghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stansburygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Avenagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ramosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Parksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rhinehart v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Forden v. Joseph G.green2 sentences2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R 2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Burgener
green
2 sentences2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial 2013As we pointed out earlier, “the correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.” (People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 538 .) Where the claim is that the jury might have been misled, “we inquire „whether there is a 10 The defense below asked the court to modify CALCRIM No. 520 (the murder instruction) to include the prosecution‟s obligation to disprove heat of passion. | 2 | 2013–2016 |
Wilson & Wilson v. City Council
green
2 sentences2024(Parkford, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 722; Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573 .) Richmond counters the issue is ripe for review because her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated when she was required to sign the murder waiver as a condition of her plea. 2024(Parkford, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 722; Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573 .) Richmond counters the issue is ripe for review because her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated when she was required to sign the murder waiver as a condition of her plea. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Merriman
green
1 sentence2024“Absent some showing to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the court’s instructions.” (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 48-49.) Further, as to Langi and Maldonado, we observe that cases are distinguishable from the instant case as the issue of prejudice. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Beck
green
1 sentence2023Referring to implied malice “ ‘could confuse jurors’ ” because “ ‘conspiracy to commit murder, may not be based on a theory of implied malice.’ ” (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 642 .) When giving the conspiracy instruction, the murder instruction should be modified to delete references to implied malice. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Jo
green
1 sentence2022To the contrary, the basis for defendant’s criminal liability in this case was his failure to act.10 Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on unanimity, in violation of his state and federal rights.11 In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the parties’ disagreement over whether the continuous course of conduct exception to the prosecutorial-election-or unanimity- instruction requirement applies to these facts (People v. Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1178 ; People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572 ) | 1 | 2022–2022 |
The People v. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2022To the contrary, the basis for defendant’s criminal liability in this case was his failure to act.10 Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on unanimity, in violation of his state and federal rights.11 In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the parties’ disagreement over whether the continuous course of conduct exception to the prosecutorial-election-or unanimity- instruction requirement applies to these facts (People v. Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1178 ; People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572 ) | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Rountree
green
2 sentences2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) 2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Green
green
2 sentences2018Specifically, he argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had a felonious purpose independent of the murder under the rule established in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ( Green ). 2018Specifically, he argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had a felonious purpose independent of the murder under the rule established in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ( Green ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Brents
green
2 sentences2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) 2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) 2018We disagree. *89 "To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could *410 find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823 , 852-853, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 301 P.3d 150 .) "This standard of review applies when the evidence is largely circumstantial and to review of special circumstance findings." ( People v. Johnson (2015) | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Carrington
green
1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. O'Malley
green
1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Reyes
green
1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences2016Defendant relies on Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 (Mullaney) to argue that CALCRIM No. 520 should state “the state’s burden to disprove voluntary manslaughter as a separately numbered, bracketed element within the murder instruction(s) along with the other required and bracketed elements.” In Mullaney, the United States Supreme Court considered a Maine law that required “a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on 56 sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter.” ( Mullaney, supra, at p. 703 .) The court held that 2016Defendant relies on Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 (Mullaney) to argue that CALCRIM No. 520 should state “the state’s burden to disprove voluntary manslaughter as a separately numbered, bracketed element within the murder instruction(s) along with the other required and bracketed elements.” In Mullaney, the United States Supreme Court considered a Maine law that required “a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on 56 sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter.” ( Mullaney, supra, at p. 703 .) The court held that | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Bloyd
green
1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
green
1 sentence2016(Id., at pp. 703-704; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349 .)” (Id. at p. 462.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 ; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [“A single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of all instructions given.”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [An “instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Matlock
green
2 sentences2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R 2007Our Supreme Court rejected an “assisted suicide” argument in People v. Matlock (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682 [ 336 P.2d 505 ] {Matlock), stating “ ‘where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim ....’” (Id., at p. 694, followed in People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 376-377 [ 280 Cal.R | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Prettyman red | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Beardslee green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Martinez v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Connecticut v. Johnson green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Sanchez v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.