8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1948–1992 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kirtleygreen2 sentences1989We discussed the term “provocation” at some length in State v. Kirtley, 162 W.Va. 249 , 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978), and while it does not form a complete defense as does self-defense, it nevertheless does affect the degree of exposure to a homicide conviction, as we summarized in Kirtley : “Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted.” 162 W.Va. at 254 , 252 S.E.2d at 377 . 1989We discussed the term “provocation” at some length in State v. Kirtley, 162 W.Va. 249 , 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978), and while it does not form a complete defense as does self-defense, it nevertheless does affect the degree of exposure to a homicide conviction, as we summarized in Kirtley : “Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted.” 162 W.Va. at 254 , 252 S.E.2d at 377 . | 2 | 3 |
STATE EX REL. v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences1992Leach v. Hamilton, — W.Va. —, —, 280 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1980): “We cannot envision a murder defense, however, that would not require introduction of all possible evidence toward reduction of a jury’s view of the severity of defendant’s acts. 1991Leach v. Hamilton, ___ W.Va. ___, 280 S.E.2d 62 (1980) where we said: We cannot envision a murder defense, however, that would not require introduction of all possible evidence toward reduction of a jury's view of the severity of defendant's acts. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kirtley
green
2 sentences1989We discussed the term “provocation” at some length in State v. Kirtley, 162 W.Va. 249 , 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978), and while it does not form a complete defense as does self-defense, it nevertheless does affect the degree of exposure to a homicide conviction, as we summarized in Kirtley : “Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted.” 162 W.Va. at 254 , 252 S.E.2d at 377 . 1989We discussed the term “provocation” at some length in State v. Kirtley, 162 W.Va. 249 , 252 S.E.2d 374 (1978), and while it does not form a complete defense as does self-defense, it nevertheless does affect the degree of exposure to a homicide conviction, as we summarized in Kirtley : “Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted.” 162 W.Va. at 254 , 252 S.E.2d at 377 . | 2 | 1983–1989 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences1979Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted. [1] It is the instructional aspect of this problem which gave rise to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), where it was determined that the absence of provocation was an essential element of the State's proof of second degree murder. 1979Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted. [1] It is the instructional aspect of this problem which gave rise to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), where it was determined that the absence of provocation was an essential element of the State's proof of second degree murder. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
State v. Pendry
green
2 sentences1979Consequently, where provocation is shown to exist as a matter of law, a murder instruction or conviction is not warranted. [1] It is the instructional aspect of this problem which gave rise to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and our case of State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), where it was determined that the absence of provocation was an essential element of the State's proof of second degree murder. 1978Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975), and our case of State v. Pendry, _ W.Va. _, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), where it was determined that the absence of provocation was an essential element of the State’s proof of second degree murder. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
State v. Boggs
green
1 sentence1948Va. 603 , 42 S. E. (2d) 1 , we held: “The court’s refusal to incorporate in its charge in a trial for murder an instruction bearing on the presumption of innocence in defendant’s favor constitutes prejudicial error.” That statement was made by the court for the first time as a syllabus point, and is a direct holding that it is error not to give an instruction on the presumption of innocence, when a request therefor by a defendant has been made. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.