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15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Consumer Protection Division Office of the Attorney General v. Consumer Publishing Co.green2 sentences2023See Consumer Publ’g, 304 Md. at 770-71 (affirming the CPD’s finding of a CPA violation that was based solely on the advertisements at issue). 2023See Consumer Publ’g, 304 Md. at 770-71 (affirming the CPD’s finding of a CPA violation that was based solely on the advertisements at issue). | 1 | 1 |
Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunsongreen2 sentences2016The deteriorated paint must be present “at the inception of a lease for the hazard to qualify as a basis for a CPA violation.” Id. at 668 , 80 A.3d 298 ; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 685 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) (“It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit application of the CPA to material misstatements and omissions at the inception of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease.”). 2016The deteriorated paint must be present “at the inception of a lease for the hazard to qualify as a basis for a CPA violation.” Id. at 668 , 80 A.3d 298 ; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 685 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) (“It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit application of the CPA to material misstatements and omissions at the inception of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hassler v. Sovereign Bankgreen2 sentences2015Yet, the Deposit Account Agreement plainly provides that, “[i]n general,” the bank “currently process[es] [a customer’s] Orders, including but not limited to ATM and POS transactions ... at the end of each business day in high to low dollar amount.” In view of that explicit disclosure, there is simply no factual basis for the allegation that the bank somehow concealed its practice of batch-processing ATM and POS transactions “in high to low dollar amount.” See Hassler v. Sovereign Bank, 644 F.Supp.2d 509, 515-16 (D.N.J.2009), aff'd, 374 Fed.Appx. 341 (3d Cir.2010) (rejecting challenge to batch 2015Yet, the Deposit Account Agreement plainly provides that, “[i]n general,” the bank “currently process[es] [a customer’s] Orders, including but not limited to ATM and POS transactions ... at the end of each business day in high to low dollar amount.” In view of that explicit disclosure, there is simply no factual basis for the allegation that the bank somehow concealed its practice of batch-processing ATM and POS transactions “in high to low dollar amount.” See Hassler v. Sovereign Bank, 644 F.Supp.2d 509, 515-16 (D.N.J.2009), aff'd, 374 Fed.Appx. 341 (3d Cir.2010) (rejecting challenge to batch | 1 | 1 |
Scroggins v. Dahnegreen2 sentences2013This Court has made clear that if “[a]t the time the lease ... was entered into, there was no chipping or peeling paint on the premises ... [then] the landlord could not be said to have engaged in a deceptive trade practice under the CPA.” Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 696 , 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (1994). 2013This Court has made clear that if “[a]t the time the lease ... was entered into, there was no chipping or peeling paint on the premises ... [then] the landlord could not be said to have engaged in a deceptive trade practice under the CPA.” Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 696 , 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. N.B.S., Inc.green2 sentences2009We recently held in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 541 , 976 A.2d 279, 286 (2009), that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, CJP § 11-108, applies to a personal injury claim brought under the CPA. 2009We recently held in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 541 , 976 A.2d 279, 286 (2009), that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, CJP § 11-108, applies to a personal injury claim brought under the CPA. | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Osmose Wood Preservinggreen2 sentences2005We affirmed the dismissal of the CPA claim on the ground that any misrepresentations made by the manufacturer regarding the plywood were made to the build *32 er, not the plaintiff-buyers of the homes, and that there was “no allegation that the defendants were in any way involved in selling, offering, or advertising the townhouses that the plaintiffs bought.” Morris, supra, 340 Md. at 542, 667 A.2d at 636 . 2005We affirmed the dismissal of the CPA claim on the ground that any misrepresentations made by the manufacturer regarding the plywood were made to the build *32 er, not the plaintiff-buyers of the homes, and that there was “no allegation that the defendants were in any way involved in selling, offering, or advertising the townhouses that the plaintiffs bought.” Morris, supra, 340 Md. at 542, 667 A.2d at 636 . | 1 | 1 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green2 sentences1992See Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 143 , 550 A.2d 69, 75 (1988) ("[T]he General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation."); Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 203 , 517 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (1986). 1992See Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 143 , 550 A.2d 69, 75 (1988) ("[T]he General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation."); Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 203 , 517 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Frank v. Storergreen2 sentences1992See Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 143 , 550 A.2d 69, 75 (1988) ("[T]he General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation."); Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 203 , 517 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (1986). 1992See Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. USF & G, 314 Md. 131, 143 , 550 A.2d 69, 75 (1988) ("[T]he General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enactments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation."); Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 203 , 517 A.2d 1098, 1102-03 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cottman Transmissions Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices).... 2014For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices).... | 2 | 1995–2014 |
Mills v. Galyn Manor Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 674 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Butler v. S & S Partnership
green
2 sentences2016The deteriorated paint must be present “at the inception of a lease for the hazard to qualify as a basis for a CPA violation.” Id. at 668 , 80 A.3d 298 ; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 685 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) (“It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit application of the CPA to material misstatements and omissions at the inception of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease.”). 2016The deteriorated paint must be present “at the inception of a lease for the hazard to qualify as a basis for a CPA violation.” Id. at 668 , 80 A.3d 298 ; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 685 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994) (“It is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended to limit application of the CPA to material misstatements and omissions at the inception of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease.”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hassler v. Sovereign Bank
green
2 sentences2015Yet, the Deposit Account Agreement plainly provides that, “[i]n general,” the bank “currently process[es] [a customer’s] Orders, including but not limited to ATM and POS transactions ... at the end of each business day in high to low dollar amount.” In view of that explicit disclosure, there is simply no factual basis for the allegation that the bank somehow concealed its practice of batch-processing ATM and POS transactions “in high to low dollar amount.” See Hassler v. Sovereign Bank, 644 F.Supp.2d 509, 515-16 (D.N.J.2009), aff'd, 374 Fed.Appx. 341 (3d Cir.2010) (rejecting challenge to batch 2015Yet, the Deposit Account Agreement plainly provides that, “[i]n general,” the bank “currently process[es] [a customer’s] Orders, including but not limited to ATM and POS transactions ... at the end of each business day in high to low dollar amount.” In view of that explicit disclosure, there is simply no factual basis for the allegation that the bank somehow concealed its practice of batch-processing ATM and POS transactions “in high to low dollar amount.” See Hassler v. Sovereign Bank, 644 F.Supp.2d 509, 515-16 (D.N.J.2009), aff'd, 374 Fed.Appx. 341 (3d Cir.2010) (rejecting challenge to batch | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Polek v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
green
2 sentences2015Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 424 Md. 333, 365 , 36 A.3d 399 (2012) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they suffered actual injury because of CPA violation). 11 D. 2015Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 424 Md. 333, 365 , 36 A.3d 399 (2012) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they suffered actual injury because of CPA violation). 11 D. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Butler v. S & S Partnership
green
2 sentences2013The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that “[t]he undisputed facts in the record indicate that the walls were painted and repaired and there was no peeling or flaking paint at the time [Petitioner] entered into the lease and moved into the property .... [therefore,] [t]here was simply no admissible evidence to support a CPA claim against [Respondents].” 207 Md.App. at 119 , 51 A.3d at 742 . 2013The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that “[t]he undisputed facts in the record indicate that the walls were painted and repaired and there was no peeling or flaking paint at the time [Petitioner] entered into the lease and moved into the property .... [therefore,] [t]here was simply no admissible evidence to support a CPA claim against [Respondents].” 207 Md.App. at 119 , 51 A.3d at 742 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d at 1011 . 2013Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d at 1011 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010The court explained: Well, the court took an opportunity to read both [Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 , 835 A.2d 616 (2003) ] and [Benik].... 2010The court explained: Well, the court took an opportunity to read both [Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 , 835 A.2d 616 (2003) ] and [Benik].... | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Walker v. Grow
green
2 sentences2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi 2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mahler v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi 2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Benik v. Hatcher
green
2 sentences2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi 2010With respect to the negligence claim, she argues that “there are no possible circumstances or inferences that the landlords were not negligent” because the “facts are undisputed that there was chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the property during the entire time that Janay resided there” and “the landlords never inspected the property.” With respect to the CPA claim, Ms. Barksdale argues that she was entitled to judgment in her favor because, in Benik, 358 Md. at 534 , 750 A.2d 10 , the Court of Appeals held “that chipping, peeling, and flaking paint at the inception of the lease is a vi | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Smith v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences2010Rule 2-532(a). “ ‘A party is not entitled to judgment unless evidence on the issue and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, are such as to permit only one conclusion with regard to the issue.’ ” Mahler, 170 Md.App. at 317 , 907 A.2d 276 (quoting Smith v. Miller, 71 Md.App. 273, 278 , 525 A.2d 245 (1987)). 2010Rule 2-532(a). “ ‘A party is not entitled to judgment unless evidence on the issue and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, are such as to permit only one conclusion with regard to the issue.’ ” Mahler, 170 Md.App. at 317 , 907 A.2d 276 (quoting Smith v. Miller, 71 Md.App. 273, 278 , 525 A.2d 245 (1987)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
T-UP, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division
green
2 sentences2008Div., 145 Md.App. 27, 72 , 801 A.2d 173 (2002) (" ‘a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action.’ ”) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. 2008Div., 145 Md.App. 27, 72 , 801 A.2d 173 (2002) (" ‘a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action.’ ”) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2002Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997), this Court held that “a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action[.]” Id. at 265 , 674 A.2d at 129 . 2002Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997), this Court held that “a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action[.]” Id. at 265 , 674 A.2d at 129 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2002Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997), this Court held that “a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action[.]” Id. at 265 , 674 A.2d at 129 . 2002Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217 , 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd, 346 Md. 122 , 695 A.2d 153 (1997), this Court held that “a CPA violation is in the nature of a tort action[.]” Id. at 265 , 674 A.2d at 129 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cavacos v. Sarwar
green
2 sentences1998Cavacos v. Sarwar, 313 Md. 248, 250 , 545 A.2d 46 (1988); Md. 1998Cavacos v. Sarwar, 313 Md. 248, 250 , 545 A.2d 46 (1988); Md. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Phillips v. Cook
green
2 sentences1996By analogy, the reasoning in Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215 , 210 A.2d 743 (1965) offers some guidance. 1996By analogy, the reasoning in Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215 , 210 A.2d 743 (1965) offers some guidance. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Custom Pools
green
2 sentences1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d 1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Valley Forge Towers South Condominium v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d 1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Valley Forge Towers v. RON-IKE FOAM
green
2 sentences1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d 1995For other examples see State v. Cottman Transmissions, 86 Md.App. 714 , 587 A.2d 1190 (1991) (permitting CPA action against franchiser who directed franchisee to engage in deceptive practices), cert. denied, 324 Md. 121 , 596 A.2d 627 (1991); Valley Forge Towers v. Ron-Ike F. Ins., 393 Pa.Super. 339 , 574 A.2d 641 (1990) (permitting consumer’s action against manufacturer when contract specified a particular manufacturer’s roofing product and promised a direct manufacturer’s warranty which the manufacturer issued directly to plaintiffs and later refused to honor), aff'd, 529 Pa. 512 , 605 A.2d | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.