Schultz test in Maryland

2017Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md.App. 649, 564 , 694 A.2d 150, 157 (1997), Here, the Protestants did not set forth sufficient evidence to indicate that the proposed fuel service station would have any adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such use under the Schultz standard. 291 Md. at 15 , 432 A.2d at 1327 .

2017Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md.App. 649, 564 , 694 A.2d 150, 157 (1997), Here, the Protestants did not set forth sufficient evidence to indicate that the proposed fuel service station would have any adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such use under the Schultz standard. 291 Md. at 15 , 432 A.2d at 1327 .

1991The Court of Appeals in Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 218 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988), referring to the standards for special exception grants outlined in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), said: The Schultz test accords with the general standard for judicial review of the ruling of an administrative agency, *330 which we have defined as “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached; this need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.” Supervisor

1991The Court of Appeals in Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 218 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988), referring to the standards for special exception grants outlined in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), said: The Schultz test accords with the general standard for judicial review of the ruling of an administrative agency, *330 which we have defined as “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached; this need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.” Supervisor

2008Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 500 , 588 A.2d at 776 (noting that the Schultz test is "normally regarded as consistent with general legislative intent" (quoting Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 484-85 , 483 A.2d at 790 )); see also Earl E.

2008Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 500 , 588 A.2d at 776 (noting that the Schultz test is "normally regarded as consistent with general legislative intent" (quoting Gotach, 60 Md.App. at 484-85 , 483 A.2d at 790 )); see also Earl E.

1999Schultz “remains the standard by which special exception [and conditional use] questions are resolved.” Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 8 , 666 A.2d 1253 .

1999Schultz “remains the standard by which special exception [and conditional use] questions are resolved.” Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 8 , 666 A.2d 1253 .

1998Id. at 304, 685 A.2d 454 .

1998Id. at 304, 685 A.2d 454 .

2017Donaldson analogizes the issue at bar to the law of nuisance,17 arguing that, like in the law of nuisance, an objective standard should be applied to the Schultz test because it 17 Donaldson cites the United States Supreme Court case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), where the Supreme Court expressly called for consultation to nuisance law when helpful to understand the scope of the police power underlying zoning laws: (continued . . .) 28 would allow the conditional use applicant, in evaluating a particular property, “to determine whether those norma

2017Donaldson analogizes the issue at bar to the law of nuisance,17 arguing that, like in the law of nuisance, an objective standard should be applied to the Schultz test because it 17 Donaldson cites the United States Supreme Court case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), where the Supreme Court expressly called for consultation to nuisance law when helpful to understand the scope of the police power underlying zoning laws: (continued . . .) 28 would allow the conditional use applicant, in evaluating a particular property, “to determine whether those norma

2017We also noted in Attar that "[w]hile an applicant for a [conditional use] bears both the burden of persuasion and of production, the concurrent presumption in favor of a [conditional use] applicant is not a mutually exclusive evidentiary burden.” 451 Md. at 286 , 152 A.3d at 774 .

2017We also noted in Attar that "[w]hile an applicant for a [conditional use] bears both the burden of persuasion and of production, the concurrent presumption in favor of a [conditional use] applicant is not a mutually exclusive evidentiary burden.” 451 Md. at 286 , 152 A.3d at 774 .

2011In a particularly relevant review, Judge Harrell in Loyola, supra, 406 Md. at 105 , 956 A.2d 166 , clarified that “the Schultz standard ... requires that the adverse effect ‘inherent’ in a proposed use be determined without recourse to a comparative geographic analysis.” Id. (any language to the contrary in other cases is “disapproved”).

2011In a particularly relevant review, Judge Harrell in Loyola, supra, 406 Md. at 105 , 956 A.2d 166 , clarified that “the Schultz standard ... requires that the adverse effect ‘inherent’ in a proposed use be determined without recourse to a comparative geographic analysis.” Id. (any language to the contrary in other cases is “disapproved”).

2008In Harris v. State, 81 Md.App. 247 , 567 A.2d 476 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 324 Md. 490 , 597 A.2d 956 (1991), Judge Moylan stated: The Maryland decisional law on the subject that some call "other crimes evidence"... gives no occasion for complaint.

2008In Harris v. State, 81 Md.App. 247 , 567 A.2d 476 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 324 Md. 490 , 597 A.2d 956 (1991), Judge Moylan stated: The Maryland decisional law on the subject that some call "other crimes evidence"... gives no occasion for complaint.

2008In Harris v. State, 81 Md.App. 247 , 567 A.2d 476 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 324 Md. 490 , 597 A.2d 956 (1991), Judge Moylan stated: The Maryland decisional law on the subject that some call "other crimes evidence"... gives no occasion for complaint.

2008In Harris v. State, 81 Md.App. 247 , 567 A.2d 476 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 324 Md. 490 , 597 A.2d 956 (1991), Judge Moylan stated: The Maryland decisional law on the subject that some call "other crimes evidence"... gives no occasion for complaint.

2008Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 503 , 588 A.2d at 777 ("Reading all of the provisions which pertain to special exceptions together, as we must to ascertain the intention of the County Council, we find no intention on the part of the [Harford] County Council to substitute a Gowl [v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md.App. 410 , 341 A.2d 832 (1975)][ [18] ] test for the test applicable generally for measuring the adverse impact of a proposed special exception use which we adopted in Schultz . ").

2008Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 503 , 588 A.2d at 777 ("Reading all of the provisions which pertain to special exceptions together, as we must to ascertain the intention of the County Council, we find no intention on the part of the [Harford] County Council to substitute a Gowl [v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md.App. 410 , 341 A.2d 832 (1975)][ [18] ] test for the test applicable generally for measuring the adverse impact of a proposed special exception use which we adopted in Schultz . ").

2008To solve this perceived quandary, the Court of Special Appeals divided the Schultz test into what the court considered to be its elements, noting that "[a]lthough in their articulation the tests are sometimes telescoped together into a single compound test, there are actually two tests inherent in the Schultz v. Pritts guidelines." Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 178 , 819 A.2d at 1086 .

2008To solve this perceived quandary, the Court of Special Appeals divided the Schultz test into what the court considered to be its elements, noting that "[a]lthough in their articulation the tests are sometimes telescoped together into a single compound test, there are actually two tests inherent in the Schultz v. Pritts guidelines." Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 178 , 819 A.2d at 1086 .

2008In reaching that determination, the Board used the following standard: "The question is one of whether or not the adverse effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the other areas within the R.C. 2 zones." The Board noted that it believed that "the appellant has the burden of establishing that the impact factor caused by the proposed use is not greater at the site than the same use elsewhere in the zone (R.C. 2 zone)." Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 223 , 807 A.2d at 1184 .

2008In reaching that determination, the Board used the following standard: "The question is one of whether or not the adverse effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the other areas within the R.C. 2 zones." The Board noted that it believed that "the appellant has the burden of establishing that the impact factor caused by the proposed use is not greater at the site than the same use elsewhere in the zone (R.C. 2 zone)." Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 223 , 807 A.2d at 1184 .

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1998Holbrook, 70 Md.App. at 217 , 520 A.2d 1096 .

1998Holbrook, 70 Md.App. at 217 , 520 A.2d 1096 .

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1998Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (finding that “[t]he Board ... made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the [applicant’s] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone” (emphasis added)); Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 217-18 , 550 A.2d 664 (1988) (“[W]here the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular speci

1988Additionally, in Snowden v. Mayor and C.C. of Balto., 224 Md. 443, 448 , 168 A.2d 390 (1961), we said: The heart of the fact finding process often is the drawing of inferences from the facts.

1988Additionally, in Snowden v. Mayor and C.C. of Balto., 224 Md. 443, 448 , 168 A.2d 390 (1961), we said: The heart of the fact finding process often is the drawing of inferences from the facts.

1987Sharp Farm v. Somerlock, 52 Md.App. 207 , 447 A.2d 500 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 622 (1982), we affirmed the trial court’s remand of a case involving an application for a special exception use of land for a private airstrip so that the Board of Appeals could weigh the evidence in light of the Schultz test.

1987Sharp Farm v. Somerlock, 52 Md.App. 207 , 447 A.2d 500 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 622 (1982), we affirmed the trial court’s remand of a case involving an application for a special exception use of land for a private airstrip so that the Board of Appeals could weigh the evidence in light of the Schultz test.

1986Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 230 , 462 A.2d 58 (1983).

1986Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 230 , 462 A.2d 58 (1983).