continuing care exception in Missouri

2025First recognized by the Missouri Supreme Court in Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943), the continuing care exception is itself a defense to the defense of the statute of limitations and operates to toll the commencement of the statute of limitations so long as a "physician's 'treatment is continuing and of such a nature as to charge the medical man with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery . . . .'" Templeton, 685 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762 ).

2025First recognized by the Missouri Supreme Court in Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943), the continuing care exception is itself a defense to the defense of the statute of limitations and operates to toll the commencement of the statute of limitations so long as a "physician's 'treatment is continuing and of such a nature as to charge the medical man with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery . . . .'" Templeton, 685 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762 ).

2024Id.

2024Our high court held that the continuing care exception did not apply to the claims against the radiologist because he only provided his diagnostic services on a single date and, excluding certain exceptions, “[w]here a physician commits an act of neglect on one specific date, and has no other contact with the patient, the statute of limitations begins to run on that date . . . .” Id. at 194 .

2024The continuing care exception exists so the patient, in the face of a short statute of limitations, is not forced to choose between interrupting a course of treatment by suing their physician or losing their cause of action. 5 Since Thatcher, this Court has outlined the continuing care exception more thoroughly in two cases: Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. banc 1998), and Newton v. Mercy Clinic East Communities, 596 S.W.3d 625 (Mo. banc 2020).

2023I also have no quarrel with the majority’s discussion of the applicable standard of review or its legal analysis of the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions and the continuing care doctrine set forth in Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. banc 1998).

2024See Norman v. Lehman, 347 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. App. 2011) (holding that material facts were in dispute as to when the continuing care relationship ended when the patient merely sought a second opinion).

2023Id. at 615 .

2025See Tiemann, 632 S.W.3d at 841 (quoting 16 Kamerick v. Dorman, 907 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (finding that a phone call by a patient to physician's office with complaints "does not rise to the level of medical care, services or treatment"); Newton, 596 S.W.3d at 629 (finding that the failure to diagnose an infection or other complication does not constitute continuing care).

2025Wolfe relies primarily on Reynolds v. Dennison, 981 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) to argue that a physician-patient relationship is not terminated if a patient later returns to receive treatment for an infection stemming from an earlier surgery despite having been released from surgical care.

1998Adams v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Mo.App.1997); Thompson v. Volini, 849 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo.App.1993).

1998Hill v. Klontz, 909 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo.App.1995).

1998Adams v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Mo.App.1997); Thompson v. Volini, 849 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo.App.1993).