inherently dangerous exception in Missouri

1994We hold that the inherently dangerous exception no longer applies to employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation and overrule Mallory and cases following Mallory , including Ballinger v. Gascosage Electric Cooperative, 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. banc 1990), to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with this opinion.” Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 384 .

1991We hold that the inherently dangerous exception no longer applies to employees of independent contractors covered by workers' compensation and overrule Mallory and cases following Mallory , including Ballinger v. Gascosage Electric Cooperative, 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. banc 1990), to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with this opinion.

2024The vicarious liability aspect of Mallory was temporarily abandoned in Smith v. Inter–County Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. banc 1977), in favor of a rule requiring the showing of some negligence on the part of the landowner, however, in Ballinger v. Gascosage Electric Co-op., 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. banc 1990), the Missouri Supreme Court returned to the Mallory standard and eliminated the requirement of landowner negligence.

1992The vicarious liability aspect of Mallory was temporarily abandoned in Smith v. Inter-County Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. banc 1977), in favor of a rule requiring the showing of some negligence on the part of the landowner, however, in Ballinger v. Gascosage Electric Co-op., 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. banc 1990), the Missouri Supreme Court returned to the Mallory standard and eliminated the requirement of landowner negligence.

2008Id.

1994The Supreme Court followed Zueck in Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. banc 1993), saying again that the inherently dangerous activity doctrine “no longer applies to employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation.” Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 130 .

2008Id. (citing Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. banc 1991)).

1993Id. *245 The trial court based its order for summary judgment on the finding that Reed was not within the class of persons to be “protected” under the inherently dangerous doctrine, because he was not a “third party.” The trial court found that, under the evidence adduced, Reed was in fact the contractor and the employer for whom the inherently dangerous doctrine does not apply- The inherently dangerous doctrine arose as an exception to the general rule that one who contracts with an independent contractor is generally not liable for bodily harm for the torts of the contractor or the contracto

1993Louis Station Associates, 770 S.W.2d 352 (Mo.App.1989), we held that the inherently dangerous doctrine had no applicability to injuries sustained by a subcontractor’s employee when a come-along chain that was being used to laterally steady an 11,500-pound boiler shattered and the chain struck him in the head, causing brain damage.

1990“Generally, one who contracts with an independent contractor to perform work is not liable for bodily injury caused by the contractor or one of its employees.” Barbera v. Brod-Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318 , 322 (Mo.App.E.D.1989).