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15 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Brown v. State, 986 So.2d 270, 276 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2008) (To meet the second prong of the Spicer test, it must be clear that absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury would have found the defendant guilty.). 2017See Brown v. State, 986 So.2d 270, 276 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2008) (To meet the second prong of the Spicer test, it must be clear that absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury would have found the defendant guilty.). | 5 | 6 |
Rush v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Spicer argues that "[i]t is a common-law right of a person being tried for the commission of a crime to be free from all manner of shackles or bonds, whether of hands or feet, when in court in the presence of the jury, unless in exceptional cases where there is a realistic danger of his escape or in order to protect others from attack by [the] prisoner." Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1974). 2006Spicer argues that “[i]t is a common-law right of a person being tried for the commission of a crime to be free from all manner of shackles or bonds, whether of hands or feet, when in court in the presence of the jury, unless in exceptional cases where there is a realistic danger of his escape or in order to protect others from attack by [the] prisoner.” Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1974). | 3 | 3 |
Spicer v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Under Spicer, we ask if “the remarks were improper.” And if so, we ask if “the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193 (¶ 17) (quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 318 (55) (Miss.2006), abrogated on other grounds by O’Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390, 400-01 (¶¶ 28-19) (Miss.2013)). ¶23. 2015Under Spicer, we ask if “the remarks were improper.” And if so, we ask if “the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193 (¶ 17) (quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 318 (55) (Miss.2006), abrogated on other grounds by O’Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390, 400-01 (¶¶ 28-19) (Miss.2013)). ¶23. | 1 | 4 |
Long v. Stategreen2 sentences2013The Long Court declined to proceed to the Spicer test, finding both that the challenged statement was not so inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion and that it did “not rise to the level of those statements which this Court has found to be improper.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193-94 . 2013The Long Court declined to proceed to the Spicer test, finding both that the challenged statement was not so inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion and that it did “not rise to the level of those statements which this Court has found to be improper.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193-94 . | 1 | 2 |
Jeremy Alan Snyder v. State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2017Under Spicer, we ask if ‘the remarks were improper.’ And if so, we ask if ‘the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.’” Snyder v. State, 174 So. 3d 331, 336 (¶22) (Miss. 2017Under Spicer, we ask if ‘the remarks were improper.’ And if so, we ask if ‘the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.’” Snyder v. State, 174 So. 3d 331, 336 (¶22) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
O'Connor v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Under Spicer, we ask if “the remarks were improper.” And if so, we ask if “the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193 (¶ 17) (quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 318 (55) (Miss.2006), abrogated on other grounds by O’Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390, 400-01 (¶¶ 28-19) (Miss.2013)). ¶23. 2015Under Spicer, we ask if “the remarks were improper.” And if so, we ask if “the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.” Long, 52 So.3d at 1193 (¶ 17) (quoting Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 318 (55) (Miss.2006), abrogated on other grounds by O’Connor v. State, 120 So.3d 390, 400-01 (¶¶ 28-19) (Miss.2013)). ¶23. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007Spicer's claim does not pass the standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 4. 2007Spicer's claim does not pass the standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 4. | 2 | 2003–2007 |
Payton v. State
green
2 sentences2004We stated that we have “cautioned against using harmless error analysis to ‘transgress the rules of fair argument that are repeatedly promulgated by this Court’.” Id. citing Payton, 785 So. 2d at 271 . 8 ¶17. 2004We stated that we have “cautioned against using harmless error analysis to ‘transgress the rules of fair argument that are repeatedly promulgated by this Court’.” Id. citing Payton, 785 So. 2d at 271 . 8 ¶17. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.