field sobriety test in Texas

2011In Berkemer , the defendant driver was stopped after he was seen weaving in and out of his lane, and he subsequently failed a field sobriety test. 468 U.S. at 423 .

2011In Berkemer, the defendant driver was stopped after he was seen weaving in and out of his lane, and he subsequently failed a field sobriety test. 468 U.S. at 423 .

2012See Emerson v. State , 880 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Tex. Crim.

2025In Martin v. State, 97 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d), the court held that an officer’s threat of arrest for the defendant’s refusal to conduct field sobriety tests was not coercive, stating “a defendant may be compelled to give physical evidence of intoxication” and that “the performance of field sobriety tests is not compulsive in violation of one’s right to be free from self-incrimination when it does not make an express or implied assertion of fact.” Similarly, in Oguntope v. State, 177 S.W.3d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.), the court rejected coe

2020App. 1997); Oguntope v. State, 177 S.W.3d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).1 Brown explained that when a person exhibits a certain number 1 See, e.g., Ashby v. State, 527 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (“[B]ased on Ashby’s slow, deliberate movements, his poor performance on the field sobriety tests, and his inability to follow instructions, Deputy Gossett determined that Ashby did not have his normal mental and physical faculties, and he placed Ashby under arrest for driving while intoxicated.”); Henry v. State, 263 S.W.3d 151, 153 (Tex.

2011See Gassaway v. State , 957 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. Crim.

2005Gassaway v. State, 957 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 175 ; see also Shpikula v. State, 68 S.W.3d 212 , 219 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Youens *438 v. State, 988 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

2025In Martin v. State, 97 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d), the court held that an officer’s threat of arrest for the defendant’s refusal to conduct field sobriety tests was not coercive, stating “a defendant may be compelled to give physical evidence of intoxication” and that “the performance of field sobriety tests is not compulsive in violation of one’s right to be free from self-incrimination when it does not make an express or implied assertion of fact.” Similarly, in Oguntope v. State, 177 S.W.3d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.), the court rejected coe

2025Arthur, 216 S.W.3d at 54-55 (“no Texas law requires that a suspect be warned, or that consent be obtained, before the administration of a field sobriety test”).

2025In Martin v. State, 97 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d), the court held that an officer’s threat of arrest for the defendant’s refusal to conduct field sobriety tests was not coercive, stating “a defendant may be compelled to give physical evidence of intoxication” and that “the performance of field sobriety tests is not compulsive in violation of one’s right to be free from self-incrimination when it does not make an express or implied assertion of fact.” Similarly, in Oguntope v. State, 177 S.W.3d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.), the court rejected coe

2007Oguntope v. State, 177 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that while transportation code sections 724.012, 724.013, and 724.015 require statutory warnings of consequences of consent or failure to consent to a breathalyzer test, no statute requires warnings prior to the administration of field sobriety tests); Martin v. State, 97 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. ref'd) (holding that a field sobriety test was not illegally obtained because, unlike the statutory mandate that a breathalyzer test may not be administered if the subject refuses to submit to

2026Id. at 58.

2026Id. at 58.

2015See id.

2015See id.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Evidence of intoxication may include (1) slurred speech, (2) bloodshot eyes, (3) the odor of alcohol on the person, (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath, (5) unsteady balance, or (6) a staggered gait.”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A) (“‘Intoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol . . . into the body . . . .”); Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim.

2008See State v. Stevenson , 958 S.W.2d 824 , 829 n.7 (Tex. Crim.

2005See 468 U.S. at 423 , 104 S.Ct. at 3141-42 ; Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d at 829 n. 7.

2011Id. at 174-76 & n. 3 (citing Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 27.4 (1987); Chadwick v. State, 766 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988), aff'd, 795 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 , 100 S.Ct. at 1689 ).

2005Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 173, 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (questions by officer conducting a field sobriety test, including asking name and date of birth, were not interrogation); Townsend v. State, 813 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd) (“Inquiries by the custodial officer regarding a defendant’s name, address, height, weight, place of employment, or physical disabilities are the type of questions normally attendant to arrest and custody and do not constitute interrogation under the fifth amendment.”).

2019See Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 291 (observing degree of incapacitation only necessary to assure officer safety and assure suspect presence during investigation); Rodriguez v. State, 191 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) (concluding “[t]he ‘least intrusive means’ available to determine if appellant was intoxicated was to conduct a field sobriety test at the scene of the accident”).

2014See Castro, 373 S.W.3d at 166 (citing Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Baird, J., concurring and dissenting)); Rodriguez v. State, 191 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref'd) (concluding “[t]he ‘least intrusive means’ available to determine if appellant was intoxicated was to conduct a field sobriety test at the scene of the accident”). *46 Based on the record before us, Trooper Salaz’s transporting Adams for such short distances conflicts with the trial court’s conclusion that these movements escalated any detention to an arrest.

2013See Warren v. State , 377 S.W.3d 9 , 17–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“In order to assess a field sobriety test’s efficacy in determining intoxication, it is beneficial for the officer to know if there are factors other than intoxication that would inhibit the suspect’s ability to perform the required tasks.”).

2013See Warren v. State, 377 S.W.3d 9 , 17–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“In order to assess a field sobriety test’s efficacy in determining intoxication, it is beneficial for the officer to know if there are factors other than intoxication that would inhibit the suspect’s ability to perform the required tasks.”). 17 IV.

2011See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2010See Moses v. State , 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim.

2009Kirby v. State , No. 01-07-00444-CR, 2008 WL 2930181 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analyzing officer’s qualifications in context of (non-scientific) walk-and-turn test) (applying Smith v. State , 65 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (analyzing in context of HGN) and Kerr , 921 S.W.2d at 502 (same)).

2008See Smith v. State , 65 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, no pet.); Kerr v. State , 921 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, no pet.).

2009Kirby v. State , No. 01-07-00444-CR, 2008 WL 2930181 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 31, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analyzing officer’s qualifications in context of (non-scientific) walk-and-turn test) (applying Smith v. State , 65 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (analyzing in context of HGN) and Kerr , 921 S.W.2d at 502 (same)).

2008See Smith v. State , 65 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, no pet.); Kerr v. State , 921 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, no pet.).

2006See id. 5 testimony, the horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test is a four-phase test in which an officer asks an individual to follow the movement of a stimulus such as a pen tip with her eyes, while the police officer looks for an involuntary jerking of the eyeball, which is exaggerated by the use of alcohol or drugs.

2006See id. 3 should be moved during the test.

2006The final field sobriety test was performed approximately an hour and twenty minutes after the accident and subsequent to Rodriguez's leaving the police department. [22] I conclude that the officers had specific articulable facts to support the right to investigate a vehicular accident involving serious bodily injury, [23] and that they were engaged in a community caretaking function, "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating *467 to the violation of a criminal statute." See Cady, 413 U.S. at 446 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 ("These officers in a rural area we

2006The final field sobriety test was performed approximately an hour and twenty minutes after the accident and subsequent to Rodriguez's leaving the police department. [22] I conclude that the officers had specific articulable facts to support the right to investigate a vehicular accident involving serious bodily injury, [23] and that they were engaged in a community caretaking function, "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating *467 to the violation of a criminal statute." See Cady, 413 U.S. at 446 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 ("These officers in a rural area we

2006See Held v. State , 948 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref = d) (citing Emerson v. State , 880 S.W.2d 759, 769 (Tex. Crim.

2001See Held v. State, 948 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd); Espericueta v. State, 838 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).

2005Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 173, 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (questions by officer conducting a field sobriety test, including asking name and date of birth, were not interrogation); Townsend v. State, 813 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd) (“Inquiries by the custodial officer regarding a defendant’s name, address, height, weight, place of employment, or physical disabilities are the type of questions normally attendant to arrest and custody and do not constitute interrogation under the fifth amendment.”).

2005App. 1990) (questions by officer conducting a field sobriety test, including asking name and date of birth, were not interrogation); Townsend v. State , 813 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d) (“Inquiries by the custodial officer regarding a defendant’s name, address, height, weight, place of employment, or physical disabilities are the type of questions normally attendant to arrest and custody and do not constitute interrogation under the fifth amendment.”).

1994Id.; see also Jones v. State, 742 S.W.2d 398, 401-02 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (court held that the audio portion of a tape taken during a field sobriety test should not have been played to the jury because it revealed that the defendant requested an attorney); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989), pet. ref'd, 785 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (the court held that, when the defendant invoked his right to counsel during a videotaped interrogation, any oral statements made after that were inadmissible).

1994Id.; see also Jones v. State, 742 S.W.2d 398 , 401-02 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (court held that the audio portion of a tape taken during a field sobriety test should not have been played to the jury because it revealed that the defendant requested an attorney); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989), pet. ref'd, 785 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Crim.App.1990) (the court held that, when the defendant invoked his right to counsel during a videotaped interrogation, any oral statements made after that were inadmissible).

2006Thus, appellant’s contention is that the trial court erred in overruling the second motion to suppress on this basis because, as stated in his specialized objection in his suppression motion, the field sobriety test evidence did not meet the criteria of Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d at 573 .

2006Thus, appellant's contention is that the trial court erred in overruling the second motion to suppress on this basis because, as stated in his specialized objection in his suppression motion, the field sobriety test evidence did not meet the criteria of Kelly v. State , 824 S.W.2d at 573 .

2019CONCLUSION The majority relies heavily on the original report of a suicide to argue that Otter’s detention was akin to the short detentions in Castro v. State, 373 S.W.3d 159 , 165–66 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (concluding officer detained defendant “merely long enough to engage in an investigatory procedure”) and Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (explaining no investigation while waiting for second officer was not unreasonable).

2014See Castro, 373 S.W.3d at 166 (citing Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Baird, J., concurring and dissenting)); Rodriguez v. State, 191 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref'd) (concluding “[t]he ‘least intrusive means’ available to determine if appellant was intoxicated was to conduct a field sobriety test at the scene of the accident”). *46 Based on the record before us, Trooper Salaz’s transporting Adams for such short distances conflicts with the trial court’s conclusion that these movements escalated any detention to an arrest.

2011Id.

2005Gassaway v. State, 957 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Jones, 795 S.W.2d at 175 ; see also Shpikula v. State, 68 S.W.3d 212 , 219 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Youens *438 v. State, 988 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

2011Id.

2010See Banda v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, 2010 WL 2899000, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2010, no pet. h.) (citing Diaz v. State, No. 05-09-00750-CR, 2010 WL 1714001 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding officer had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated based on results of field-sobriety tests, appellant’s breath smelling of alcohol, and appellant’s unsteady Perez v. State Page 4 balance), and Johnson v. State, No. 14-07-00818-CR, 2008 WL 5085561 , at *2 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25,