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29 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fishgreen2 sentences2017The field sobriety test results were testimonial because parts of the test required the defendant to “communicate information regarding [his] state of mind” and “dr[ew] upon [his] memory, perception, and ability to communicate.” Id. 2017In that case, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to perform a field sobriety test. 321 Or at 50 . | 4 | 7 |
State v. Nagelgreen2 sentences2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i 2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i | 2 | 3 |
State v. Prickettgreen2 sentences2014Lawrence, however, was later abrogated by State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 495 , 930 P2d 221 (1997), which determined that this court in Lawrence made an “analytical error” “by transforming a fact-specific answer into an answer as a matter of law” and, ultimately, the Supreme Court held that “completing a field sobriety test, without more, does not create a ‘compelling’ setting as a matter of state constitutional law.” (Emphasis omitted.) As such, defendant’s reliance on Lawrence is misplaced. 2014Lawrence, however, was later abrogated by State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 495 , 930 P2d 221 (1997), which determined that this court in Lawrence made an “analytical error” “by transforming a fact-specific answer into an answer as a matter of law” and, ultimately, the Supreme Court held that “completing a field sobriety test, without more, does not create a ‘compelling’ setting as a matter of state constitutional law.” (Emphasis omitted.) As such, defendant’s reliance on Lawrence is misplaced. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wyattgreen2 sentences2020See ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.”). 2020See ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2013See State v. Johnson, 219 Or App 200 , 182 P3d 256 (2008) (reversing DUII conviction because evidence that the defendant was weaving while driving, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, admitted to consuming “two or three” cocktails, could not maintain his balance, and failed a field sobriety test was “not so overwhelming that we can conclude that there is little likelihood that the admission of [the police officer’s] testimony affected the jury’s verdict”). 2013See State v. Johnson, 219 Or App 200 , 182 P3d 256 (2008) (reversing DUII conviction because evidence that the defendant was weaving while driving, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, admitted to consuming “two or three” cocktails, could not maintain his balance, and failed a field sobriety test was “not so overwhelming that we can conclude that there is little likelihood that the admission of [the police officer’s] testimony affected the jury’s verdict”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bretchesgreen2 sentences2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after 2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 1 |
State v. Peppardgreen2 sentences2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after 2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 1 |
State v. BRETCHESgreen2 sentences2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after 2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 1 |
State v. Peppardgreen2 sentences2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after 2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hackworthgreen2 sentences1997State v. Schaffer, 114 Or App 328, 332 , 835 P2d 134 (1992); see also State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 85 , 893 P2d 1023 (1995) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (valid stop to administer field sobriety tests is neither custody nor a setting that is “compelling”); State v. Whitehead, 121 Or App 619, 623 , 855 P2d 1149 (1993) (driver’s performance of field tests generally does not violate rights against compelled self-incrimination); State v. Hackworth, 69 Or App 358, 363 , 685 P2d 480 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a motorist may temporarily feel that he is not ‘free to leave’ does no 1997State v. Schaffer, 114 Or App 328, 332 , 835 P2d 134 (1992); see also State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 85 , 893 P2d 1023 (1995) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (valid stop to administer field sobriety tests is neither custody nor a setting that is “compelling”); State v. Whitehead, 121 Or App 619, 623 , 855 P2d 1149 (1993) (driver’s performance of field tests generally does not violate rights against compelled self-incrimination); State v. Hackworth, 69 Or App 358, 363 , 685 P2d 480 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a motorist may temporarily feel that he is not ‘free to leave’ does no | 1 | 1 |
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizonared2 sentences1995See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 , 97 S.Ct. 582 , 50 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977) (overruling, by a vote of 6-3, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 , 94 S.Ct. 517 , 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), a case decided by a 7-1 majority less than four years earlier). [1] The overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded that admitting evidence of a refusal to submit either to a breath-alcohol or a field sobriety test does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 1995See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 , 97 S.Ct. 582 , 50 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977) (overruling, by a vote of 6-3, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 , 94 S.Ct. 517 , 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), a case decided by a 7-1 majority less than four years earlier). [1] The overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded that admitting evidence of a refusal to submit either to a breath-alcohol or a field sobriety test does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
Oregon Ex Rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.green2 sentences1995See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 , 97 S.Ct. 582 , 50 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977) (overruling, by a vote of 6-3, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 , 94 S.Ct. 517 , 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), a case decided by a 7-1 majority less than four years earlier). [1] The overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded that admitting evidence of a refusal to submit either to a breath-alcohol or a field sobriety test does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 1995See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 , 97 S.Ct. 582 , 50 L.Ed.2d 550 (1977) (overruling, by a vote of 6-3, Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 , 94 S.Ct. 517 , 38 L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), a case decided by a 7-1 majority less than four years earlier). [1] The overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded that admitting evidence of a refusal to submit either to a breath-alcohol or a field sobriety test does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Gildroy v. Motor Vehicles Divisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Spencergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Green
red
2 sentences1989In State v. Green, 68 Or App 518, 526 , 684 P2d 575 , rev den 297 Or 601 (1984), we held that a defendant invoked his right to remain silent under Article I, section 12, when he refused, before his arrest, to take a field sobriety test, and that the state could not introduce that refusal in evidence. 1989In State v. Green, 68 Or App 518, 526 , 684 P2d 575 , rev den 297 Or 601 (1984), we held that a defendant invoked his right to remain silent under Article I, section 12, when he refused, before his arrest, to take a field sobriety test, and that the state could not introduce that refusal in evidence. | 3 | 1989–2007 |
State v. Trenary
green
2 sentences2014The legislative purpose of informing a person of the consequences of refusing to take a field sobriety test “was not to create a right, but to bring further pressure on suspected intoxicated drivers to take the field sobriety tests.” State v. Trenary, 316 Or 172, 177 , 850 P2d 356 (1993). 2014The legislative purpose of informing a person of the consequences of refusing to take a field sobriety test “was not to create a right, but to bring further pressure on suspected intoxicated drivers to take the field sobriety tests.” State v. Trenary, 316 Or 172, 177 , 850 P2d 356 (1993). | 2 | 1997–2014 |
State v. Schaffer
green
2 sentences1994The state argues that that holding is inconsistent with our holding in State v. Schaffer, 114 Or.App. 328, 332 , 835 P.2d 134 (1992), that "a request to perform field sobriety tests does not create inherently compelling circumstances for Miranda purposes, as a matter of law." It is unnecessary to address that question, however, because here Miranda -like warnings preceded the officer's questions. [3] We note that State v. Lawrence, supra , and State v. Harrison, supra , were decided after the trial court's ruling in this case. [4] The dissent argues that we are bound by the trial court's findi 1994The state argues that that holding is inconsistent with our holding in State v. Schaffer, 114 Or.App. 328, 332 , 835 P.2d 134 (1992), that "a request to perform field sobriety tests does not create inherently compelling circumstances for Miranda purposes, as a matter of law." It is unnecessary to address that question, however, because here Miranda -like warnings preceded the officer's questions. [3] We note that State v. Lawrence, supra , and State v. Harrison, supra , were decided after the trial court's ruling in this case. [4] The dissent argues that we are bound by the trial court's findi | 2 | 1994–1997 |
State v. Miller
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Bates
green
2 sentences2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i 2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i 2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i 2021In the former situation, procur- ing a warrant is not a punishment for the refusal to consent, nor does it produce evidence, like a confession, that the state would otherwise not obtain; it is merely an alternative 7 As a general matter, a field sobriety test is a “search.” See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994). 8 For two thoughtful views on that history, one might consider Justice Linde’s succinct dissenting opinion in State v. Bates, 307 Or 170 , 764 P2d 550 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (discussing that history and the “dubious proposition” apparently endorsed i | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Kramyer
neutral
2 sentences2018I want to say a few things' " and discussed his relationship with the victim's mother, the detective's handling of the investigation, and his own innocence). *425 The state argues that defendant showed a "willingness" to continue the interrogation when, after invoking his right to counsel, and without further prompting, he answered Knea's question about the other "male that was at the house." The state likens this case to State v. Kramyer , 222 Or.App. 193 , 194 P.3d 156 (2008), in which the defendant, who was suspected of driving while intoxicated, requested a lawyer but then continued to par 2018I want to say a few things' " and discussed his relationship with the victim's mother, the detective's handling of the investigation, and his own innocence). *425 The state argues that defendant showed a "willingness" to continue the interrogation when, after invoking his right to counsel, and without further prompting, he answered Knea's question about the other "male that was at the house." The state likens this case to State v. Kramyer , 222 Or.App. 193 , 194 P.3d 156 (2008), in which the defendant, who was suspected of driving while intoxicated, requested a lawyer but then continued to par | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Paulson
green
2 sentences2014Because a field sobriety test constitutes a search under Article I, section 9, State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31 , 880 P2d 451 (1994), a warrant is required, or the search must come within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 351 , 833 P2d 1278 (1992). 2014Because a field sobriety test constitutes a search under Article I, section 9, State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31 , 880 P2d 451 (1994), a warrant is required, or the search must come within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 351 , 833 P2d 1278 (1992). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Primeaux
green
1 sentence2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Arabzadeh
green
2 sentences2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after 2009According to the record, the HGN test was the only field sobriety test that the officer administered. [3] See State v. Bretches, 225 Or.App. 602 , 202 P.3d 883 , rev. den., 346 Or. 361 , 211 P.3d 930 (2009) (holding that where the defendant was told he was free to leave but continued to converse with the officer, his consent did not occur in the course of an illegal stop); see also State v. Peppard, 172 Or.App. 311 , 18 P.3d 488 , vac'd, 332 Or. 630 , 34 P.3d 168 (2001) (holding that no violation occurred under Article I, section 9, when an officer told the defendant he was free to leave after | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1998Typically, but not necessarily, scientific evidence is presented by an expert witness who can explain data or test results and, if necessary, explain the scientific principles which are said to give the evidence its reliability or accuracy.” Brown, 297 Or at 407-08 . 5 In O’Key, the court elaborated on the meaning of “scientific evidence.” In that case, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants, and the issue was the admissibility of a field sobriety test known as the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. 1998Typically, but not necessarily, scientific evidence is presented by an expert witness who can explain data or test results and, if necessary, explain the scientific principles which are said to give the evidence its reliability or accuracy." Brown, 297 Or. at 407-08 , 687 P.2d 751 . [5] In O'Key, the court elaborated on the meaning of "scientific evidence." In that case, the defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicants, and the issue was the admissibility of a field sobriety test known as the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Penrod
green
2 sentences1998State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48, 60 , 893 P.2d 1023 (1995). [4] The dissent cites State v. Penrod, 133 Or.App. 454 , 892 P.2d 729 (1995), for the proposition that "the right to consult with counsel in a DUII setting includes the right to a private consultation." 154 Or.App. at 104 , 960 P.2d at 889 . 1998State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48, 60 , 893 P.2d 1023 (1995). [4] The dissent cites State v. Penrod, 133 Or.App. 454 , 892 P.2d 729 (1995), for the proposition that "the right to consult with counsel in a DUII setting includes the right to a private consultation." 154 Or.App. at 104 , 960 P.2d at 889 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Ramos
green
2 sentences1998The following colloquy took place between the ALJ and Janzen: “[ALJ]: [Dlid you ask him to take a field sobriety test? “[Janzen]: Yes, I did. “[ALJ]: And what was his response? ‘TJanzen]: That he would take them. '[Janzen]: He agreed to take the test.' In State v. Ramos, 149 Or App 269, 272 , 942 P2d 841 (1997), we held that “consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement and that probable cause is not a necessary prerequisite to asking a defendant for consent to perform field sobriety tests in the context of a DUII stop.” (Emphasis in original.) Typically, field sobriety tests contai 1998The following colloquy took place between the ALJ and Janzen: “[ALJ]: [Dlid you ask him to take a field sobriety test? “[Janzen]: Yes, I did. “[ALJ]: And what was his response? ‘TJanzen]: That he would take them. '[Janzen]: He agreed to take the test.' In State v. Ramos, 149 Or App 269, 272 , 942 P2d 841 (1997), we held that “consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement and that probable cause is not a necessary prerequisite to asking a defendant for consent to perform field sobriety tests in the context of a DUII stop.” (Emphasis in original.) Typically, field sobriety tests contai | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Walls v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services
neutral
2 sentences1998State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48, 60 , 893 P.2d 1023 (1995). [4] The dissent cites State v. Penrod, 133 Or.App. 454 , 892 P.2d 729 (1995), for the proposition that "the right to consult with counsel in a DUII setting includes the right to a private consultation." 154 Or.App. at 104 , 960 P.2d at 889 . 1998State v. Fish, 321 Or. 48, 60 , 893 P.2d 1023 (1995). [4] The dissent cites State v. Penrod, 133 Or.App. 454 , 892 P.2d 729 (1995), for the proposition that "the right to consult with counsel in a DUII setting includes the right to a private consultation." 154 Or.App. at 104 , 960 P.2d at 889 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Whitehead
green
2 sentences1997State v. Schaffer, 114 Or App 328, 332 , 835 P2d 134 (1992); see also State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 85 , 893 P2d 1023 (1995) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (valid stop to administer field sobriety tests is neither custody nor a setting that is “compelling”); State v. Whitehead, 121 Or App 619, 623 , 855 P2d 1149 (1993) (driver’s performance of field tests generally does not violate rights against compelled self-incrimination); State v. Hackworth, 69 Or App 358, 363 , 685 P2d 480 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a motorist may temporarily feel that he is not ‘free to leave’ does no 1997State v. Schaffer, 114 Or App 328, 332 , 835 P2d 134 (1992); see also State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 85 , 893 P2d 1023 (1995) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (valid stop to administer field sobriety tests is neither custody nor a setting that is “compelling”); State v. Whitehead, 121 Or App 619, 623 , 855 P2d 1149 (1993) (driver’s performance of field tests generally does not violate rights against compelled self-incrimination); State v. Hackworth, 69 Or App 358, 363 , 685 P2d 480 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a motorist may temporarily feel that he is not ‘free to leave’ does no | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Pinnell
green
2 sentences1995And indeed, this is exactly what every witness testified: for this purpose, and in *317 combination with other officer observations, the test is a reliable, if imprecise, indicator of the probability of impairment.” 41 Sergeant Studdard testified that officers in all 50 states are using the HGN test. 42 Of course, if the examining officer in the administration of the HGN test finds the absence of nystagmus, that finding would be relevant, because it would tend to make less probable the existence of the consequential fact of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 43 In State v. Pinne 1995And indeed, this is exactly what every witness testified: for this purpose, and in *317 combination with other officer observations, the test is a reliable, if imprecise, indicator of the probability of impairment.” 41 Sergeant Studdard testified that officers in all 50 states are using the HGN test. 42 Of course, if the examining officer in the administration of the HGN test finds the absence of nystagmus, that finding would be relevant, because it would tend to make less probable the existence of the consequential fact of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 43 In State v. Pinne | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences1994Our holding in State v. Scott, 111 Or App 308, 313 , 826 P2d 71 (1992), is pertinent here: “[T]he officer’s request that defendant rate his level of intoxication on a scale of 1-10 cannot properly be characterized as a field sobriety test. 1994Our holding in State v. Scott, 111 Or App 308, 313 , 826 P2d 71 (1992), is pertinent here: “[T]he officer’s request that defendant rate his level of intoxication on a scale of 1-10 cannot properly be characterized as a field sobriety test. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Lawrence green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Dill green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Frye v. United States red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Reed green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Moore v. STATE, MOTOR VEHICLES DIV., ETC. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Scott green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Brock green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Wacker neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Trenary green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Chapman v. California yellow | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.