stale claim in New Jersey

1997Therefore, process was issued within thirty days of the occurrence as directed by N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 and defendant’s convictions for [violations of chapters 3 and 4 of Title 39] must not be reversed on statute of limitations grounds. [ 291 N.J.Super. at 496 , 677 A.2d 824 .] 5 See also Latorre, supra, 228 N.J.Super. at 319 , 549 A.2d 871 (“Given the fact that [defendant] was or should have been aware of [the] essential facts [embodied in the complaint] ... had the State moved timely to cure the defect even at the trial date (notwithstanding that the ... limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 had expired)

1997Therefore, process was issued within thirty days of the occurrence as directed by N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 and defendant’s convictions for [violations of chapters 3 and 4 of Title 39] must not be reversed on statute of limitations grounds. [ 291 N.J.Super. at 496 , 677 A.2d 824 .] 5 See also Latorre, supra, 228 N.J.Super. at 319 , 549 A.2d 871 (“Given the fact that [defendant] was or should have been aware of [the] essential facts [embodied in the complaint] ... had the State moved timely to cure the defect even at the trial date (notwithstanding that the ... limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 had expired)

2023A plaintiff's primary equitable right is to have their claim adjudicated on the merits, Zaccardi, 88 N.J. at 252 , while a defendant's main equitable consideration is the eventual right to repose such that they may not be blindsided by the prosecution of a stale claim, after they had presumed their liability had expired, Galligan, 82 N.J. at 192 .

2023A plaintiff's primary equitable right is to have their claim adjudicated on the merits, Zaccardi, 88 N.J. at 252 , while a defendant's main equitable consideration is the eventual right to repose such that they may not be blindsided by the prosecution of a stale claim, after they had presumed their liability had expired, Galligan, 82 N.J. at 192 .

2020It also assumed NJM was "first provided with information it request[ed] and need[ed] to evaluate the UIM claim in order to be in a position to settle and resolve it short of arbitration." The trial court found application of the statute of limitations was "warranted and necessary" to relieve NJM from being required to "litigate a stale claim." On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court's order granting summary judgment to NJM should be reversed because the decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Price v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., 182 N.J. 519 (2005).

2012Lopez, supra, 62 N.J. at 273-74, 300 A.2d 563 .

2010The Tax Court has held that equitable relief “is not available in the context of a stale claim for a tax refund[.]” Estate of Ehringer v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 24 N.J.Tax 599, 616 (Tax 2009), aff'd, 412 N.J.Super. 316 , 990 A.2d 678 (App.Div.2010).

2010The Tax Court has held that equitable relief “is not available in the context of a stale claim for a tax refund[.]” Estate of Ehringer v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 24 N.J.Tax 599, 616 (Tax 2009), aff'd, 412 N.J.Super. 316 , 990 A.2d 678 (App.Div.2010).

2009Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 552 U.S. 130 , 128 S.Ct. 750 , 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008), the Supreme Court distinguished between statutes of limitation that “seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims” and those that seek “to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as ... limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity.... [23 N.J.Tax at 652.] The John R.

2009Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 552 U.S. 130 , 128 S.Ct. 750 , 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008), the Supreme Court distinguished between statutes of limitation that “seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims” and those that seek “to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as ... limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity.... [23 N.J.Tax at 652.] The John R.

1999The Supreme Court's decision in Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. 437 , 713 A. 2d 411 , amply illustrates this point.

1999The Supreme Court's decision in Kernan, supra, 154 N.J. 437 , 713 A. 2d 411 , amply illustrates this point.

1997Therefore, process was issued within thirty days of the occurrence as directed by N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 and defendant’s convictions for [violations of chapters 3 and 4 of Title 39] must not be reversed on statute of limitations grounds. [ 291 N.J.Super. at 496 , 677 A.2d 824 .] 5 See also Latorre, supra, 228 N.J.Super. at 319 , 549 A.2d 871 (“Given the fact that [defendant] was or should have been aware of [the] essential facts [embodied in the complaint] ... had the State moved timely to cure the defect even at the trial date (notwithstanding that the ... limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 had expired)

1997Therefore, process was issued within thirty days of the occurrence as directed by N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 and defendant’s convictions for [violations of chapters 3 and 4 of Title 39] must not be reversed on statute of limitations grounds. [ 291 N.J.Super. at 496 , 677 A.2d 824 .] 5 See also Latorre, supra, 228 N.J.Super. at 319 , 549 A.2d 871 (“Given the fact that [defendant] was or should have been aware of [the] essential facts [embodied in the complaint] ... had the State moved timely to cure the defect even at the trial date (notwithstanding that the ... limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:5-3 had expired)

1992Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J.

1986To deserve that category, that delay must be for a length of time which unexplained and unexcused, is altogether unreasonable under the circumstances, and has been prejudicial to the party asserting it or renders it very doubtful that the truth can be ascertained and justice administered. [ Ibid. (quoting from Stroebel v. Jefferson Trucking & Rigging Co., 125 N.J.L. 484, 487 (E. & A. 1940).]) Berkeley's claim that it should be permitted to allow a supermarket in the shopping center is not a stale claim.

1966A wing nut, though immured within a patient's body and undiscovered for a long period of time, see Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282 , 154 A. 2 d 788 ( Sup. Ct. 1959), retains its identity so that a defendant's ability to defend a stale claim is not unduly impaired.

1917In Sullivan v. Portland and Kennebec Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806 , the rule touching the enforcement of stale claims in a court of equity is stated as follows: "To let in the defence that the claim is stale, and that the bill cannot, therefore, be supported, it is not necessary that a foundation shall be laid by any averment in the answer of the defendants.