stale claim in New York

1992(Norr v Spiegler, 72 AD2d 20 [1980], affd 53 NY2d 661 [1981]; Matter of Rosenberg v City of New York, 309 NY 304 [1955].) Even though General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) was amended (L 1976, ch 745, §2), effective September 1, 1976, to expand the time in which a late filing could be made and to expand the grounds for making a late application, the amendment could not be retroactively applied to revive a stale claim.

1992(Norr v Spiegler, 72 AD2d 20 [1980], affd 53 NY2d 661 [1981]; Matter of Rosenberg v City of New York, 309 NY 304 [1955].) Even though General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) was amended (L 1976, ch 745, §2), effective September 1, 1976, to expand the time in which a late filing could be made and to expand the grounds for making a late application, the amendment could not be retroactively applied to revive a stale claim.

1992(Norr v Spiegler, 72 AD2d 20 [1980], affd 53 NY2d 661 [1981]; Matter of Rosenberg v City of New York, 309 NY 304 [1955].) Even though General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) was amended (L 1976, ch 745, §2), effective September 1, 1976, to expand the time in which a late filing could be made and to expand the grounds for making a late application, the amendment could not be retroactively applied to revive a stale claim.

1990Here, under the foregoing criteria set forth in Brock v Bua (supra), Supreme Court correctly dismissed the action against Prime Computer because plaintiff became fully aware of her potential claim against that defendant some nine months before the period of limitations expired.

1984Those courts have found that the longer period is justified by the State’s interest in conserving the public purse, and that such interest outweighs the dangers of forcing a putative father to defend a stale claim (see, e.g., Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971 ; Matter of Lydia L. v Vidal L., 95 Misc 2d 507 ; Matter of Jay v Wolfe, 76 Misc 2d 680 ; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N. Y. v Jones, 73 Misc 2d 1014 ; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942 ).

1984Those courts have found that the longer period is justified by the State’s interest in conserving the public purse, and that such interest outweighs the dangers of forcing a putative father to defend a stale claim (see, e.g., Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971 ; Matter of Lydia L. v Vidal L., 95 Misc 2d 507 ; Matter of Jay v Wolfe, 76 Misc 2d 680 ; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N. Y. v Jones, 73 Misc 2d 1014 ; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942 ).

1984Those courts have found that the longer period is justified by the State’s interest in conserving the public purse, and that such interest outweighs the dangers of forcing a putative father to defend a stale claim (see, e.g., Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971 ; Matter of Lydia L. v Vidal L., 95 Misc 2d 507 ; Matter of Jay v Wolfe, 76 Misc 2d 680 ; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N. Y. v Jones, 73 Misc 2d 1014 ; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942 ).

1984Those courts have found that the longer period is justified by the State’s interest in conserving the public purse, and that such interest outweighs the dangers of forcing a putative father to defend a stale claim (see, e.g., Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971 ; Matter of Lydia L. v Vidal L., 95 Misc 2d 507 ; Matter of Jay v Wolfe, 76 Misc 2d 680 ; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N. Y. v Jones, 73 Misc 2d 1014 ; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942 ).

1984Those courts have found that the longer period is justified by the State’s interest in conserving the public purse, and that such interest outweighs the dangers of forcing a putative father to defend a stale claim (see, e.g., Matter of Van Alstyne v David Q., 92 AD2d 971 ; Matter of Lydia L. v Vidal L., 95 Misc 2d 507 ; Matter of Jay v Wolfe, 76 Misc 2d 680 ; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N. Y. v Jones, 73 Misc 2d 1014 ; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942 ).

1982Thus, Maxwell (supra) was an attempt to judicially create a new Statute of Limitations.

1976Such prospective filing is permissible (see Matter of Johnson v State of New York, 49 AD2d 136 ) and complies with the legislative purpose to give the State prompt notice that a claim will be asserted against it so that the State will not be prejudiced and taken by surprise by a stale claim.

1976Mr. Justice Kane’s argument in dissent that Atlantic Mutual was not the claimant and therefore could not file a notice of intention to file a claim is at variance with the holding in Matter of Johnson v State of New York (supra), that a prospective claimant may file to preserve its rights before it becomes endowed with the official status of a claimant.

1942(Adams v. Olin, 140 N. Y. 150 ; Scott v. Palmer, 246 App. Div. 379 ; affd., 273 N. Y. 471 .) The character of the proof adduced on behalf of the claimant was clearly insufficient to establish that this stale claim had not been barred by the Statute of Limitations.

1942(Adams v. Olin, 140 N. Y. 150 ; Scott v. Palmer, 246 App. Div. 379 ; affd., 273 N. Y. 471 .) The character of the proof adduced on behalf of the claimant was clearly insufficient to establish that this stale claim had not been barred by the Statute of Limitations.

1942(Adams v. Olin, 140 N. Y. 150 ; Scott v. Palmer, 246 App. Div. 379 ; affd., 273 N. Y. 471 .) The character of the proof adduced on behalf of the claimant was clearly insufficient to establish that this stale claim had not been barred by the Statute of Limitations.

1941To coerce an employer to commit a crime, or to pay a stale claim (Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc., v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 262 ; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 ), even though the payment of such a claim may be to the material advantage of the employees, does not make such actions labor disputes or bring them within the terms of the phrase “ the respective interests of employer and employee ” and thus overrule the previous decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court of the United States.

1941Judge Finch finds authority for the injunction also in some cases in the Federal courts and stresses particularly Dorchy v. Kansas ( 272 U. S. 306 ) as a holding that coercion of an employer to pay a stale claim is unlawful “ even though the payment of such a claim may be to the material advantage of the employees.” In that case the only question presented was whether a statute which restricted or prohibited strikes in the mining; industry constituted a denial of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if applied to strikes called, as the court pointed out, “ to collect a stale clai

1941The cases of Goldfinger v. Feintuch ( 276 N. Y. 281 ), May’s Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc., v. Bauer ( 282 N. Y. 331 ) and Baillis v. Fuchs ( 283 N. Y. 133 ) were all cases where a mere inspection of the questions presented shows the legitimate and real labor *359 interests there involved.

1941The cases of Goldfinger v. Feintuch ( 276 N. Y. 281 ), May’s Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc., v. Bauer ( 282 N. Y. 331 ) and Baillis v. Fuchs ( 283 N. Y. 133 ) were all cases where a mere inspection of the questions presented shows the legitimate and real labor *359 interests there involved.

1941To coerce an employer to commit a crime, or to pay a stale claim (Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc., v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 262 ; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 ), even though the payment of such a claim may be to the material advantage of the employees, does not make such actions labor disputes or bring them within the terms of the phrase “ the respective interests of employer and employee ” and thus overrule the previous decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court of the United States.

1941The cases of Goldfinger v. Feintuch ( 276 N. Y. 281 ), May’s Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc., v. Bauer ( 282 N. Y. 331 ) and Baillis v. Fuchs ( 283 N. Y. 133 ) were all cases where a mere inspection of the questions presented shows the legitimate and real labor *359 interests there involved.

1940(Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction Co., 95 F. [2d] 50; Del Valle v. Hyland, 76 Hun, 493 ; affd., 148 N. Y. 751 ; McConnell v. Barber, 86 Hun, 360, 362 ; Livermore v. Northrup, 44 N. Y. 107 ; Matter of Sheppard, 180 Penn.

1940(Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction Co., 95 F. [2d] 50; Del Valle v. Hyland, 76 Hun, 493 ; affd., 148 N. Y. 751 ; McConnell v. Barber, 86 Hun, 360, 362 ; Livermore v. Northrup, 44 N. Y. 107 ; Matter of Sheppard, 180 Penn.

1940(Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction Co., 95 F. [2d] 50; Del Valle v. Hyland, 76 Hun, 493 ; affd., 148 N. Y. 751 ; McConnell v. Barber, 86 Hun, 360, 362 ; Livermore v. Northrup, 44 N. Y. 107 ; Matter of Sheppard, 180 Penn.

1940(Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction Co., 95 F. [2d] 50; Del Valle v. Hyland, 76 Hun, 493 ; affd., 148 N. Y. 751 ; McConnell v. Barber, 86 Hun, 360, 362 ; Livermore v. Northrup, 44 N. Y. 107 ; Matter of Sheppard, 180 Penn.

1940(Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United Traction Co., 95 F. [2d] 50; Del Valle v. Hyland, 76 Hun, 493 ; affd., 148 N. Y. 751 ; McConnell v. Barber, 86 Hun, 360, 362 ; Livermore v. Northrup, 44 N. Y. 107 ; Matter of Sheppard, 180 Penn.