affirmative act exception (New York) · Go Syfert
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affirmative act exception in New York

15 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Oboler v. City of New Yorkgreen
ny · 2007 · cited in 7 New York opinions naming this issue, 2015–2022
2 sentences

2022The affirmative act exception "'is limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'" ( id. at 728 , quoting Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). "[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp. , 76 AD3d 210 , 214).

2020The affirmative act exception, the only exception at issue here, "'is limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'" ( id. at 728 , quoting Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). "[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp. , 76 AD3d 210 , 214).

67
Schleif v. City of New Yorkgreen
nyappdiv · 2009 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

22
Corey v. Town of Huntingtongreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

22
Steins v. Incorporated Village of Garden Citygreen
nyappdiv · 2015 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

22
Hirasawa v. City of Long Beachgreen
nyappdiv · 2008 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

22
Spanos v. Town of Clarkstowngreen
nyappdiv · 2011 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

22
Lopez v. G&J Rudolph Inc.green
nyappdiv · 2005 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

2014Evidence that the City, in response to an oral complaint received on April 3, 2009, repaired potholes in the subject street on April 17, 2009, more than 10 weeks prior to the happening of the accident, did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City affirmatively created the condition, as there was no evidence that a dangerous condition existed immediately after the repair was completed or that the repair caused subsequent immediate deterioration (see Spanos v Town of Clarkstown, 81 AD3d 711, 713 [2011]; Hirasawa v City of Long Beach, 57 AD3d 846, 848 [2008]; Lopez v G&J Rudolph I

22
Beiner v. Village of Scarsdalegreen
nyappdiv · 2017 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021"The affirmative act exception, the only exception at issue here, is limited to work by [the municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition" ( id. at 715 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Yarborough v. City of New York green
ny · 2008
2 sentences

2022The affirmative act exception "'is limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'" ( id. at 728 , quoting Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). "[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp. , 76 AD3d 210 , 214).

2020The affirmative act exception, the only exception at issue here, "'is limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'" ( id. at 728 , quoting Oboler v City of New York , 8 NY3d 888, 889 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). "[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp. , 76 AD3d 210 , 214).

32018–2022
Carlucci v. Village of Scarsdale green
nyappdiv · 2013
2 sentences

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

2015The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that it did not have prior written notice of the roadway defect and that the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice requirement alleged in the pleadings does not apply (see Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 [2007]; Steins v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 127 AD3d 957, 958 [2015]; Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d at 798 ; Schleif v City of New York, 60 AD3d 926, 928 [2009]; Corey v Town of Huntington, 9 AD3d 345, 345 [2004]).

22015–2015
Conner v. City of New York green
nyappdiv · 2013
2 sentences

2013Furthermore, the plaintiff did not address the special use exception to the prior written notice law (see Conner v City of New York, 104 AD3d 637 [2013]).

2013Furthermore, the plaintiff did not address the special use exception to the prior written notice law (see Conner v City of New York, 104 AD3d 637 [2013]).

22013–2013
ITT Hartford Insurance v. Village of Ossining green
nyappdiv · 1999
2 sentences

2013Co. v Village of Ossining, 257 AD2d 606 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not address the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice law.

2013Co. v Village of Ossining, 257 AD2d 606 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not address the affirmative act exception to the prior written notice law.

22013–2013
Loghry v. Village of Scarsdale green
nyappdiv · 2017
1 sentence

2018The affirmative act exception, the only exception at issue here, is limited to work by the municipality that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition ( id. at 728 ; Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889 ; Beiner v Village of Scarsdale, 149 AD3d 679, 680 ). "[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings" ( Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 AD3d 210 , 214).

12018–2018
People v. Brown green
nyappdiv · 1971
1 sentence

1983(CPLR 4102, subds [a], [c]; Sepinski v Bergstol, 81 AD2d 860 ; Kenford Co. v Erie County, 38 AD2d 781 ; Fritschy Corp. v Chase Manhattan Bank, 36 AD2d 600 .) Further, plaintiff is not entitled to a jury in its lien foreclosure action.

11983–1983
Malone v. Dimco Corp. neutral
nyappdiv · 1972
1 sentence

1983(CPLR 4102, subds [a], [c]; Sepinski v Bergstol, 81 AD2d 860 ; Kenford Co. v Erie County, 38 AD2d 781 ; Fritschy Corp. v Chase Manhattan Bank, 36 AD2d 600 .) Further, plaintiff is not entitled to a jury in its lien foreclosure action.

11983–1983
Sabater v. Enayat Hakim-Elahi neutral
nyappdiv · 1981
1 sentence

1983(CPLR 4102, subds [a], [c]; Sepinski v Bergstol, 81 AD2d 860 ; Kenford Co. v Erie County, 38 AD2d 781 ; Fritschy Corp. v Chase Manhattan Bank, 36 AD2d 600 .) Further, plaintiff is not entitled to a jury in its lien foreclosure action.

11983–1983

Where else courts name it

NY 15 (1983–2022) MI 5 (1984–2023) GA 4 (1946–2019) IA 3 (2018–2021) DE 3 (1986–2022) CT 3 (1999–2020) KY 2 (2009–2021) WI 2 (2008–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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