103 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Troupegreen2 sentences2025E. that modified the constancy of accusation doctrine, as set forth in State v. Troupe ( 237 Conn. 284 ), and returned to the standard previously articulated in Troupe, which provides that a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim’s complaint, that constancy evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim’s testi- mony and not for substantive purposes, and that a defendant is entitled to an instruction that a victim’s delay in reporting is a factor that the jury can consider in evaluating the victi 2023The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the constancy of accusation testimony of M and T relating to J’s disclosure of the defen- dant’s sexual abuse: Under the constancy of accusation rule that existed at the time of the defendant’s trial, as articulated by this court in State v. Troupe ( 237 Conn. 284 ), a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim’s complaint, any testimony regarding the details of the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim’s complai | 7 | 48 |
State v. De Wolfgreen2 sentences1994Although the constancy of accusation doctrine was adopted by this court in a case in which a female sexual assault victim had confided in a female friend; State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 100 (1830); we have never restricted its application to female victims. 1987To satisfy such inquiry, it is reasonable that she should be heard in her declarations, that she did so communicate it, and that testimony should be received to confirm her story.” State v. DeWolf, supra, 99. “[S]uch a course [of conduct] would be natural if the crime had been committed, but very unnatural if it had not been.” State v. Kinney, supra. We have noted that, while our legislature in 1974 repealed General Statutes § 53a-68, which required corroboration of the testimony of the victim of an alleged sexual assault as a prerequisite to any conviction for the offense, the legislature has | 4 | 4 |
State v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2000See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 293 ; State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 (“[o]ur Supreme Court has held that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate the right to confrontation”), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 947 , 704 A.2d 802 (1997). 2000“In determining whether to permit [constancy of accusation] testimony, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice to the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 239 . “[Constancy of accusation evidence is not admissible unless the victim has testified, and is subject to cross-examination, concerning the crime and the identity of the person or persons to whom the victim has reported the crime . . . .” State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 293 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996); see also State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 , cert. denie | 3 | 4 |
Trafton v. Correiagreen2 sentences2000See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 293 ; State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 (“[o]ur Supreme Court has held that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate the right to confrontation”), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 947 , 704 A.2d 802 (1997). 2000“In determining whether to permit [constancy of accusation] testimony, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice to the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 239 . “[Constancy of accusation evidence is not admissible unless the victim has testified, and is subject to cross-examination, concerning the crime and the identity of the person or persons to whom the victim has reported the crime . . . .” State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 293 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996); see also State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 , cert. denie | 3 | 4 |
State v. Lindstromgreen2 sentences2000See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 293 ; State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 (“[o]ur Supreme Court has held that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate the right to confrontation”), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 947 , 704 A.2d 802 (1997). 2000See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 293 ; State v. Lindstrom, 46 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 702 A.2d 410 (“[o]ur Supreme Court has held that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate the right to confrontation”), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 947 , 704 A.2d 802 (1997). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Samuelsgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 300 n.15 . 14 We note that, in State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541 , 871 A.2d 1005 (2005), this court modified the constancy of accusation doctrine by precluding the admission of any out-of-court complaint made by the victim following an official complaint to the police. 2016See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 300 n.15 . 14 We note that, in State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541 , 871 A.2d 1005 (2005), this court modified the constancy of accusation doctrine by precluding the admission of any out-of-court complaint made by the victim following an official complaint to the police. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Parrisgreen2 sentences2001I write separately, however, because I am of the opinion that the facts of this case provide this court with an opportunity to limit further the constancy of accusation doctrine. 2 This court set forth the parameters for determining whether evidence is cumulative in State v. Parris, 219 Conn. 283 , 592 A.2d 943 (1991). 2001I write separately, however, because I am of the opinion that the facts of this case provide this court with an opportunity to limit further the constancy of accusation doctrine. 2 This court set forth the parameters for determining whether evidence is cumulative in State v. Parris, 219 Conn. 283 , 592 A.2d 943 (1991). | 2 | 5 |
State v. Kinneygreen2 sentences2001See State v. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153 (1876). 1987To satisfy such inquiry, it is reasonable that she should be heard in her declarations, that she did so communicate it, and that testimony should be received to confirm her story.” State v. DeWolf, supra, 99. “[S]uch a course [of conduct] would be natural if the crime had been committed, but very unnatural if it had not been.” State v. Kinney, supra. We have noted that, while our legislature in 1974 repealed General Statutes § 53a-68, which required corroboration of the testimony of the victim of an alleged sexual assault as a prerequisite to any conviction for the offense, the legislature has | 2 | 3 |
| State v. Martingreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dabkowskigreen2 sentences1996We last undertook a comprehensive review of the efficacy of the constancy of accusation doctrine a decade ago in State v. Dabkowski, supra, 199 Conn. 193 , wherein we reaffirmed the vitality of the rule. 1996The constancy of accusation rule “is an evidentiary rule of long standing in this jurisdiction.” State v. Dabowski, 199 Conn. 193, 199 , 506 A.2d 118 (1986). | 1 | 11 |
State v. Ouellettegreen2 sentences2004Although Ouellette did not involve a suggestion of recent contrivance, this court noted that “[b]ecause the rationale of the constancy of accusation exception so clearly suggests the recent contrivance or fabrication exception, there is no analytical reason to approach them differently.” Id., 99 . 1996Although we have characterized the constancy of accusation doctrine as an exception to the hearsay rule; see, e.g., State v. Rodgers, supra, 207 Conn. 649 ; State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 76 , 530 A.2d 155 (1987); State v. Dabkowski, supra, 199 Conn. 197 ; State v. Ouellette, 190 Conn. 84, 92 , 459 A.2d 1005 (1983); State v. Hamer, 188 Conn. 562, 565 , 452 A.2d 313 (1982); State v. Gelinas, 160 Conn. 366, 367 , 279 A.2d 552 (1971); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207 , 251 A.2d 178 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 , 89 S. Ct. 1788 , 23 L. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Kelleygreen2 sentences2001State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 36 ; State v. Sullivan, supra, 244 Conn. 645 ; State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 297 -98, 303-304; State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 565 , 643 A.2d 854 (1994). 2001State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 36 ; State v. Sullivan, supra, 244 Conn. 645 ; State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 297 -98, 303-304; State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 565 , 643 A.2d 854 (1994). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Betheagreen2 sentences1997“Long standing precedent set by our Supreme Court demands that the following criteria be met before a witness can testify under what has consistently been labeled the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule: (1) the court must balance the probative force of the testimony against its prejudicial effect; (2) the crime charged must be sex related; (3) the witness must be one to whom the victim complained about the offense; (4) the accusation must have been made at a time when it was natural for the victim to have made it; and (5) the victim must first testify, in court, as to the fa 1997“Long standing precedent set by our Supreme Court demands that the following criteria be met before a witness can testify under what has consistently been labeled the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule: (1) the court must balance the probative force of the testimony against its prejudicial effect; (2) the crime charged must be sex related; (3) the witness must be one to whom the victim complained about the offense; (4) the accusation must have been made at a time when it was natural for the victim to have made it; and (5) the victim must first testify, in court, as to the fa | 1 | 4 |
State v. Betheagreen2 sentences1997“Long standing precedent set by our Supreme Court demands that the following criteria be met before a witness can testify under what has consistently been labeled the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule: (1) the court must balance the probative force of the testimony against its prejudicial effect; (2) the crime charged must be sex related; (3) the witness must be one to whom the victim complained about the offense; (4) the accusation must have been made at a time when it was natural for the victim to have made it; and (5) the victim must first testify, in court, as to the fa 1997“Long standing precedent set by our Supreme Court demands that the following criteria be met before a witness can testify under what has consistently been labeled the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule: (1) the court must balance the probative force of the testimony against its prejudicial effect; (2) the crime charged must be sex related; (3) the witness must be one to whom the victim complained about the offense; (4) the accusation must have been made at a time when it was natural for the victim to have made it; and (5) the victim must first testify, in court, as to the fa | 1 | 4 |
State v. Beliveaugreen2 sentences1999Their testimony did not include details critical to the state’s case, namely penetration. “[Wjhether evidence is admissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beliveau, 237 Conn. 576, 592 , 678 A.2d 924 (1996). 1999Their testimony did not include details critical to the state’s case, namely penetration. “[Wjhether evidence is admissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beliveau, 237 Conn. 576, 592 , 678 A.2d 924 (1996). | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Pereiragreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re Salvatore P.green | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Pereiragreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. DePastinogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Town of Preston v. Connecticut Siting Councilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dollingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dollingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rodgersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Briscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2001Nevertheless, the trial court did issue a constancy of accusation instruction to the jury regarding Grunden’s testimony on direct examination. 9 Because, as noted previously, the defendant did not object to Grunden’s testimony at the trial court, to prevail on his claim before this court he must, as he admits, do so under either State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 233 , or the plain error doctrine. 1997In doing so, he urges this court to abandon the constancy of accusation doctrine. 4 In the alternative, he requests us to review his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and the plain error doctrine. | 9 | 1994–2011 |
State v. Brice
green
2 sentences1996In none of these cases, however, has the court retreated from its holding in Green that the sixth amendment is not violated if the declarant testifies in court and is subject to cross-examination. 11 Because constancy of accusation evidence is not admissible unless the victim has testified, and is subject to cross-examination, concerning the crime and the identity of the person or persons to whom the victim has reported the crime; see, e.g., State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 566 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994); State v. Brice, 186 Conn. 449, 453-55 , 442 A.2d 906 (1982); we reject the defendant’s conte 1996In none of these cases, however, has the court retreated from its holding in Green that the sixth amendment is not violated if the declarant testifies in court and is subject to cross-examination. 11 Because constancy of accusation evidence is not admissible unless the victim has testified, and is subject to cross-examination, concerning the crime and the identity of the person or persons to whom the victim has reported the crime; see, e.g., State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 566 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994); State v. Brice, 186 Conn. 449, 453-55 , 442 A.2d 906 (1982); we reject the defendant’s conte | 5 | 1982–1996 |
State v. Daniel W. E.
green
2 sentences2019E., 322 Conn. 593, 618 , 142 A.3d 265 (2016). 10 In its memorandum, the state, inter alia, acknowledged that the recordings contained the hearsay statements of J and D, but asserted that they were admissible under the medical treatment or tender years exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 11 Specifically, the defendant contended that the constancy of accusation doctrine is limited to cases of sexual assault, that this was not a case of ‘‘incremental disclosure’’ by J and D and that the concept of incremental and delayed disclosure by abused children is ‘‘well-known.’’ (Internal quotation mar 2019E., 322 Conn. 593, 618 , 142 A.3d 265 (2016). 10 In its memorandum, the state, inter alia, acknowledged that the recordings contained the hearsay statements of J and D, but asserted that they were admissible under the medical treatment or tender years exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 11 Specifically, the defendant contended that the constancy of accusation doctrine is limited to cases of sexual assault, that this was not a case of ‘‘incremental disclosure’’ by J and D and that the concept of incremental and delayed disclosure by abused children is ‘‘well-known.’’ (Internal quotation mar | 4 | 2019–2023 |
State v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2003The constancy of accusation doctrine, as limited in Troupe , recently was reaffirmed in State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001). 2003The constancy of accusation doctrine, as limited in Troupe , recently was reaffirmed in State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 35-36 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001). | 4 | 2001–2011 |
State v. Francis D.
green
2 sentences2013An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 815 A.2d 191 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909 , 819 A.2d 842 (2003). 2013An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 815 A.2d 191 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909 , 819 A.2d 842 (2003). | 3 | 2004–2013 |
State v. Francis D.
green
2 sentences2013An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 815 A.2d 191 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909 , 819 A.2d 842 (2003). 2013An appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 815 A.2d 191 , cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909 , 819 A.2d 842 (2003). | 3 | 2004–2013 |
State v. McKenzie-Adams
green
2 sentences2007Judicial decisions rendered after that development, concerning the constancy of accusation doctrine’s rationale, were summarized recently by our Supreme Court in State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L. 2007Judicial decisions rendered after that development, concerning the constancy of accusation doctrine’s rationale, were summarized recently by our Supreme Court in State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L. | 3 | 2007–2009 |
State v. Alvarez
green
2 sentences2005Whether testimony was admitted properly under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question. “[E]videntiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 306 , 579 A.2d 515 (1990); see State v. Pereira, 72 Conn. App. 107, 117 , 806 A.2d 51 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 931 , 815 A.2d 135 (2003). 2005Whether testimony was admitted properly under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question. “[E]videntiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 306 , 579 A.2d 515 (1990); see State v. Pereira, 72 Conn. App. 107, 117 , 806 A.2d 51 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 931 , 815 A.2d 135 (2003). | 3 | 1996–2005 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences2003State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). 2002“In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). | 3 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Repetti
green
2 sentences2003State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). 2002“In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). | 3 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences2002“In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). 2002“In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” State v. Romero, 59 Conn. App. 469, 480 , 757 A.2d 643 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 919 , 763 A.2d 1043 (2000). | 3 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Cansler
green
2 sentences2002We disagree. “[Wjhether evidence is admissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cansler, 54 Conn. App. 819, 825 , 738 A.2d 1095 (1999). 2002We disagree. “[Wjhether evidence is admissible under the constancy of accusation doctrine is an evidentiary question that will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cansler, 54 Conn. App. 819, 825 , 738 A.2d 1095 (1999). | 3 | 2000–2002 |
State v. Segerberg
green
2 sentences1988Withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications or records disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.” Although there were other witnesses who testified in this case under the doctrine of constancy of accusation, see part VII, infra, their testimony is admissible “only when the complainant has testified.” State v. Brice, 186 Conn. 449, 454 , 442 A.2d 906 (1982); State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 549 , 41 A.2d 101 (1945). 1988Withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications or records disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.” Although there were other witnesses who testified in this case under the doctrine of constancy of accusation, see part VII, infra, their testimony is admissible “only when the complainant has testified.” State v. Brice, 186 Conn. 449, 454 , 442 A.2d 906 (1982); State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 549 , 41 A.2d 101 (1945). | 3 | 1983–1988 |
State v. Dolphin
green
2 sentences1985While this evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statements was not admissible on the charge of attempted murder; State v. Dolphin, 178 Conn. 564, 568 , 424 A.2d 266 (1979); the statements were admissible, under the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule, on the charge of sexual assault. 1985While this evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statements was not admissible on the charge of attempted murder; State v. Dolphin, 178 Conn. 564, 568 , 424 A.2d 266 (1979); the statements were admissible, under the constancy of accusation exception to the hearsay rule, on the charge of sexual assault. | 3 | 1983–1987 |
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2011We conclude that the defendant’s claim fails under the second prong of Golding 2 “In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Thompson, 71 Conn. App. 8, 13 , 799 A.2d 1126 (2002). 2011We conclude that the defendant’s claim fails under the second prong of Golding 2 “In Connecticut, it is well established that the constancy of accusation doctrine does not violate a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Thompson, 71 Conn. App. 8, 13 , 799 A.2d 1126 (2002). | 2 | 2003–2011 |
| State v. Arroyo green | 2 | 2009–2009 |
McKenzie-Adams v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2007Judicial decisions rendered after that development, concerning the constancy of accusation doctrine’s rationale, were summarized recently by our Supreme Court in State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L. 2007Judicial decisions rendered after that development, concerning the constancy of accusation doctrine’s rationale, were summarized recently by our Supreme Court in State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L. | 2 | 2007–2009 |
| State v. Hill green | 2 | 2005–2008 |
| State v. Bispham green | 2 | 2002–2004 |
| State v. Watkins green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Bispham neutral | 2 | 2002–2004 |
| Lauer v. Zoning Commission green | 2 | 1998–1999 |
| Cadle Co. v. C.F.D. Development Corp. green | 2 | 1998–1999 |
| State v. Jones green | 2 | 1998–1999 |
| State v. Eged green | 2 | 1998–1999 |
| State v. Hamer green | 2 | 1987–1996 |
| Miller v. Miller green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| Guarco v. Curtis green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| State v. Saraceno green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| State v. Bailey neutral | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Brigandi green | 2 | 1982–1988 |
| State v. Adam P. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. McClain green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| DePietro v. Department of Public Safety green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| DePietro v. Department of Public Safety green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Polanco green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Ali green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Acosta green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.