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15 New York opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re the Claim of Ragogreen2 sentences2023Moreover, "the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing[*2]" ( Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 22 AD3d 1002, 1002 [3d Dept 2005]; accord Matter of McKenzie [Strategic Delivery Solutions LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 142 AD3d at 1272 ). 2016Notably, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc. — Com missioner of Labor], 22 AD3d 1002, 1002 [2005]; see Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008]). | 7 | 9 |
Zaire v. Artusgreen2 sentences2016Notably, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc. — Com missioner of Labor], 22 AD3d 1002, 1002 [2005]; see Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008]). 2016Moreover, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie— Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]). | 7 | 7 |
In re the Claim of Agarwalgreen2 sentences2016Moreover, "the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing" (Matter of White [Lurie–Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]). 2016Moreover, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie— Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]). | 4 | 8 |
In re the Claim of Maygreen2 sentences2013Although the employer contends that the admittedly late written request for a hearing was due to law office failure, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 22 AD3d at 1002 ; see Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d at 933; Matter of May [Ribaudo — Commissioner of Labor], 288 AD2d 538, 538 [2001]). 2013Although the employer contends that the admittedly late written request for a hearing was due to law office failure, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 22 AD3d at 1002 ; see Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d at 933; Matter of May [Ribaudo — Commissioner of Labor], 288 AD2d 538, 538 [2001]). | 2 | 3 |
Matter of McKenzie (Commr. of Labor)green2 sentences2023Moreover, "the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing[*2]" ( Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 22 AD3d 1002, 1002 [3d Dept 2005]; accord Matter of McKenzie [Strategic Delivery Solutions LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 142 AD3d at 1272 ). 2021"Pursuant to Labor Law § 620 (2), an employer has 30 days to request a hearing after the mailing or personal delivery of a notice of determination from which it claims to be aggrieved" ( Matter of White [F2 Solutions, LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 138 AD3d 1377, 1378 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Brown [Express Delivery LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 146 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2017]). " Notably, the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an em | 2 | 2 |
Matter of White (Commr. of Labor)green1 sentence2021"Pursuant to Labor Law § 620 (2), an employer has 30 days to request a hearing after the mailing or personal delivery of a notice of determination from which it claims to be aggrieved" ( Matter of White [F2 Solutions, LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 138 AD3d 1377, 1378 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Brown [Express Delivery LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 146 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2017]). " Notably, the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an em | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Brown (Commr. of Labor)green1 sentence2021"Pursuant to Labor Law § 620 (2), an employer has 30 days to request a hearing after the mailing or personal delivery of a notice of determination from which it claims to be aggrieved" ( Matter of White [F2 Solutions, LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 138 AD3d 1377, 1378 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Brown [Express Delivery LLC-Commissioner of Labor] , 146 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2017]). " Notably, the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an em | 1 | 1 |
In re the Claim of Hickmangreen1 sentence2015Although CR argues that its delays in both instances should be excused, as it reasonably believed that it was not aggrieved for unemployment insurance purposes if no benefits were awarded, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of Rago [Resource One, Inc .—Com missioner of Labor], 22 AD3d 1002, 1002 [2005]; accord Matter of Hickman [Maximum Litigation Support Servs., LL C—Com missioner of Labor], 111 AD3d 1000 , 1000 [2013]; Ma | 1 | 1 |
In re Schwartzgreen1 sentence2008Income Life—Commissioner of Labor], 17 AD3d 903, 903-904 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Claim of Lubin
neutral
1 sentence2005Notwithstanding Resource One’s excuse for its failure to request a hearing earlier, the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing (see Matter of May [Commissioner of Labor], 288 AD2d 538 [2001]; Matter of Storch [Cora Gross—Sweeney], 244 AD2d 755 [1997]; Matter of Davino [Good Samaritan Hosp. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.