interests-of-justice exception in New York

2007(See, Mejia v Mejia, 82 AD2d 875 [2d Dept 1981].) It has not been interpreted as a means for the prosecution to revive a matter that had been dismissed and is no longer before the court. . . .

2007The interests of justice standard is one applied to relieve a party of [*8]possible injustice. ( See , Mejia v Mejia , 82 AD2d 875 [2d Dept 1981].) It has not been interpreted as a means for the prosecution to revive a matter that had been dismissed and is no longer before the court. . . .

2025That statute expressly provides that a plaintiff's time to serve may be extended "upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice." ( 97 NY2d at 101 , quoting CPLR 306-b.) CPLR 205 does not contain any comparable language; and the Appellate Division, First Department, has held that the filing and service requirements of CPLR 205 (a) apply whether or not the plaintiff has received an extension of time to serve for CPLR 306-b purposes. ( See Mira v Argus Media , 222 AD3d 528, 530 [1st Dept 2023].) Plaintiff provides no appellate authority that an interests-of-justice exception should nonethe

2018Under the interest of justice standard, "the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant" ( Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer , 97 NY2d at 105-106 ; see Bumpus v New York City Trans.

2002In Busier v Corbett (supra), for example, the Court granted plaintiff’s application to extend the time for service under the interests of justice standard contained in CPLR 306-b where her attorney commenced the action six days before the expiration of the statute of limitations but failed to serve defendants until 28 days after the statutorily permissible time for service.

2000(See, Busler v Corbett, supra.) The interests of justice standard is akin to the discretion provided to Federal courts under rule 4 (m) to extend the time for service absent a showing of good cause.

2021Defendant's related contention regarding the inadequacy of County Court's limiting instruction given after the prosecutor referenced the victim's prior "[l]ife experiences" during the summation is unpreserved inasmuch as defendant requested the limiting instruction and agreed to the language crafted by the court ( see People v Delbrey , 179 AD3d 1292, 1296 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 969 [2020]; People v Irby, 140 AD3d 1319, 1323 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 931 [2016]).

2021Although defendant argues that such evidence might have discredited the victim — which he argues would fall in the interests of justice exception — County Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting exploration of the victim's alleged prior sexual experiences, as such information is not supported by any evidence other than through defendant's testimony, and such irrelevant testimony would likely have confused the jury ( see CPL 60.42; People v Youngs , 175 AD3d 1604 , 1611 [2019]; People v Serrano-Gonzalez , 146 AD3d 1013, 1016 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 952 [2017]).

2012Given the uncertainty as to what the friend’s testimony would be, we cannot conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in declining to admit the proposed evidence under the interests of justice exception (see People v Schafer, 81 AD3d 1361, 1363 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 861 [2011]; People v Monko, 162 AD2d 553, 554-555 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 861 [1990]).

2004In Wideman v Barbel Trucking ( 300 AD2d 184 [2002]), this Court granted an extension under the interests of justice standard of CPLR 306-b, notwithstanding invalid service.

2001If Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 applied here, the Court would permit the disclosure at issue under the interests of justice standard of that statute because the disclosure would benefit the class members by giving the records sought to plaintiffs’ attorneys in order to enable them to try to demonstrate plaintiffs’ need for discharge planning and defendants’ apparent continuing failure to provide it to other than a small percentage of the class (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 [c] [1]; Heard v Cuomo, 142 AD2d 537 [1st Dept 1988]; Matter of City of New York v Bleuler Psychotherapy Ctr., 181 Misc 2

2001If Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 applied here, the Court would permit the disclosure at issue under the interests of justice standard of that statute because the disclosure would benefit the class members by giving the records sought to plaintiffs’ attorneys in order to enable them to try to demonstrate plaintiffs’ need for discharge planning and defendants’ apparent continuing failure to provide it to other than a small percentage of the class (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 [c] [1]; Heard v Cuomo, 142 AD2d 537 [1st Dept 1988]; Matter of City of New York v Bleuler Psychotherapy Ctr., 181 Misc 2

1996The court found that the "interests of justice” exception to sealing "must permit sealing to be stayed in circumstances beyond the exceptions in CPL 160.50 (1) (d), otherwise the language would not be needed.” 4 (People v Abedi, supra, at 1014 .) The court noted that the Legislature could not have "intended to create broad exceptions to the sealing requirement whenever the District Attorney is quick to move to stop sealing, but only narrow exceptions to the sealing requirement when the desire for the records occurs immediately after sealing.” (People v Abedi, supra, at 1014 .) The court found

1996The court found that the "interests of justice” exception to sealing "must permit sealing to be stayed in circumstances beyond the exceptions in CPL 160.50 (1) (d), otherwise the language would not be needed.” 4 (People v Abedi, supra, at 1014 .) The court noted that the Legislature could not have "intended to create broad exceptions to the sealing requirement whenever the District Attorney is quick to move to stop sealing, but only narrow exceptions to the sealing requirement when the desire for the records occurs immediately after sealing.” (People v Abedi, supra, at 1014 .) The court found

1989Moreover, the court’s ruling with respect to defense counsel’s questioning of the complainant regarding her alleged drug use and prostitution activities did not unduly infringe upon the defendant’s right of confrontation (see, People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).

1989The trial court did not err in concluding that the interests of justice exception contained within CPL 60.42 (5) did not warrant inquiry into the victim’s sexual history (see, People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952 , cert denied 446 US 949 ).

1989Moreover, the court’s ruling with respect to defense counsel’s questioning of the complainant regarding her alleged drug use and prostitution activities did not unduly infringe upon the defendant’s right of confrontation (see, People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).

1989The trial court did not err in concluding that the interests of justice exception contained within CPL 60.42 (5) did not warrant inquiry into the victim’s sexual history (see, People v Mandel, 48 NY2d 952 , cert denied 446 US 949 ).

1989Moreover, the court’s ruling with respect to defense counsel’s questioning of the complainant regarding her alleged drug use and prostitution activities did not unduly infringe upon the defendant’s right of confrontation (see, People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).