reach principle in New York

2001An indictment must contain a factual allegation of every element of a crime charged (CPL 200.50 [7]) and we have held that “ ‘[i]t is bright line law that if the offense charged has an exception contained within the statute, the indictment must contain an allegation that defendant’s conduct does not come within the reach of the exception’ ” (People v Hogabone, 278 AD2d 525, 525-526 , quoting People v Bingham, 263 AD2d 611 , lv denied 93 NY2d 1014 ; see, People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 ).

2000As we recently iterated, “[i]t is bright line law that if the offense charged has an exception contained within the statute, the indictment must contain an allegation that defendant’s conduct does not come within the reach of the exception” (People v Bingham, 263 AD2d 611 , lv denied 93 NY2d 1014 ; see, People v Rodriguez, 68 NY2d 674 ; People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Best, 132 AD2d 773, 774-775 ).

2000As we recently iterated, “[i]t is bright line law that if the offense charged has an exception contained within the statute, the indictment must contain an allegation that defendant’s conduct does not come within the reach of the exception” (People v Bingham, 263 AD2d 611 , lv denied 93 NY2d 1014 ; see, People v Rodriguez, 68 NY2d 674 ; People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Best, 132 AD2d 773, 774-775 ).

1999It is bright line law that if the offense charged has an exception contained within the statute, the indictment must contain an allegation that defendant’s conduct does not come within the reach of the exception (see, People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 ; People v Best, 132 AD2d 773, 774-775 ).

2011To the extent that defendants argue that we should presume that the parties must have intended to fulfill the conditions of the contract within 21 years so as to avoid its invalidity, such conclusion “would give an effect to EPTL 9-1.3 that the Legislature could not have intended: the virtual exemption from the reach of the rule against remoteness in vesting ... of options which contain no limit . . . [unless they specifically provided] that the option [was] intended to be unlimited or to last perpetually” (Buffalo Seminary v McCarthy, 86 AD2d 435, 446 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 867 [1983]).

2009Corp. v Tax Assessor of City of White Plains ( 58 AD2d 653 [2d Dept 1977]) as supporting its argument that it is not an “income-producing property” within the reach of the rule.

2001An indictment must contain a factual allegation of every element of a crime charged (CPL 200.50 [7]) and we have held that “ ‘[i]t is bright line law that if the offense charged has an exception contained within the statute, the indictment must contain an allegation that defendant’s conduct does not come within the reach of the exception’ ” (People v Hogabone, 278 AD2d 525, 525-526 , quoting People v Bingham, 263 AD2d 611 , lv denied 93 NY2d 1014 ; see, People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 ).

2000Recently, in People v Evans ( 94 NY2d 499 ), this Court plumbed the reach of this doctrine, and noted that it “addresses the potentially preclusive effect of judicial determinations made in the course of a single litigation before final judgment” (id., at 502 [emphasis supplied in first instance]).

1997In our view, the activities engaged in here come within the reach of this principle (see, Lamey v Foley, 188 AD2d 157, 163 ; Nagawiecki v State of New York, 150 AD2d 147 ).

1997When the risks of the activity in question are perfectly obvious, the plaintiff is deemed to have consented to them and the defendant has satisfied its only duty of care—which is to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be (see, Turcotte v Fell, supra, at 438-439; Giordano v Shanty Hollow Corp., 209 AD2d 760 , lv denied 85 NY2d 802 ; Pascucci v Town of Oyster Bay, 186 AD2d 725, 726 ).

1997In our view, the activities engaged in here come within the reach of this principle (see, Lamey v Foley, 188 AD2d 157, 163 ; Nagawiecki v State of New York, 150 AD2d 147 ).

1997When the risks of the activity in question are perfectly obvious, the plaintiff is deemed to have consented to them and the defendant has satisfied its only duty of care—which is to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be (see, Turcotte v Fell, supra, at 438-439; Giordano v Shanty Hollow Corp., 209 AD2d 760 , lv denied 85 NY2d 802 ; Pascucci v Town of Oyster Bay, 186 AD2d 725, 726 ).

1993The Paine, Webber holding was reiterated by the Second Circuit in Haviland v Goldman, Sachs & Co. (947 F2d 601, cert denied — US —, 112 S Ct 1995 ), but the court continued to "confine [its] ruling to situations in which the alleged misconduct is attributed to the nonmember” (id., at 606, n 1; see also, Pearce v E.F.

1989It is unquestionably an agency of the State (see, Executive Law § 661), one which the Court of Appeals has implicitly recognized to be an employer for purposes of the Taylor Law (see, Van Vlack v Ternullo, 53 NY2d 1003, 1004 ), one which this court has found to be a public employer for purposes of the Human Rights Law (Matter of New York State Dept, of Correctional Servs. v McCall, 111 AD2d 571, 572 ) and one which clearly exercises governmental powers (see, New York Inst, for Educ. of Blind v United Fedn. of Teachers’ Comm. for N. Y.

1989It is unquestionably an agency of the State (see, Executive Law § 661), one which the Court of Appeals has implicitly recognized to be an employer for purposes of the Taylor Law (see, Van Vlack v Ternullo, 53 NY2d 1003, 1004 ), one which this court has found to be a public employer for purposes of the Human Rights Law (Matter of New York State Dept, of Correctional Servs. v McCall, 111 AD2d 571, 572 ) and one which clearly exercises governmental powers (see, New York Inst, for Educ. of Blind v United Fedn. of Teachers’ Comm. for N. Y.

1988In construing the reach of the privilege, it has been held that the fact that a person has received treatment is as much confidential information protected by the privilege as is the nature of the treatment (see, Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 90 AD2d 990 , affd 59 NY2d 130 ; Boddy v Parker, 45 NY2d 1000 ).

1988In construing the reach of the privilege, it has been held that the fact that a person has received treatment is as much confidential information protected by the privilege as is the nature of the treatment (see, Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 90 AD2d 990 , affd 59 NY2d 130 ; Boddy v Parker, 45 NY2d 1000 ).

1984And while some doubt exists as to whether the reach of the immunity of the Federal “speech and debate clause” would extend to press conferences conducted by a legislator as a part of his “informing function” (Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111 , supra), we find it unnecessary to determine the reach of our State “speech and debate clause” in respect to the alleged defamation Senator Marino is charged with uttering at a press conference in the first cause of action.

1981The court, in discussing the reach of the privilege and immunities clause, said, “[I]t is settled that a State may not premise an individual’s right to engage in his chosen occupation within its borders solely on residence.” (Matter of Gordon, supra, at p 271.) The court, however, also recognized a narrow exception to the general prohibition and allowed that the State may differentiate between residents and nonresidents in “matters which directly implicate its sovereignty, such as *** entitlement to public office (Chimento v Stark, 414 US 802 )” (Matter of Gordon, supra, p 271).

1981In Chimento v Stark ( 414 US 802 ) the United States Supreme Court upheld a seven-year durational residence requirement for candidates seeking election to the office of Governor of a State.

1971Violence (Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 ; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 351 U. S. 266 ; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 ; Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 ), mass picketing (Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Bd., supra), and forms of activity imperiling domestic peace are of such paramount State concern that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction, the States are not ousted of jurisdiction (Garmon II, supra, p. 247).

1971Violence (Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 ; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 351 U. S. 266 ; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 ; Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 ), mass picketing (Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Bd., supra), and forms of activity imperiling domestic peace are of such paramount State concern that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction, the States are not ousted of jurisdiction (Garmon II, supra, p. 247).

1971Violence (Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 ; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 351 U. S. 266 ; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 ; Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 ), mass picketing (Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Bd., supra), and forms of activity imperiling domestic peace are of such paramount State concern that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction, the States are not ousted of jurisdiction (Garmon II, supra, p. 247).

1971(And, see, Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 477 , as to the reach of the principle that a duty of support arises from an invalid marriage.) At most a husband can rely on the invalidity of his divorce from wife No. 1 and on such factors as wife No. 2’s knowledge, to defeat an action for separation by wife No. 2.

1971(See Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 17 ; Krause v. Krause dissent, 282 N. Y. 355, 364 , supra; cf. Zeitlan v. Zeitlan, 31 A D 2d 955, 957; Amerling v. Amerling, 180 Misc. 701 , app. dsmd. 270 App. Div. 935 ; Matter of Werger, 64 Misc 2d 1094, 1096 .) The instant Family Court proceeding however, is not a status action, hut merely involves the economic obligation incident to marriage.