reach rule in California

2017In Tuolumne CCRG , the test we adopted and applied was whether the acts in question were " 'related to each other.' " ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 , 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , quoting Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712 , 726, 117 Cal.Rptr. 96 .) We described the reach of this test by stating there are different ways actions can be related to (i.e., connected with) each other. ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 .) For instance, the two actions could be "related in (1) time, (2) physical locatio

2017In Tuolumne CCRG , the test we adopted and applied was whether the acts in question were " 'related to each other.' " ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 , 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , quoting Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712 , 726, 117 Cal.Rptr. 96 .) We described the reach of this test by stating there are different ways actions can be related to (i.e., connected with) each other. ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 .) For instance, the two actions could be "related in (1) time, (2) physical locatio

2017In Tuolumne CCRG , the test we adopted and applied was whether the acts in question were " 'related to each other.' " ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 , 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , quoting Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712 , 726, 117 Cal.Rptr. 96 .) We described the reach of this test by stating there are different ways actions can be related to (i.e., connected with) each other. ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 .) For instance, the two actions could be "related in (1) time, (2) physical locatio

2017In Tuolumne CCRG , the test we adopted and applied was whether the acts in question were " 'related to each other.' " ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 , 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , quoting Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712 , 726, 117 Cal.Rptr. 96 .) We described the reach of this test by stating there are different ways actions can be related to (i.e., connected with) each other. ( Tuolumne CCRG , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 .) For instance, the two actions could be "related in (1) time, (2) physical locatio

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ] (Yurko)), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas (People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 504 P.2d 452 ]) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juve

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 ( Yurko )), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 ), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas ( People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 ) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juvenile court law ( In re Ronald E ., supra, 19 Cal.3d 315 ).

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ] (Yurko)), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas (People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 504 P.2d 452 ]) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juve

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 ( Yurko )), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 ), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas ( People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 ) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juvenile court law ( In re Ronald E ., supra, 19 Cal.3d 315 ).

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ] (Yurko)), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas (People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 504 P.2d 452 ]) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juve

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 ( Yurko )), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 ), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas ( People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 ) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juvenile court law ( In re Ronald E ., supra, 19 Cal.3d 315 ).

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ] (Yurko)), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 329 , 515 P.2d 273 ]), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas (People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 504 P.2d 452 ]) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juve

1999We expanded the reach of this rule, applying it to admissions of prior felony convictions alleged as enhancements for sentencing purposes ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 ( Yurko )), guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288 ), submissions on preliminary examination transcripts that were tantamount to guilty pleas ( People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648 ) and, with the exception of warnings regarding the right to a jury trial, admissions under the juvenile court law ( In re Ronald E ., supra, 19 Cal.3d 315 ).

2025(Lidow v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 351 , 358–359; see Corp. Code, § 2106.) However, the reach of the doctrine does not extend to procedural laws.

2023(See e.g., Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763 , 770–771 [“Pleadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications’’].) Thus, we affirm the trial court’s initial finding that “[o]n its face the privilege of [section] 47 bars this action.” The People do not dispute this point but contend that their case against Potter can be prosecuted under an exception to the privilege, so to that topic we next turn.

2015(See, e.g., People v. Davenport (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 885, 892 .) Penal Code section 198.5, however, expressly excludes family members from the reach of the presumption.

2013(Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342 , 387–389; Garat v. City of Riverside, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 290 [“This requirement of some sort of nexus of relevancy between the direct object of the challenge (e.g., an amendment to a general plan) and the overall reach of the challenge (e.g., those portions of the general plan being amended or impacted by the amendment) is hardly startling and has been recognized in other contexts by other courts.”].) A contrary rule would chaotically upend the very certainty and confidence the statute exp

2011In this respect, the language of those decisions is entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment itself, which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." (Italics added.) It is also consistent with one of the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception: "the reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained. [Citation.]" ( Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 802-803, italics added.) Contrary to the dissent's analysis, whether an item of personal property co

2011In this respect, the language of those decisions is entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment itself, which protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” (Italics added.) It is also consistent with one of the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception: “the reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained. [Citation.]” ( Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 802-803, italics added.) Contrary to the dissent’s analysis, whether an item of personal property co

2011In this respect, the language of those decisions is entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment itself, which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." (Italics added.) It is also consistent with one of the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception: "the reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained. [Citation.]" ( Edwards, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 802-803, italics added.) Contrary to the dissent's analysis, whether an item of personal property co

2009He argued that the search conducted incident to his arrest was beyond the scope of the arm’s reach rule of Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ].

2009He argued that the search conducted incident to his arrest was beyond the scope of the arm’s reach rule of Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ].

2007Our courts have correctly stressed that the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to "provide greater punishment for recidivists" ( Fowler, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 584 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 ) and that its focus "is on the defendant's conduct" grounded "on findings of factual guilt." (Ibid., italics added; People v. Bowden, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 390 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ["the prosecution's proof of the prior juvenile adjudication showed the juvenile court found Tennant committed robbery"].) "A prior juvenile adjudication ... demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt [citation] that a defen

2007Our courts have correctly stressed that the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to "provide greater punishment for recidivists" ( Fowler, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 584 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 ) and that its focus "is on the defendant's conduct" grounded "on findings of factual guilt." (Ibid., italics added; People v. Bowden, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 390 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ["the prosecution's proof of the prior juvenile adjudication showed the juvenile court found Tennant committed robbery"].) "A prior juvenile adjudication ... demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt [citation] that a defen

2007Our courts have correctly stressed that the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to "provide greater punishment for recidivists" ( Fowler, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 584 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 ) and that its focus "is on the defendant's conduct" grounded "on findings of factual guilt." (Ibid., italics added; People v. Bowden, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 390 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ["the prosecution's proof of the prior juvenile adjudication showed the juvenile court found Tennant committed robbery"].) "A prior juvenile adjudication ... demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt [citation] that a defen

2007Our courts have correctly stressed that the purpose of the Three Strikes law is to "provide greater punishment for recidivists" ( Fowler, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 584 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 ) and that its focus "is on the defendant's conduct" grounded "on findings of factual guilt." (Ibid., italics added; People v. Bowden, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 390 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513 ["the prosecution's proof of the prior juvenile adjudication showed the juvenile court found Tennant committed robbery"].) "A prior juvenile adjudication ... demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt [citation] that a defen

2005(Gross, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 820 .) A fair reading of Cartwright makes clear that the decision at most extended the reach of the bar against using the nolo contendere plea and conviction (see Pen.

2004As we have cautioned, the privilege cannot be defeated by providing a new label for the alleged wrong. ( Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1203 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 847 P.2d 1044 .) As discussed above, in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and later cases we explained that section 47(b) operates to bar civil liability for any tort claim based upon a privileged communication, with the exception of malicious prosecution, whose requirements include malice, lack of probable cause, and termination in the plaintiff's favor. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 21

2004As we have cautioned, the privilege cannot be defeated by providing a new label for the alleged wrong. ( Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1203 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 847 P.2d 1044 .) As discussed above, in Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205 , 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 , and later cases we explained that section 47(b) operates to bar civil liability for any tort claim based upon a privileged communication, with the exception of malicious prosecution, whose requirements include malice, lack of probable cause, and termination in the plaintiff's favor. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 21

2003(Carden v. Getzoff, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 913 .) Pollock argues that “ ‘[b]ecause the tort is based on the wrongful conduct of filing and executing a deliberately false declaration, the litigation privilege . . . does not apply.’ ” (Italics and underscoring in original.) By this argument, Pollock seeks to fit the facts of this case within the sole limitation on the reach of the privilege, namely, that it does not apply to conduct.

2002L.Rev. 1272, 1274; United States v. *488 DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 .) In short, the clause was intended, as Justice Black put it, to prevent "oppressive practices" by the state through its prosecutorial arm. ( Wade v. Hunter (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 .) But important countervailing social interests limiting the reach of the clause have also been identified.

2002L.Rev. 1272, 1274; United States v. *488 DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 .) In short, the clause was intended, as Justice Black put it, to prevent "oppressive practices" by the state through its prosecutorial arm. ( Wade v. Hunter (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 .) But important countervailing social interests limiting the reach of the clause have also been identified.

2002L.Rev. 1272, 1274; United States v. *488 DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 .) In short, the clause was intended, as Justice Black put it, to prevent "oppressive practices" by the state through its prosecutorial arm. ( Wade v. Hunter (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 .) But important countervailing social interests limiting the reach of the clause have also been identified.

2002L.Rev. 1272, 1274; United States v. *488 DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 .) In short, the clause was intended, as Justice Black put it, to prevent "oppressive practices" by the state through its prosecutorial arm. ( Wade v. Hunter (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834 , 93 L.Ed. 974 .) But important countervailing social interests limiting the reach of the clause have also been identified.