reach doctrine in New Jersey

2024He views the Appellate Division’s two-pronged test for the application of the ministerial exemption to tort claims to contravene this Court’s decision in McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 51-53 , and asserts that under McKelvey, his defamation claims are beyond the reach of the exception.

2012Under that canon of statutory construction, “where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Id. at 543-44 , 2 A.3d 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Under that canon of statutory construction, “where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Id. at 543-44 , 2 A.3d 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010In considering whether a wrongful death action should have a broader reach than a survival action—or a greater reach than the claim the victim could have asserted had he or she lived—we should not overlook that wrongful death statutes were enacted in response to the English common law rule that "in a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained *255 of as an injury," Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 375 , 766 A .2d 738 (2001) (quoting Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng.

2010In considering whether a wrongful death action should have a broader reach than a survival action—or a greater reach than the claim the victim could have asserted had he or she lived—we should not overlook that wrongful death statutes were enacted in response to the English common law rule that "in a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained *255 of as an injury," Miller v. Estate of Sperling, 166 N.J. 370, 375 , 766 A .2d 738 (2001) (quoting Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng.

2002Id. at 271 , 307 A. 2d 65 .

2002Id. at 271 , 307 A. 2d 65 .

1997Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 116 N.J. 505, 516 , 562 A.2d 202 (1989).

1997Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 116 N.J. 505, 516 , 562 A.2d 202 (1989).

1996In Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 313 , 78 A.2d 572 (1951), the Court broadened the reach of the doctrine by requiring joinder of defenses.

1996In Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 313 , 78 A.2d 572 (1951), the Court broadened the reach of the doctrine by requiring joinder of defenses.

1992California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. ___ , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1991).

1992California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. ___ , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1991).

1992While we recognize the broad reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we have no occasion to apply it here. *378 In New Jersey, we have a "long history of instances where equity has interposed to bar the statute of limitations ... where some conduct on the part of the defendant ... has rendered it inequitable that he be allowed to avail himself of this defense." Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 , 275 n. 2, 300 A. 2d 563 (1973).

1992While we recognize the broad reach of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we have no occasion to apply it here. *378 In New Jersey, we have a "long history of instances where equity has interposed to bar the statute of limitations ... where some conduct on the part of the defendant ... has rendered it inequitable that he be allowed to avail himself of this defense." Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 , 275 n. 2, 300 A. 2d 563 (1973).

1989With these three out, there would be no council and therefore no body to pass upon this locally important matter which, for reasons within the record, would not permit of delay. [116 N.J. at 514-15] The court concluded that the governing body could act notwithstanding the potential disqualification. *648 In Pyatt v. Mayor and Council of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548 (1952), the governing body had before it a proposed ordinance which would allow the expansion of a business which constituted Dunellen's largest industry.

1980Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334 (1966), the court, in referring to the section of the rule which permits the vacation of a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief," said: ...