substantive legal rule in New York

2014Instead, the court relied on Raquet v Braun ( 90 NY2d 177 [1997]) for the proposition that “a defendant may seek contribution from a third party even if the injured plaintiff has no direct right of recovery against that party, either because of a procedural bar or because of a substantive legal rule” (Clamp, 10 Misc 3d at 991 , quoting Raquet, 90 NY2d at 182 ).

2005The cases cited by the Georges herein are not controlling in the instant matter as they each involve an injured employee plaintiff, subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law, directly suing an owner (Rose v Gelco Corp., 261 AD2d 381 [1999] [injured plaintiff employee sued owner of van; no liability imputed to owner of van because employer immune from suit under Workers’ Compensation Law and no independent negligence alleged against van owner; plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is Workers’ Compensation Law]; Chiriboga v Ebrahimoff, 281 AD2d 353 [2001] [Workers’ Compensation Law is exclusive remedy for

2005The cases cited by the Georges herein are not controlling in the instant matter as they each involve an injured employee plaintiff, subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law, directly suing an owner (Rose v Gelco Corp., 261 AD2d 381 [1999] [injured plaintiff employee sued owner of van; no liability imputed to owner of van because employer immune from suit under Workers’ Compensation Law and no independent negligence alleged against van owner; plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is Workers’ Compensation Law]; Chiriboga v Ebrahimoff, 281 AD2d 353 [2001] [Workers’ Compensation Law is exclusive remedy for

2000“Part of the reason for this seeming circuity is that the avoidance of direct liability to the injured plaintiff does not logically or legally equate to the absence of shared fault on the part of the otherwise immune defendant as among the joint tortfeasors” (Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281, 285 ).

1997Moreover, a court’s inherent power to correct its own records where a mistake is clerical in nature extends to errors where "the court merely misspoke or a patent clerical mistake has been made [citations omitted].” (People v Moquin, 77 NY2d 449, 452 [1991]; People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 364 [1981], cert denied 455 US 1024 .) However, "the limited 'inherent authority’ to vacate a plea after imposition of sentence may not be utilized to remedy a substantive legal error in the acceptance of the plea, at least after the defendant has begun serving his sentence” (People v Moquin, supra, at 452 ) o

1997Co., 30 NY2d 143 ; cf., L 1996, ch 635 [amending Workers’ Compensation Law § 11]).

1993Such improper delegation of judicial authority constitutes a "substantial departure from a statutory provision that affects the ' "organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law” ’ ” (People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760 ), and simultaneously violates a defendant’s "absolute and unequivocal” right (People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760 ) to be present during instructions to the jury—a material stage of his trial (see, CPL 310.30; People v Torres, 72 NY2d 1007 ; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 ; cf., People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 ).

1993Such improper delegation of judicial authority constitutes a "substantial departure from a statutory provision that affects the ' "organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law” ’ ” (People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760 ), and simultaneously violates a defendant’s "absolute and unequivocal” right (People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760 ) to be present during instructions to the jury—a material stage of his trial (see, CPL 310.30; People v Torres, 72 NY2d 1007 ; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 ; cf., People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 ).

1993Such improper delegation of judicial authority constitutes a "substantial departure from a statutory provision that affects the ' "organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law” ’ ” (People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760 ), and simultaneously violates a defendant’s "absolute and unequivocal” right (People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760 ) to be present during instructions to the jury—a material stage of his trial (see, CPL 310.30; People v Torres, 72 NY2d 1007 ; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 ; cf., People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 ).

1993Such improper delegation of judicial authority constitutes a "substantial departure from a statutory provision that affects the ' "organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law” ’ ” (People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760 ), and simultaneously violates a defendant’s "absolute and unequivocal” right (People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760 ) to be present during instructions to the jury—a material stage of his trial (see, CPL 310.30; People v Torres, 72 NY2d 1007 ; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 ; cf., People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 ).

1993Such improper delegation of judicial authority constitutes a "substantial departure from a statutory provision that affects the ' "organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law” ’ ” (People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759, 760 ), and simultaneously violates a defendant’s "absolute and unequivocal” right (People v Mehmedi, supra, at 760 ) to be present during instructions to the jury—a material stage of his trial (see, CPL 310.30; People v Torres, 72 NY2d 1007 ; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 ; cf., People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 ).

1985Co., 381 Mass 432, 409 NE2d 1279, 1283 , and cases cited therein.) The substantive legal doctrine of assumption of the risk was specifically intended to be included within the phrase "culpable conduct”.

1985Thus, irrespective of whether it can be said that the arbitrators misconstrued the plain meaning of the agreement or misapplied the substantive legal principle in Matter of Chalachan v City of Binghamton {supra), the award must be confirmed {see, e.g., Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 NY2d 299, 308 ).

1985Thus, irrespective of whether it can be said that the arbitrators misconstrued the plain meaning of the agreement or misapplied the substantive legal principle in Matter of Chalachan v City of Binghamton {supra), the award must be confirmed {see, e.g., Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 NY2d 299, 308 ).

1982Thus the master arbitrators in both matters purported to vacate the original awards on the ground of error of law; but, said the Court of Appeals in Matter of Mott ( 55 NY2d, at p 232 ), the master arbitrator’s “conclusions relat[ing] to the propriety of the arbitrator’s refusal to consider the blood test results and to the weight of the evidence regarding Mott’s intoxication at the time of the accident” were actually issues of procedure (i.e., admissibility) and weight of the evidence, respectively.