sweeping rule in New York

2026This sweeping rule is controverted by Nazario , however, since there summary judgment was not warranted ( see Nazario , 28 NY3d at 1055 ) despite the ladder's clear failure to remain steady and erect ( see Nazario , 135 AD3d at 508 [ladder and the plaintiff "fell to the ground"]).

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2025In sum, we agree with the Second Department's conclusion that the Legislature intended for adolescent offenders to be prosecuted in criminal court "only in the most exceptional cases" ( People v Lloyd F. , ___ AD3d at ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583 at *4 ).

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2025Sanchez v State of New York</i>, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]; <i>Mirand v City of New York</i>, 84 NY2d 44 [1994];<i> Pratt v Robinson</i>, 39 NY2d 554 [1976]; <i>Flaherty v State</i>, 296 NY 342 [1947]), the Court determined that the State owed a duty of care to those in its physical custody, including incarcerated individuals (<i>see Sanchez</i>, 99 NY2d at 252 ) and students while at school (<i>Pratt</i>, 39 NY2d at 560 ), because of the nature of the custody.</p> <p>Despite the majority's protestations, our physical custody cases are inapplicable for the obvious reason that plaintiff was not in the

2014Although the Court rejected the proposition that “any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a background principle of property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after the enactment,” it also stated that it had “no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law” other than to note that “a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title” ( 533 US 606, 629-630 ), certa

1996Indeed, we have since emphasized that options to purchase are to be treated differently than preemptive rights, underscoring that preemptive rights impede alienability only minimally whereas purchase options vest substantial control over the transferability of property in the option holder (see, Wildenstein & Co. v Wallis, 79 NY2d at 648 , supra; Morrison v Piper, 77 NY2d at 169-170 , supra).

1996Indeed, we have since emphasized that options to purchase are to be treated differently than preemptive rights, underscoring that preemptive rights impede alienability only minimally whereas purchase options vest substantial control over the transferability of property in the option holder (see, Wildenstein & Co. v Wallis, 79 NY2d at 648 , supra; Morrison v Piper, 77 NY2d at 169-170 , supra).

1994(See, People v Bolden, 81 NY2d 146 , supra.) On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the Second Department’s sweeping analysis of the amendment.

1994(People v Bolden, 81 NY2d 146 , supra.) It concluded that the purpose of the 1984 amendment was not to absolve the People from all responsibility regarding an absconding defendant and that the issuance of a warrant did not automatically stop the speedy trial clock.

1991Unambiguous language in a statute must be construed to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used (see, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321-322 ; Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662, 665 ; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 674-675 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 76, 94).

1991Unambiguous language in a statute must be construed to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used (see, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321-322 ; Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662, 665 ; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 674-675 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 76, 94).

1991Unambiguous language in a statute must be construed to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used (see, Matter of Yong-Myun Rho v Ambach, 74 NY2d 318, 321-322 ; Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662, 665 ; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669, 674-675 ; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 76, 94).

1988The decisions in the McCann v City of New York ( 270 App Div 1040 , supra) and Roffenbender v City of New York ( 24 AD2d 581 , affd 17 NY2d 754 , supra) cases, rather than establishing the sweeping rule of law relied upon by our dissenting colleague, seem merely to hold that dismissal of a complaint is warranted where an infant plaintiff fails to prove that his fall was caused by some dangerous condition existing on the defendant’s property.

1988The decisions in the McCann v City of New York ( 270 App Div 1040 , supra) and Roffenbender v City of New York ( 24 AD2d 581 , affd 17 NY2d 754 , supra) cases, rather than establishing the sweeping rule of law relied upon by our dissenting colleague, seem merely to hold that dismissal of a complaint is warranted where an infant plaintiff fails to prove that his fall was caused by some dangerous condition existing on the defendant’s property.

1988The decisions in the McCann v City of New York ( 270 App Div 1040 , supra) and Roffenbender v City of New York ( 24 AD2d 581 , affd 17 NY2d 754 , supra) cases, rather than establishing the sweeping rule of law relied upon by our dissenting colleague, seem merely to hold that dismissal of a complaint is warranted where an infant plaintiff fails to prove that his fall was caused by some dangerous condition existing on the defendant’s property.

1983(See People v Karassik, 90 Mise 2d 839, 847; People v Brown, 87 Mise 2d 403; State v O’Daniel, 62 Hawaii 518 .) Under the facts here presented, the omission seems to us to have been a substantial defect, and one which may well have caused prejudice to the defendant.

1980A case subsequent to Rogers, People v Johnson ( 103 Misc 2d 798 ) limited the Rogers holding as follows: 'Rogers does not hold * * * that there is a sweeping bar to all questioning of a suspect once he has been represented by counsel on any pending criminal matter” (People v Johnson, supra, p 805 ).

1980A case subsequent to Rogers, People v Johnson ( 103 Misc 2d 798 ) limited the Rogers holding as follows: 'Rogers does not hold * * * that there is a sweeping bar to all questioning of a suspect once he has been represented by counsel on any pending criminal matter” (People v Johnson, supra, p 805 ).

1980However, Rogers ( 48 NY2d 167 , supra) does not hold, as urged by defense counsel in our case, that there is a sweeping bar to all questioning of a suspect once he has been represented by counsel on any pending criminal matter.

1978More recently, in Harris v New York ( 401 US 222 ), the Supreme Court extended the rule announced in Walder to cases where the constitutional violation had been one of Fifth Amendment rights as embodied in Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 ).

1978More recently, in Harris v New York ( 401 US 222 ), the Supreme Court extended the rule announced in Walder to cases where the constitutional violation had been one of Fifth Amendment rights as embodied in Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 ).

1957It is true that in the early case of Matter of Rappleye ( 43 App. Div. 84 ) the sweeping rule was laid down by way of dictum that the right of a member of a foreign corporation — whether as stockholder, director or officer — to inspect its books depended upon the law of the State of its incorporation and could be enforced only by its courts.

1957A more realistic view of corporate organizations and operations was taken in Matter of Rogers v. American Tobacco Co. ( 143 Misc. 306 , affd. 233 App. Div. 708 [1st dept.]) which expressly declined to follow the “ rule ” of the Rappleye case.

1957A more realistic view of corporate organizations and operations was taken in Matter of Rogers v. American Tobacco Co. ( 143 Misc. 306 , affd. 233 App. Div. 708 [1st dept.]) which expressly declined to follow the “ rule ” of the Rappleye case.

1940If it meant to lay down the sweeping rule that in no case where the man had purported to marry a woman and lived with her as his wife will he be heard to assert that he is actually still the husband of another, why did the prevailing opinion distinguish, and reaffirm, the holding in Vose v. Vose (supra) to the effect that if the second marriage be void because preceded by a Mexican “ mail order ” divorce from the former spouse there is no estoppel against repudiation of the obligations of such abortive second marriage?