sweeping rule in Pennsylvania

2000Blackwell, 527 Pa. at 182 , 589 A.2d at 1099 ; Commonwealth v. Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 10-11 , 684 A.2d 597, 602 (1996).

2000Blackwell, 527 Pa. at 182 , 589 A.2d at 1099 ; Commonwealth v. Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 10-11 , 684 A.2d 597, 602 (1996).

1997This sweeping immunity is “not for the benefit of high public officials, but for the benefit of the public.” Bario v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 272 , 378 A.2d 927, 932 (1977) (Spaeth, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 487 Pa. 455 , 409 A.2d 857 (1980).

1997This sweeping immunity is “not for the benefit of high public officials, but for the benefit of the public.” Bario v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 272 , 378 A.2d 927, 932 (1977) (Spaeth, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 487 Pa. 455 , 409 A.2d 857 (1980).

1994Appellant’s reliance on Kuchinic in the face of Cabeza and Blackwell is not convincing and bolsters the efficacy of Justice Nix’ dissent in Cabeza which pointed out that a sweeping rule of retroactive application is unsupported in Pennsylvania cases. “ ‘Retroactive application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.’ August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 554 , 424 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1981), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).” Cabeza, supra 503 Pa. at 232 , 469 A.2d at 148 (Nix, Justice dissenting).

1994Appellant’s reliance on Kuchinic in the face of Cabeza and Blackwell is not convincing and bolsters the efficacy of Justice Nix’ dissent in Cabeza which pointed out that a sweeping rule of retroactive application is unsupported in Pennsylvania cases. “ ‘Retroactive application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.’ August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 554 , 424 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1981), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).” Cabeza, supra 503 Pa. at 232 , 469 A.2d at 148 (Nix, Justice dissenting).

2022However, “a sweeping rule of retroactive application is not justified,” and “[r]etrospective application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.” Id. at 1099 .

1996The standard for such a determination was set by our Supreme Court in Blackwell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 527 Pa. 172 , 589 A.2d 1094 (1991), which stated that although the general rule requires retroactivity, “a sweeping rule of retroactive application is not justified.” Id. at 182 , 589 A.2d at 1099 .

1997After an extensive review of the relevant criteria regarding prospective and retroactive applicability, this court concluded: “Applying a modified version of the common law and rejecting a sweeping rule of retroactive application, we conclude that the decision announced in Brion is to be prospectively applied and is not applicable to searches and intercepted conversations with occurred prior to December 30, 1994.” Metts, 447 Pa.Super. at 295 , 669 A.2d at 356 (emphasis added).

1997After an extensive review of the relevant criteria regarding prospective and retroactive applicability, this court concluded: “Applying a modified version of the common law and rejecting a sweeping rule of retroactive application, we conclude that the decision announced in Brion is to be prospectively applied and is not applicable to searches and intercepted conversations with occurred prior to December 30, 1994.” Metts, 447 Pa.Super. at 295 , 669 A.2d at 356 (emphasis added).

1994Appellant’s reliance on Kuchinic in the face of Cabeza and Blackwell is not convincing and bolsters the efficacy of Justice Nix’ dissent in Cabeza which pointed out that a sweeping rule of retroactive application is unsupported in Pennsylvania cases. “ ‘Retroactive application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.’ August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 554 , 424 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1981), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).” Cabeza, supra 503 Pa. at 232 , 469 A.2d at 148 (Nix, Justice dissenting).

1994Appellant’s reliance on Kuchinic in the face of Cabeza and Blackwell is not convincing and bolsters the efficacy of Justice Nix’ dissent in Cabeza which pointed out that a sweeping rule of retroactive application is unsupported in Pennsylvania cases. “ ‘Retroactive application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.’ August v. Stasak, 492 Pa. 550, 554 , 424 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1981), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).” Cabeza, supra 503 Pa. at 232 , 469 A.2d at 148 (Nix, Justice dissenting).

2025See Chevalier, 532 A.2d at 413 ; Crowell, 613 A.2d at 1181 (rejecting a broad interpretation of Mascaro II).

2025See Chevalier, 532 A.2d at 413 ; Crowell, 613 A.2d at 1181 (rejecting a broad interpretation of Mascaro II).

1995The court concluded that “the holding in Geary itself signals a narrow rather than an expansive interpretation of the public policy exception.” Id. at 918. (citations omitted) The following year, a federal trial court ignored the mandates of Bruffett , and opined that Geary was a “landmark case,” as it established a broad and sweeping exception to the at-will doctrine.