sweeping claim in Michigan

2005Palazzolo, supra at 626-630 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 . [33] However, notice of such regulations *382 should nevertheless be taken into account. [34] In her separate concurrence in Palazzolo , Justice O'Connor explained the importance of notice: As the Court holds, the Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping rule that the pre-acquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction. . . .

2005Palazzolo, supra at 626-630 . 33 However, notice of such regulations should nevertheless be taken into account. 34 In her separate concurrence in Palazzolo , Justice O’Connor explained the importance of notice: As the Court holds, the Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction....

2025See Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 878-879 ; 110 S Ct 1595 ; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Ramirez v Collier, 595 US 411 , 424- 425; 142 S Ct 1264 ; 212 L Ed 2d 262 (2022).

2025See Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 878-879 ; 110 S Ct 1595 ; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Ramirez v Collier, 595 US 411 , 424- 425; 142 S Ct 1264 ; 212 L Ed 2d 262 (2022).

2000Although there is no indication that defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of this procedure, because of the fundamental nature of the right to trial by an impartial jury and the difficulty in examining such claims, prejudice need not be shown. *45 Miller, supra. Thus, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial. [Emphasis in original.] In our previous opinion in this matter, we were constrained by court rule (MCR 7.215[H][1]) to follow this Court’s prior opinion in Colon, supra, and adhere to the sweeping rule of automatic reversal espoused therein, originally derived fro

2000Although there is no indication that defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of this procedure, because of the fundamental nature of the right to trial by an impartial jury and the difficulty in examining such claims, prejudice need not be shown. *45 Miller, supra. Thus, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial. [Emphasis in original.] In our previous opinion in this matter, we were constrained by court rule (MCR 7.215[H][1]) to follow this Court’s prior opinion in Colon, supra, and adhere to the sweeping rule of automatic reversal espoused therein, originally derived fro

1993The United States Supreme Court explained: Thus, a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce [supra at 535 ], "prepare [them] for additional obligations.” [Yoder, supra at 214 .] Although the state asserts that "its interest in its system of compu

1986Citation Omitted.] The Court’s most recent free exercise decision in Bowen v Roy, 476 US —; 106 S Ct 2147 ; 90 L Ed 2d 735 (1986), in which the Court was divided three-two-four, has not overruled or modified the standard of review consistently applied in each of those prior controlling decisions.

1986Citation Omitted.] The Court’s most recent free exercise decision in Bowen v Roy, 476 US —; 106 S Ct 2147 ; 90 L Ed 2d 735 (1986), in which the Court was divided three-two-four, has not overruled or modified the standard of review consistently applied in each of those prior controlling decisions.

1970The Court held the introduction of the evidence illegally seized in 1950 for impeachment permissible because (at p 65 [ 74 S Ct at p 356 ; 98 L Ed at p 507 ]) “defendant went *610 beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes * * * and made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.” There is, however, a serious question as to whether Walder is still good law, 12 or whether the reasoning it was based on is still tenable.

1970The Court held the introduction of the evidence illegally seized in 1950 for impeachment permissible because (at p 65 [ 74 S Ct at p 356 ; 98 L Ed at p 507 ]) “defendant went *610 beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes * * * and made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.” There is, however, a serious question as to whether Walder is still good law, 12 or whether the reasoning it was based on is still tenable.