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15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2010We recognize that our Supreme Court has held "that Article I, Section 8 often provides greater protection since the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct." Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 591 , 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (1997). 2010We recognize that our Supreme Court has held "that Article I, Section 8 often provides greater protection since the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct." Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 591 , 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (1997). | 6 | 8 |
COM. EX REL. BARNES v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court has regularly departed from the United States Supreme Court’s construction of the Fourth Amendment, holding Article I, Section 8 “generally provides greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment, because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2020See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 , 862 n.9 (2018) (“‘Article I § 8 . . . generally provides greater protection . . . because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010)); Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 164 (Pa. 2016) (noting “this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 939 n.10 (Pa. 201 | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen2 sentences2003When examining the text of Article I, Section 8, this Court has repeatedly stated that this constitutional provision embodies a strong notion of privacy, and has held that the section often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because "the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct." Williams, 692 A.2d at 1038 ; see Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897 . 2003When examining the text of Article I, Section 8, this Court has repeatedly stated that this constitutional provision embodies a strong notion of privacy, and has held that the section often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because “the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.” Williams, 692 A.2d at 1038 ; see Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897 . | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Sellgreen2 sentences2000Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 398, 586 A.2d at 897; Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 65 , 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983). 2000Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 398, 586 A.2d at 897; Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 65 , 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Glassgreen2 sentences2006In its Glass opinion, our Supreme Court explained the reason for this divergence in state and federal law: The philosophical divergence ... concerned the purposes of the exclusionary rule originally commanded by Mapp : the U.S. Supreme Court has since come to focus on deterrence of police misconduct, while the more recent Article I, Section 8 eases from this Court have focused on the potentiality of the rule, once embraced by us, to safeguard privacy and ensure that warrants are issued only upon probable cause. 562 Pa. at 199 n. 11, 754 A.2d at 662 n. 11; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 2006In its Glass opinion, our Supreme Court explained the reason for this divergence in state and federal law: The philosophical divergence ... concerned the purposes of the exclusionary rule originally commanded by Mapp : the U.S. Supreme Court has since come to focus on deterrence of police misconduct, while the more recent Article I, Section 8 eases from this Court have focused on the potentiality of the rule, once embraced by us, to safeguard privacy and ensure that warrants are issued only upon probable cause. 562 Pa. at 199 n. 11, 754 A.2d at 662 n. 11; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Valdivia, R., Aplt.green1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 , 862 n.9 (2018) (“‘Article I § 8 . . . generally provides greater protection . . . because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010)); Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 164 (Pa. 2016) (noting “this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 939 n.10 (Pa. 201 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Arter, K., Aplt.green1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 , 862 n.9 (2018) (“‘Article I § 8 . . . generally provides greater protection . . . because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010)); Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 164 (Pa. 2016) (noting “this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 939 n.10 (Pa. 201 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Santiago, A., Aplt.green1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 , 862 n.9 (2018) (“‘Article I § 8 . . . generally provides greater protection . . . because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010)); Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 164 (Pa. 2016) (noting “this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 939 n.10 (Pa. 201 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown , 606 Pa. 198 , 996 A.2d 473 , 476 (2010) ("Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, though similarly phrased, generally provides greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment, because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct."). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2005In considering the history, Russo notes that “this constitutional provision embodies a strong notion of privacy, and has held that the section often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because ‘the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’ ” (Appellant Br. at 10) (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 575 Pa. 447, 463 , 836 A.2d 893, 902 (2003)). 2005In considering the history, Russo notes that “this constitutional provision embodies a strong notion of privacy, and has held that the section often provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because ‘the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’ ” (Appellant Br. at 10) (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 575 Pa. 447, 463 , 836 A.2d 893, 902 (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. DeJohn
green
1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 , 862 n.9 (2018) (“‘Article I § 8 . . . generally provides greater protection . . . because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010)); Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 164 (Pa. 2016) (noting “this Court’s long-standing interpretation of Article I, Section 8 as embodying a strong individual privacy right”); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 939 n.10 (Pa. 201 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2010However, this Court has held that federal jurisprudence, specifically Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (investigatory stop subjecting suspect to stop and limited period of detention requires reasonable suspicion criminal activity is afoot), sets forth the reasonableness standard for Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 2010However, this Court has held that federal jurisprudence, specifically Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (investigatory stop subjecting suspect to stop and limited period of detention requires reasonable suspicion criminal activity is afoot), sets forth the reasonableness standard for Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Pollard
green
2 sentences2007In Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138 , 299 A.2d 233 (1973), a case rendered prior to Mimms II and Wilson, our Supreme Court held that a police officer may not order a passenger out of a car in the absence of an articulated belief that criminal activity is afoot or that the passenger posed a danger to someone's safety. 2007In Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138 , 299 A.2d 233 (1973), a case rendered prior to Mimms II and Wilson, our Supreme Court held that a police officer may not order a passenger out of a car in the absence of an articulated belief that criminal activity is afoot or that the passenger posed a danger to someone's safety. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2003In Edmunds , this Court addressed the question of whether Pennsylvania should adopt the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 2003In Edmunds , this Court addressed the question of whether Pennsylvania should adopt the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). | 1 | 2003–2003 |