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102 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2026 60 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Staceygreen2 sentences2026When imposing a sentence, “[t]he trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). 2026The circuit court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. | 40 | 74 |
People v. Streitgreen2 sentences2025The trial court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). 2025The trial court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). | 17 | 18 |
People v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2025The trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing is afforded great deference because the court, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213 . 2025We will not find that the court abused its discretion unless the sentence is “ ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)); People v. Means, 2017 IL App (1st) 142613, ¶ 14 . ¶ 56 We give great deference to the circuit court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the court, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, “ ‘has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social env | 7 | 26 |
People v. Perruquetgreen2 sentences2025The trial court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). 2025The trial court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). | 6 | 12 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2025People v. Flores, 404 Ill. 2021People v. Flores, 404 Ill. | 6 | 6 |
People v. Ferngreen2 sentences2024Id. at 213 . “ ‘A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the “cold” record.’ ” Id. at 212-13 (quoting People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999)). 2013“A sentence will be deemed an abuse of discretion where the sentence is ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)). ¶ 33 “ ‘A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the “cold” record.’ ” Alexander, 239 Ill. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Goldengreen2 sentences2003People v. Streit, 142 Ill.2d 13, 19 , 153 Ill.Dec. 245 , 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991); see also People v. Golden, 323 Ill.App.3d 892, 905 , 257 Ill.Dec. 280 , 753 N.E.2d 475 (2001). 2003People v. Streit, 142 Ill.2d 13, 19 , 153 Ill.Dec. 245 , 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991); see also People v. Golden, 323 Ill.App.3d 892, 905 , 257 Ill.Dec. 280 , 753 N.E.2d 475 (2001). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Spencergreen2 sentences2021In weighing the factors, “a trial court is not required to give a defendant’s rehabilitative potential more weight in its sentencing decision than it gives the seriousness of the offense. [Citation.] In fact, the seriousness of the offense has been called the most important factor to consider in imposing sentence.” People v. Spencer, 229 Ill. 2021In the weighing of factors, “a trial court is not required to give a defendant’s rehabilitative potential more weight in its sentencing decision than it gives the seriousness of the offense. [Citation.] In fact, the seriousness of the offense has been called the most important factor to consider in imposing sentence.” People v. Spencer, 229 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ethertongreen2 sentences2026The trial court is afforded great discretion when imposing a sentence, because—unlike a reviewing court—it has an opportunity to weigh such factors as “defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 26. 2025The trial court is afforded great discretion when imposing a sentence, because—unlike a reviewing court—it has an opportunity to weigh such factors as “defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427 , ¶ 26. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Schnoorgreen1 sentence2024For these reasons, when a defendant contends that his sentence is excessive, we review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs when the sentence differs greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99 (citing People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 ). ¶ 19 We initially note that the defendant did not preserve this sentencing challenge by filing a written motion to reconsider his sentence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kelchnergreen1 sentence2023See People v. Kelchner, 221 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Quintanagreen1 sentence2022“The seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors such as the lack of a prior record, and the statute does not mandate that the absence of aggravating factors requires the minimum sentence be imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Kelley, 2015 IL App (1st) 132782, ¶ 94 (quoting People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2022“The seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors such as the lack of a prior record, and the statute does not mandate that the absence of aggravating factors requires the minimum sentence be imposed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Kelley, 2015 IL App (1st) 132782, ¶ 94 (quoting People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019Therefore, when a sentence falls within the statutory range, a reviewing court will disturb the sentence “only if the trial court abused its discretion in the sentence it imposed.” People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 373-74 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Snyder
green
2 sentences2026The trial judge is afforded substantial deference in sentencing, because— unlike a reviewing court—it has an opportunity to weigh such factors as “defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . 2025As such, defendant asserts that given the mitigating factors, probation was the option consistent with the ends of justice or, alternatively, a minimum sentence. ¶ 94 The trial judge is afforded substantial deference in sentencing, because—unlike a reviewing court—it has an opportunity to weigh such factors as “defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 . | 5 | 2021–2026 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2025“We presume a trial court evaluates the relevant factors in mitigation before it, and that presumption cannot be overcome without affirmative evidence of the sentencing court’s failure to do so.” People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 150795, ¶ 44 . 2024“We presume a trial court evaluates the relevant factors in mitigation before it, and that presumption cannot be overcome without affirmative evidence of the sentencing court’s failure to do so.” People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 150795, ¶ 44 . | 3 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Geiger
green
2 sentences2025People v. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181, ¶ 27 . ¶ 40 We provide such deference to the trial court because it had “the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). 2024People v. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181, ¶ 27 . ¶ 34 We provide such deference to the trial court because it had “the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). | 3 | 2021–2025 |
People v. McGuire
green
1 sentence2025A court is also required to consider statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation, 10 although the court “need not recite and assign a value to each factor it has considered.” People v. McGuire, 2017 IL App (4th) 150695 , ¶ 38. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Means
green
1 sentence2025We will not find that the court abused its discretion unless the sentence is “ ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)); People v. Means, 2017 IL App (1st) 142613, ¶ 14 . ¶ 56 We give great deference to the circuit court’s judgment regarding sentencing because the court, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, “ ‘has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social env | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Bunning
green
1 sentence2024Accordingly, this court “must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.” Id. (citing Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19 ). ¶ 47 Where, as here, an imposed “sentence falls within the statutory limits, it will not be overturned on appeal absent abuse of discretion.” People v. Bunning, 2018 IL App (5th) 150114, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2023Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Butler
green
2 sentences2021Id. ¶ 113 As the appellate court has explained, this does not mean deciding anew how many years of imprisonment the defendant deserves: - 32 - “It is well established that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and the sentencing decision of the court is entitled to great deference. [Citation.] The trial court is afforded great deference because it is in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence. [Citation.] The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral cha 2021Id. ¶ 113 As the appellate court has explained, this does not mean deciding anew how many years of imprisonment the defendant deserves: - 32 - “It is well established that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and the sentencing decision of the court is entitled to great deference. [Citation.] The trial court is afforded great deference because it is in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence. [Citation.] The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral cha | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Busse
green
2 sentences2020“The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). ¶ 52 “A reviewing court may only reduce a sentence under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 when the record shows that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation.]” People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142 2020“A sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Id. ¶ 53 Given the record in this case, we cannot conclude that defendant’s sentence was an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Knox
green
1 sentence2020When a sentence falls within the statutory range, it is presumed to be proper (People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46 ), and may only be “deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion” where it is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210 . - 25 - No. 1-17-1329 ¶ 67 In this case, defendant’s four-year sentence was within the statutory range for the offense, and in fact, the minimum sentence of incarceration. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.