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15 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Boggsgreen2 sentences2004State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. 2001This Court has previously held that a defendant’s “sentence is not determined by the mathematical process of adding the sum total of enhancing factors present then subtracting from this figure the mitigating factors present for a net number of years.” See State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467, 474 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Ruanegreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 785 (Tenn. Crim. 1998See generally State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 785 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cartergreen1 sentence2009See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 344 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilkersongreen2 sentences2003The [trial court] . . . in considering the enhancing factors, find[s] sufficient proof to sentence consecutively.” However, in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995), our supreme court held that satisfying Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 115(b)(4), by itself, was not sufficient to sustain consecutive sentences. 2003If the defendant is found to be a dangerous offender under the statute, the trial court must also determine whether the sentences imposed are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the defendant, the “Wilkerson factors.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ashbygreen1 sentence2001Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 (d) (1997); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goodwingreen1 sentence1997See State v. Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d 35, 45-46 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009App. P. 39 petition for rehearing asserting (1) that the Court of Criminal Appeals had misclassified him as a Range II offender for his merged aggravated robbery convictions and (2) that the manner in which the Court of Criminal Appeals considered and applied the enhancing factors violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 2004However, Blakely v. Washington calls into question whether or not the enhancing factors used here may be applied. 542 U.S. ___ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. | 4 | 2004–2009 |
State v. Pearson
green
1 sentence1997Eight days later, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded Mr. Goodwin’s case to the criminal court (1) to recalculate his sentence in the manner required by State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1993), (2) to identify the enhancing factors applied to each conviction, and (3) to reconsider the issue of consecutive sentencing. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Gauldin
green
1 sentence1989As this Court stated in State v. Gauldin, 737 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987): The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982 makes it clear that the record of the sentencing hearing “shall include specific findings of fact upon which application of the sentencing principles were based.” T.C.A. § 40-35-209(c). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Moss
green
2 sentences1989A review of the record reveals that the trial judge did not address the purposes of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, 12 the sentencing considerations enumerated in the Act, 13 the mitigating factors that might be present, 14 or the enhancing factors which may also be present. 15 As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn.1986), there is “[a] panoply of statutory provisions [which guide] sentencing courts in the exercise of their discretion.” 727 S.W.2d at 237 . 1989A review of the record reveals that the trial judge did not address the purposes of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, 12 the sentencing considerations enumerated in the Act, 13 the mitigating factors that might be present, 14 or the enhancing factors which may also be present. 15 As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn.1986), there is “[a] panoply of statutory provisions [which guide] sentencing courts in the exercise of their discretion.” 727 S.W.2d at 237 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.