Exxon standard in Texas

2025See Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d at 23 ; Morris, 106 S.W.3d at 755 (concluding testimony of subsidiary’s manager—that subsidiary’s president reported to parent company’s Chief Executive Officer and parent company had right to terminate subsidiary’s president and its safety coordinator if his performance was inadequate—was evidence of parent corporation’s general right of control over subsidiary’s operations but did not meet Exxon standard requiring plaintiff to show that parent company had specific control 30 over safety and security of premises, in particular forklift licensing and safety program); se

2003See Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 23 ; Brooks, 897 S.W.2d at 903 .

2015P. 279; Brown v. Bank of Galveston, N.A., 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). 4 Any performance by Breezevale in reliance on the contract necessarily had to occur between April 3, 1992, the date of the agreement, and mid-April, when Exxon terminated the relationship by letter, because only during this time could Breezevale have reasonably relied on the existence of an agreement. 5 Because the trial court denied Exxon's motion for directed verdict on Breezevale's claim that it had enjoyed a “special relationship of trust and confidence” with Exxon, Exxon conditionally appeals this ruling in the eve

2015P. 279; Brown v. Bank of Galveston, N.A., 963 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.1998). [4] Any performance by Breezevale in reliance on the contract necessarily had to occur between April 3, 1992, the date of the agreement, and mid-April, when Exxon terminated the relationship by letter, because only during this time could Breezevale have reasonably relied on the existence of an agreement. [5] Because the trial court denied Exxon's motion for directed verdict on Breezevale's claim that it had enjoyed a "special relationship of trust and confidence" with Exxon, Exxon conditionally appeals this ruling in the

2003See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227-28 (Tex.1990) (A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted when the evidence is conclusive and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.).

2003See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper , 802 S.W.2d 226, 227-28 (Tex. 1990) (A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted when the evidence is conclusive and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.).

2025See Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d at 23 ; Morris, 106 S.W.3d at 755 (concluding testimony of subsidiary’s manager—that subsidiary’s president reported to parent company’s Chief Executive Officer and parent company had right to terminate subsidiary’s president and its safety coordinator if his performance was inadequate—was evidence of parent corporation’s general right of control over subsidiary’s operations but did not meet Exxon standard requiring plaintiff to show that parent company had specific control 30 over safety and security of premises, in particular forklift licensing and safety program); se

2006See Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex.2005) (Points of error should be liberally construed to fairly and equitably adjudicate the litigants’ rights.).

2006See Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp. , 171 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. 2005) (Points of error should be liberally construed to fairly and equitably adjudicate the litigants' rights.).

2006See Science Spectrum, 941 S.W.2d at 912 ; Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (“It is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding”).

2006See Science Spectrum , 941 S.W.2d at 912 ; Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel.

2006See Science Spectrum, 941 S.W.2d at 912 ; Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (“It is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding”).

2005Fraudulent Concealment Fraudulent concealment defers an action’s accrual period until the plaintiff learns of, or should have discovered, “the *329 deceitful conduct or facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex.1999).

2003Exxon contends that the election doctrine bars Texas Development from recovering against it because Texas Development “elected to pursue the $117,500 [assigned amount] from IRC rather than [Exxon].” An election of remedies has been defined by the Texas Supreme Court as “the act of choosing between two or more inconsistent but coexistent modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts.” Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Company of Dallas, 491 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.1973).

1998McConnell v. Southside School District, 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tex.1993).