Exxon defendant in California

2021As discussed, IORC controlled the refining and processing of the crude oil and natural gas at the refinery (art. 4, § A, ¶ (2)) and NIOC controlled the ‘non-basic operations,’ including housing, medical and health services, and industrial and technical training and education (art. 17, §§ A, ¶ (1), B).” Contrary to [plaintiff]’s assertion the Chevron and Exxon defendants’ predecessors had effective control over the Abadan refinery, the Agreement expressly stated “‘no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time . . . carry out . . . any of the functions’” of exploration, product

2021As discussed, IORC controlled the refining and processing of the crude oil and natural gas at the refinery (art. 4, § A, ¶ (2)) and NIOC controlled the ‘non-basic operations,’ including housing, medical and health services, and industrial and technical training and education (art. 17, §§ A, ¶ (1), B).” Contrary to [plaintiff]’s assertion the Chevron and Exxon defendants’ predecessors had effective control over the Abadan refinery, the Agreement expressly stated “‘no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time . . . carry out . . . any of the functions’” of exploration, product

2021(Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075 [“[T]here is no evidence the Chevron and Exxon defendants operated or controlled the Abadan refinery or the sources of asbestos at the refinery, thereby imposing on them a duty under section 1714 to protect refinery workers like Sabetian from exposure to asbestos.”].) We therefore had no occasion to evaluate whether an exception to section 1714 applied. 30 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the existence of a d

2020The Chevron and Exxon defendants have the better argument.17 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the existence of a duty is not the general rule, but may be found based on public policy considerations.” (Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 921 (Lichtman) [company responsible for maintaining battery backup system for traffic signals owed duty of care to plaintiffs who were injured in traffic collision during power outage in which t

2021As discussed, IORC controlled the refining and processing of the crude oil and natural gas at the refinery (art. 4, § A, ¶ (2)) and NIOC controlled the ‘non-basic operations,’ including housing, medical and health services, and industrial and technical training and education (art. 17, §§ A, ¶ (1), B).” Contrary to [plaintiff]’s assertion the Chevron and Exxon defendants’ predecessors had effective control over the Abadan refinery, the Agreement expressly stated “‘no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time . . . carry out . . . any of the functions’” of exploration, product

2021As discussed, IORC controlled the refining and processing of the crude oil and natural gas at the refinery (art. 4, § A, ¶ (2)) and NIOC controlled the ‘non-basic operations,’ including housing, medical and health services, and industrial and technical training and education (art. 17, §§ A, ¶ (1), B).” Contrary to [plaintiff]’s assertion the Chevron and Exxon defendants’ predecessors had effective control over the Abadan refinery, the Agreement expressly stated “‘no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time . . . carry out . . . any of the functions’” of exploration, product

2021Malekeh failed to raise a triable issue of fact the Agreement created a special relationship between defendants’ predecessors and Khosravan Malekeh contends the Chevron and Exxon defendants (through their predecessor companies) owed a duty to protect refinery workers like Khosravan from asbestos exposure based on a special relationship between the consortium members and the refinery workers arising from the consortium members’ guarantee in the Agreement of the Operating Companies’ “due performance” under the Agreement, relying on Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 (Biakanja) and J’Aire Co

2021(Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075 [“[T]here is no evidence the Chevron and Exxon defendants operated or controlled the Abadan refinery or the sources of asbestos at the refinery, thereby imposing on them a duty under section 1714 to protect refinery workers like Sabetian from exposure to asbestos.”].) We therefore had no occasion to evaluate whether an exception to section 1714 applied. 30 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the existence of a d

2021Duty of care “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner); accord, Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; acc

2021Further, although Agopowicz was designated as the person most qualified for the Exxon defendants, his testimony was not based on personal knowledge of the consortium members’ intent in entering into the Agreement, but his reading of the Agreement.” (Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075, fn. 16.) We similarly reject Malekeh’s reliance on the statement of Chevron’s predecessor to stockholders in its 1964 annual report that “[t]he Iranian oil consortium has operated Iran’s principal oil[] producing, refining, and transportation facilities for the past ten years,” and her reliance on the Exx

2021Duty of care “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner); accord, Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; acc

2021Duty of care “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner); accord, Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 17 The Chevron and Exxon

2021(See Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073, citing Waste Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 105, 110 [“[A] parent corporation is not liable for injuries of a subsidiary’s employee in the absence of evidence establishing a duty owed by the parent corporation to the employee.”].) Here, as in Sabetian, the Khosravans abandoned their alter ego claims during the summary judgment proceedings.

2021(See Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073, citing Waste Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 105, 110 [“[A] parent corporation is not liable for injuries of a subsidiary’s employee in the absence of evidence establishing a duty owed by the parent corporation to the employee.”].) Here, the Irani plaintiffs dismissed their alter ego claims before the summary judgment proceedings. 24 In Sabetian we also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the consortium members had the ability to intervene in refinery management to meet their obligations under the Agreement based on

2021(Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.) 29 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the existence of a duty is not the general rule, but may be found based on public policy considerations.” (Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 921 (Lichtman) [company responsible for maintaining battery backup system for traffic signals owed duty of care to plaintiffs who were injured in traffic collision during power outage in which traffic signa

2021(Sabetian, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075 [“[T]here is no evidence the Chevron and Exxon defendants operated or controlled the Abadan refinery or the sources of asbestos at the refinery, thereby imposing on them a duty under section 1714 to protect refinery workers like Sabetian from exposure to asbestos.”].) We therefore had no occasion to evaluate whether an exception to section 1714 applied. 30 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the existence of a d

2020(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [“a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct”]; accord, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.”].) 28 public.

2020(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [“a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct”]; accord, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.”].) 28 public.

2020(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [“a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct”]; accord, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.”].) 28 public.

2020(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [“a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct”]; accord, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.”].) 28 public.

2021Duty of care “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner); accord, Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 .) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘“a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.”’” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; acc

2021Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1079-1080 .) Under the balancing test articulated in Biakanja and J’Aire, in determining whether a duty of care arises from a contract in favor of a noncontracting party, the Supreme Court considered “[(1)] ‘the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,’ [(2)] ‘the foreseeability of harm to [him],’ [(3)] ‘the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,’ [(4)] ‘the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,’ [(5)] ‘the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,’ and [(6)] ‘the pol

2021Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1079-1080 .) Under the balancing test articulated in Biakanja and J’Aire, in determining whether a duty of care arises from a contract in favor of a noncontracting party, the Supreme Court considered “[(1)] ‘the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,’ [(2)] ‘the foreseeability of harm to [him],’ [(3)] ‘the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,’ [(4)] ‘the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,’ [(5)] ‘the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,’ and [(6)] ‘the pol

2021Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1079-1080 .) Under the balancing test articulated in Biakanja and J’Aire, in determining whether a duty of care arises from a contract in favor of a noncontracting party, the Supreme Court considered “[(1)] ‘the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,’ [(2)] ‘the foreseeability of harm to [him],’ [(3)] ‘the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,’ [(4)] ‘the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,’ [(5)] ‘the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,’ and [(6)] ‘the pol

2009The Trust has the better argument. (1) Although interlocutory orders are generally not appealable, "[i]t is settled that the rule requiring dismissal does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party." ( Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], disapproved on another point in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) This exception to the general rule "better serves the interests of justice to afford prompt appellate review

2009The Trust has the better argument. (1) Although interlocutory orders are generally not appealable, "[i]t is settled that the rule requiring dismissal does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party." ( Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], disapproved on another point in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) This exception to the general rule "better serves the interests of justice to afford prompt appellate review

2009The Trust has the better argument. (1) Although interlocutory orders are generally not appealable, "[i]t is settled that the rule requiring dismissal does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party." ( Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], disapproved on another point in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) This exception to the general rule "better serves the interests of justice to afford prompt appellate review

2009The Trust has the better argument. (1) Although interlocutory orders are generally not appealable, "[i]t is settled that the rule requiring dismissal does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party." ( Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], disapproved on another point in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 171 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) This exception to the general rule "better serves the interests of justice to afford prompt appellate review

1983In the absence of a relevant congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific discrimination against, or burdening of, interstate commerce, we cannot conclude that the States are without power to regulate in this area." ( Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, supra, 437 U.S. 117, 128-129 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 91, 101-102 ].) The Exxon analysis applies with equal force here.

1983In the absence of a relevant congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific discrimination against, or burdening of, interstate commerce, we cannot conclude that the States are without power to regulate in this area." ( Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, supra, 437 U.S. 117, 128-129 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 91, 101-102 ].) The Exxon analysis applies with equal force here.