res adjudicata doctrine in Texas

15 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1896–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
Pierce v. Reynoldsgreen tex · 1959 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1975–2025 2 sentences 2025But that rule is simply “a species of res judicata that prohibits splitting a single cause of action and subsequently asserting claims that could have been litigated in the first instance.” Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 647 (emphasis added); see also Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985) (same); Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) (“The rule against splitting causes of action . . . is simply a branch of the broader doctrine of res adjudicata 1 Commentators likewise frame the rule in terms of whether the legal injury was actionable at the time of the earlier suit. 2024And the rule against claim-splitting, which is a “branch of the broader doctrine of res adjudicata” or claim preclusion, “is for the benefit of and may be waived by the defendant.” Pierce, 329 S.W.2d at 78 .	1	3
Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp.green tex · 2000 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025But that rule is simply “a species of res judicata that prohibits splitting a single cause of action and subsequently asserting claims that could have been litigated in the first instance.” Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 647 (emphasis added); see also Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985) (same); Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) (“The rule against splitting causes of action . . . is simply a branch of the broader doctrine of res adjudicata 1 Commentators likewise frame the rule in terms of whether the legal injury was actionable at the time of the earlier suit.	1	1
Jeanes v. Hendersongreen tex · 1985 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025But that rule is simply “a species of res judicata that prohibits splitting a single cause of action and subsequently asserting claims that could have been litigated in the first instance.” Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 647 (emphasis added); see also Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985) (same); Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) (“The rule against splitting causes of action . . . is simply a branch of the broader doctrine of res adjudicata 1 Commentators likewise frame the rule in terms of whether the legal injury was actionable at the time of the earlier suit.	1	1
City of Lubbock v. Stubbsgreen tex · 1959 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Stubbs, 160 Tex. 111 , 327 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1959), from which this is taken: “Estoppel by judgment extends only to facts in issue as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and does not prevent a re-examination of the same question between the same parties, where, in the interval, the facts have changed, or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the parties. 1970Stubbs, 160 Tex. 111 , 327 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1959), from which this is taken: “Estoppel by judgment extends only to facts in issue as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and does not prevent a re-examination of the same question between the same parties, where, in the interval, the facts have changed, or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the parties.	1	1
Cain v. Balcom Et Ux.green tex · 1937 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1969–1969 2 sentences 1969See Cain v. Balcom, 130 Tex. 497 , 109 S.W.2d 1044 . 1969See Cain v. Balcom, 130 Tex. 497 , 109 S.W.2d 1044 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Nichols v. Dibrell green tex · 1884 2 sentences 1955Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782 ; Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539 ; Stephenson v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 1039 ; Milner v. Schaefer, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 600 (er. den.); Hunt v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist. 1939In Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539 , this was said: “It is well settled that the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive, not only as to the subject matter determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated in the case and which they might have had decided.	2	1939–1955
Davis v. First National Bank of Waco green tex · 1942 2 sentences 1968Bank of Waco, 136 Tex. 36 , 161 S.W.2d 467 , 144 A.L.R. 1 , to support this argument. 1968Bank of Waco, 136 Tex. 36 , 161 S.W.2d 467 , 144 A.L.R. 1 , to support this argument.	1	1968–1968
City & County of Dallas v. Cramer neutral texapp · 1947 2 sentences 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly interfere!? with, but not so (as in City and County oi Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where “Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court.” Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the Sup 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly *377 interfered with, but not so (as in City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where "Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court." Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the	1	1962–1962
Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass green tex · 1914 2 sentences 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly 377 interfered with, but not so (as in City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where "Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court." Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly 377 interfered with, but not so (as in City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where "Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court." Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the	1	1962–1962
Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. v. M. Co. green tex · 1934 2 sentences 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly 377 interfered with, but not so (as in City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where "Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court." Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the 1962Our Supreme Court of course, recognizes the doctrine of res adjudicata and has permitted this prohibitory writ to issue in all instances where the operation of the prior judgment or its execution has been directly 377 interfered with, but not so (as in City and County of Dallas v. Cramer, Judge, Tex. Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 918 ) where "Relator would be left undisturbed, except by the annoyance of the suit, in the full enjoyment of the rights secured by the judgment of this court." Obviously the case of Milam County Oil Mill Co. v. Bass, 106 Tex. 260 , 163 S.W. 577 , was of the latter class; the	1	1962–1962
Harris Realty Co. v. Austin neutral tex · 1940 2 sentences 1959In speaking of the force of a lis pendens notice, the Commission of Appeals has said: “It does not have effect to expand in the slightest degree the general rule, pertaining to the doctrine of res adjudicata, which is to the effect that the judgment in the suit concludes nobody but the parties to the s.uit and those whose succession to the rights of property therein adjudicated are derived through or under one or the other of the parties to the suit,” and then significantly adds, “and which accrued subsequent to the commencement of the suit.” Harris Realty Co. v. Austin, Tex.Com.App., 134 Tex. 1959In speaking of the force of a lis pendens notice, the Commission of Appeals has said: “It does not have effect to expand in the slightest degree the general rule, pertaining to the doctrine of res adjudicata, which is to the effect that the judgment in the suit concludes nobody but the parties to the s.uit and those whose succession to the rights of property therein adjudicated are derived through or under one or the other of the parties to the suit,” and then significantly adds, “and which accrued subsequent to the commencement of the suit.” Harris Realty Co. v. Austin, Tex.Com.App., 134 Tex.	1	1959–1959
Stephenson v. Miller-Link Lumber Co. green texcommnapp · 1925 1 sentence 1955Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782 ; Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539 ; Stephenson v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 1039 ; Milner v. Schaefer, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 600 (er. den.); Hunt v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist.	1	1955–1955
Milner v. Schaefer green texapp · 1948 1 sentence 1955Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782 ; Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539 ; Stephenson v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 1039 ; Milner v. Schaefer, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 600 (er. den.); Hunt v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist.	1	1955–1955
Tadlock v. Eccles green tex · 1858 1 sentence 1955Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 782 ; Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539 ; Stephenson v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 1039 ; Milner v. Schaefer, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d 600 (er. den.); Hunt v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist.	1	1955–1955
Nunn-Warren Pub. Co. v. Hutchinson County green texapp · 1932 1 sentence 1943Co. v. Hutchison County, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 651 , error refused; (2) that it is sufficient to make a collateral attack on an order, if the lack of jurisdiction and lawful authority appear upon the face of the record, which includes not only the orders themselves but also the pleadings upon which they were based, Bearden v. Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 447 ; affirmed Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 1031 ; (3) that, while limitation, laches, neglect, or the doctrine of res adjudicata, might bar an attack upon a merely voidable contract, the rule is otherwise as to one that is inherently void	1	1943–1943
Bearden v. Texas Co. green texapp · 1931 1 sentence 1943Co. v. Hutchison County, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 651 , error refused; (2) that it is sufficient to make a collateral attack on an order, if the lack of jurisdiction and lawful authority appear upon the face of the record, which includes not only the orders themselves but also the pleadings upon which they were based, Bearden v. Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 447 ; affirmed Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 1031 ; (3) that, while limitation, laches, neglect, or the doctrine of res adjudicata, might bar an attack upon a merely voidable contract, the rule is otherwise as to one that is inherently void	1	1943–1943
White v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 green texapp · 1928 1 sentence 1943Co. v. Hutchison County, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 651 , error refused; (2) that it is sufficient to make a collateral attack on an order, if the lack of jurisdiction and lawful authority appear upon the face of the record, which includes not only the orders themselves but also the pleadings upon which they were based, Bearden v. Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 447 ; affirmed Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 1031 ; (3) that, while limitation, laches, neglect, or the doctrine of res adjudicata, might bar an attack upon a merely voidable contract, the rule is otherwise as to one that is inherently void	1	1943–1943
Denison v. Sheppard green tex · 1933 1 sentence 1943Co. v. Hutchison County, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 651 , error refused; (2) that it is sufficient to make a collateral attack on an order, if the lack of jurisdiction and lawful authority appear upon the face of the record, which includes not only the orders themselves but also the pleadings upon which they were based, Bearden v. Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 447 ; affirmed Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 1031 ; (3) that, while limitation, laches, neglect, or the doctrine of res adjudicata, might bar an attack upon a merely voidable contract, the rule is otherwise as to one that is inherently void	1	1943–1943
City of Detroit v. Village of Highland Park green mich · 1915 2 sentences 1943“The doctrine of res adjudicata”, says Corpus Juris, “while technically applying only to decisions in another suit, has, by analogy, been applied with like effect, to decisions in a former stage of the same suit.” 34 C.J. 752, § 1162; Detroit v. Village of Highland Park, 186 Mich. 166 , 152 N.W. 1002 , Ann. 1943“The doctrine of res adjudicata”, says Corpus Juris, “while technically applying only to decisions in another suit, has, by analogy, been applied with like effect, to decisions in a former stage of the same suit.” 34 C.J. 752, § 1162; Detroit v. Village of Highland Park, 186 Mich. 166 , 152 N.W. 1002 , Ann.	1	1943–1943
Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum green tex · 1940 2 sentences 1943Co. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543 , 135 S.W.2d 958 -967. 1943Co. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543 , 135 S.W.2d 958 -967.	1	1943–1943
First Natl. Bk. in Dallas v. Hannay green tex · 1933 2 sentences 1943My dissent is based on the conviction that the majority erred in applying to the instant case the doctrine of res adjudicata, as announced by the Supreme Court in First National Bank in Dallas v. Hannay, 123 Tex. 203 , 67 S.W.2d 215 , and reannounced in Royal Pet. 1943My dissent is based on the conviction that the majority erred in applying to the instant case the doctrine of res adjudicata, as announced by the Supreme Court in First National Bank in Dallas v. Hannay, 123 Tex. 203 , 67 S.W.2d 215 , and reannounced in Royal Pet.	1	1943–1943
Wallace v. State green texcrimapp · 1905 2 sentences 1931If the doctrine of res adjudicata would apply in this character of case, it would also apply in applications to change venue.” The doctrine laid down in Brooks v. State, supra, was expressly approved in Wallace v. State, 48 Texas Crim. 1931Rep., 318 , 87 S. W. 1041 , and Young v. State, 84 Texas Crim.	1	1931–1931
Young v. State neutral texcrimapp · 1918 1 sentence 1931Rep., 318 , 87 S. W. 1041 , and Young v. State, 84 Texas Crim.	1	1931–1931
Inge v. Cain green tex · 1885 1 sentence 1896At the time this rule was first established, a mortgage on the homestead was not absolutely void, and when the homestead right terminated, the mortgage could be enforced; and a deed of trust on the homestead, executed by both husband and wife, conferred authority on the trustee to sell' the homestead, regardless of its use as such; while under the present Constitution it is held that such liens are absolutely void, and cannot be enforced after the property ceases to be homestead (Inge v. Cain, 65 Texas, 75 ); and counsel for appellee contend that, in view of this difference in constitutional p	1	1896–1896

Where else courts name it

TX 15 (1896–2025) NY 12 (1899–1938) FL 12 (1936–2001) CA 12 (1873–1949) PA 12 (1913–1963) GA 11 (1931–1972) MS 8 (1965–2003) KY 8 (1917–1984) RI 7 (1943–2007) SC 6 (1931–2012) ME 6 (1951–1973) NJ 6 (1926–1981) MO 5 (1889–1972) IN 5 (1919–1940) AL 5 (1943–1990) IL 4 (1911–1944) NE 3 (1895–1952) CT 3 (1991–2002) MN 3 (1912–1925) VA 3 (1851–2019) SD 3 (1890–1934) IA 3 (1927–1940) OK 3 (1928–1958) VT 2 (1945–1976) KS 2 (1928–1999) DE 2 (1923–1971) UT 2 (1917–1926) TN 2 (1931–1955) WA 2 (1927–1958) MT 2 (1927–1930) AR 2 (1939–1957)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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